a question of tactics

[ChrisM(armyguy)]

Now i know we all have read accounts of units squaring off toe to toe and the decimation that it had caused, but a question for me is that in the progression of the war, had leaders begun to develop tactics that would better reflect the accuracy of the rifle and speed of loading the minie ball in an offensive situation. Upton's veriation of a napoleonic attacking column had seen success in its use in spotsylvania, and im wondering of any other such instances where tactics a drastically changed from the typical image we get of a line of shoulder to shoulder men advancing against a dug in enemy. The main idea of this is how we should best represent the difference ourselves in terms of how engagements may have occured in a '62 battle versus say a '64-65 engagement. I know from experience that if some change in you tactics will keep you alive longer, that "to hell with the manual"



chris "im in over my head on this one" mattingly

[BrianHicks]

Re: a question of tactics

I think one of the largest change in tactics, is the adoption of trench warfare as a counter to the effectivness of the minnie ball and the rifled musket.

[Wild Rover]

Re: a question of tactics

Chris,
Thre was tremedous change between the battle field actions of troops in 1862 and those in 1864.....just take a look at the formation of CS sharpshooter battalions, the use of heavy skirmish lines, and the tactics Upton utilized.

One could spend about a month talking typing it here....that will be instilled at TGW and I expect that there will be a distinct difference between it and normal bang bangs...

Come to the LR Officer and NCO school next year, this year we focussed on Grand Ta tics and Basic Principals, and I have been speaking to Jerry about doing Tactics evolution for 2005.

Pards,

[1stMaine]

Re: a question of tactics

Comrade Anders,

What you say is very true, but there is one caveat that must be added. Those changes to the existing tactics that were implemented as the war progressed were by and large only done so by veteran regiments. It was a natural evolution for them and represented their maturing and experiences under fire and in various tactical situations.
Green regiments, and even older regiments who had NOT seen combat were pretty much ignorant of these new ways, having not been exposed to them. There was little in the way of training and doctrinal command, and the word about what was working and what was not rarely, if ever, filtered down to any other commands outside of the field army.
Witness, as but one example, the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery at Petersburg. Although already 2 years into their enlistment, they had only seen combat during the overland campaign. During action at Spotsylvania, they needed assistance to extract them from a dificult situation, despite outnumbering the CS forces acting against them. The 17th Maine, who had been told they were needed to help a "Brigade in trouble" (see John Haley's "Rebel Yell and Yankee Hurrah" for more on this affair) arrived on scene, and found the "brigade" was actually the 1st Maine H.A., which was a big as a brigade, in line and manfully exposed, disdaining cover to keep their alignment intact, and blazing away into the area to their front. The 17th spread out and "unmanfully" took all available cover and picked their shots, helping to hold off the attacking CS force and allowing the Mainers to disengage.
That's just one example, but at Petersburg, the 1st Maine H.A. also made their gallant but foolhardy charge and suffered horrible casualties. It was a result of them not knowing any better, and the reson is that the lessons learned were not passed along.
The veterans in the AOP had developed and honed their survival instincts, and modified their tactics and battle drill to reflect what they had learned. What they had NOT done was to help out the newcomers. Those big new regiments that joined the army in the winter of 63-64 would be decimated in the overland campaign, precisely because they spent their time learning the manuals and practicing the drill, unaware that the war they were now fighting was not the war they were trained to fight.
Respects,

[marlin teat]

Re: a question of tactics

As in most facets of ACW studies you must be careful to differentiate between the eastern and western theaters. They were truly fighting different types of war.

Most of the battles that were fought in the east were fought in areas that had been settled for several generations and were (for the time) fairly well populated. With population density, you had large areas that were defoliated by the consumption of wood and large areas under cultivation. This is one of the reasons that Eastern battles were generally fought in and across large fields and the reason that the Wilderness fight was considered such an aberation. The large open areas facilitated the adoption of linear tactics both in the stratigic offense and defense.

In the western theater this was not always the case. North Georgia, for example, had only been settled in the late 1830s and much of the area was wilderness with only a few small clearings under cultivation (ref:Chickamauga, Resaca, Pickett's Mill, Peachtree Creek, et al). Therefore much of the fighting was in the deep woods which turned the combat into "gurrella warfare on a vast scale." This was combat that depended more heavily on skirmish tactics and much of the time linear tactics were impossible.

[BobSullivanPress]

And then there's Franklin...

Hello,

As always, just when I am about to generalize, a glaring fact rears its ugly head. We can all say that by 1864, military folks had learned a hard lesson. Evidently the five generals that paid with their lives in November of 1864 still believed massed assults with troops shoulder to shoulder worked. Or at least they didn't want to feel the wrath of Hood. I don't know what the reason was, but here you have one of the last major battles of the war fought Napoleonic style.

[ChrisM(armyguy)]

Re: a question of tactics

as with anything when it relates to history, people can make a vast generalization ie"the brittish were used to frontal attacks, while colonials would hide behind trees" what im talking of here is those veteran troops and there movements and tactics under fire in an attack and how we are to best portray that.


chris mattingly

[Curt Schmidt]

Re: a question of tactics

Hallo Kameraden!

All of these points and observations are valid...

"what im talking of here is those veteran troops and there movements and tactics under fire in an attack and how we are to best portray that."

1. Much like uniforms, gear, and weapons that are specific to the unit, time, and place being portrayed- IMHO, there is great risk in trying to ascribe or assign a universal textbook, combat tactics, and field execution(s) to a War that can be unique on an "engagement by engagement" basis.
While there are trends and similarities, evolution and development- I do not see much of PEC Rule that could be applied to troops and their combat movements other than on a case-by-case basis.

2. Up to and including some points, even at the EBUFU and H/A level of events- at times the maneuvers, tactics, and movements seem to be fixed and fixated upon "1861 style" (again, if there is such a beastie) rather than Mid War and Late War developments (again, if there is such a beastie)?

Sorry. A good question, but hard or non-existant answers.

Curt-Heinrich Schmidt
Heretic Mess

[ChrisM(armyguy)]

Re: a question of tactics

as i figured, things as this would be on a case by case basis. and for us it would be difficult to portray one weekend a green unit fighting in say early 62 versus a veteran unit fighting in mid 64. the question for me comes from my own personal experience of "there is the army way and then there is the way that works" and usually that is how tactics evolve to begin with. Such as trying to develop a successful way to attack a fortified enemy position, when the atypical methods of attack just produced a long butcher's bill.


chris mattingly

[marine05]

Re: a question of tactics

I'm not sure if it qualifies as a change of tactics, but as the army matured and the units became more battle-hardened some units refused to participate in assaults that they felt were doomed to failure. While some may view this attitude as one of cowardice or shirking, it was a matter of self survival. Many of the regiments had seen hard service, and due to combat casualties and sickness many were down to 1/3 or less of their original size. They had also seen their share of assaults and learned from the ones that worked or the ones that failed. They had learned through bloodletting that a few well entrenched troops could withstand and repulse the determined attack by a larger force and that the attackers paid heavily. This also went up to the brigade and division commanders.

This type of attitude was not unique to the Civil War, during WWII most of the troops used in amphibious assaults were new or older ones filled with replacements as the planners knew that experienced units may not agressively execute the assault.

s/f

DJM