Effective Tactics

[1stMaine]

Re: Effective Tactics

Comrades,

I'll toss into the mix a couple of points.

1.) regarding the 300yd measurement. The modern rifle is no more effective, with a single shot, than any muzzle loading rifle of the period at that range. 300 yards is the EFFECTIVE range of any rifle using iron sights. That's because 300 yards is the range at which an average man can distinguish an individual target and engage him accurately. Beyond 300 yards, again, ON AVERAGE, a man needs optical enhancement to achieve the same results.

Yes, yes, yes, there are always exceptions, and some men will always be able to push the element, but taken as a whole, which they should be, soldiers today and their weapons are limited in effective range by the visual accuity limit of 300 yards.

2.) Keep in mind, regarding mass casualties, that, not only were a large percentage garnered by relatively inexperienced units, but these units will often have been seen to be advancing in columns of divisions, or columns of battalions, presenting a massed front, with depth, to the enemy's rifles.

Tactics of the day initially favoured maneuvering in columns of dicisions or columns of companies, only deploying into line when required to give fire. If assaulting an enemy's position, the better concept was to advance in close column of divisions, brigade in line, in order to both maintain control and cover the ground quickly, with the addition of mass at the point of impact.

To this may be added the known factor of "safety in numbers", inthat the less experienced soldier will take comfort on being in a mass formation, where there are many around him to strengthen his resolve as well as conceal casualties, whereas in line, it's difficult to tell how many are still standing alongside you in your battalion, but your vision can make out ALL of the enemy to your front.

3.) Regarding bayonets. The Surgeon general's report is accurate as to the numbers treated, and should be taken as fact. However, it is misunderstood by many historians who believe the bayonet innefective, or unused, based upon those records. the simple fact is that the SG report only reflects those casualties from bayonets which required hospitalization. Most bayonet wounds were either fatal, or too light to require anything more than initial treatment at the field dressing station.

Thus, although statistically accurate regarding the numbers treated, the SG records are taken out of context when used as a basis for the effectiveness of the bayonet. Far too many letters exist where the writer talks about closing with the enemy and engaing him with "baonets and clubbed muskets", etc.

Respects,

[Kevin O'Beirne]

Re: Effective Tactics

One of the things that Lieutenant Bigelow talks about in his article is the distribution of casualties among units in an action. Kevin's post about Cold Harbor also bears on this. Bigelow uses examples from the Franco-Prussian War to illustrate that the heaviest casualties are at the "critical points" in the action.

I can't argue that heavy casualties will probably occur at "critical points"--whatever that means. Critical in what way?

Anyway, my post about Cold Harbor and mentioning the distribution of casualties among Federal attacking forces was really implying, although not stating, that it was the actions of the attacking units that dictated their casualty rates. The veterans on June 3, 1864 did not press home the attack against well-defended, prepared enemy positions like the less-experienced units did. A great example is given by two regiments at the corps boundary between the Federal Second and Sixth Corps: the 8th New York Heavy Artillery (inexperienced) and the 15th New Jersey Infantry (experienced). The 15th NJ was on the picket line and was directed to join the attack when the main assault (in that area, the 8th NYHA) went forward. The 8th NYHA went in, but had to advance over the supine forms of the 15th NJ who refused to move, having already been shot up on that ground two days earlier. The 15th lost few men on June 3, and the inexperienced 8th NYHA lost nearly 500 men in the assault. Both were on the same ground against the same defenders. Similarly, a half-mile away near the other end of Tyler's brigade (which included the 8th NYHHA), the semi-inexperienced 164th New York lost 155 men in the attack, while the regiment next to them in another brigade, the 14th Connecticut (experienced) lost only a few men on virtually the same ground and defenders.

For what it's worth, the 8th NYHA attacked organized into three battalions with two in front and one in support, so they weren't really stacked up as Tim K discusses above. The 164th New York attacked in, as I can determine, a single line, and got pasted because they actually reached some paort of the Confederate line and engaged in some hand-to-hand combat before being forced to retreat. Their brigade as a whole appears to have attacked as a single line nearly a half-mile long, with a single (300-man) regmient in support.

Summary: the veterans knew how and when to attack fortified positions and the newbies didn't and suffered for it. I hope this isn't a stunning revelation to anyone. :)

[styler]

Re: Effective Tactics

All this talk about casualties (and we're unfortunately mixing dead and wounded without distinction in this discussion) ignores psychological factors. As was mentioned earlier and has been hinted at in several posts, you don't have to kill someone to win the day. The threat of dying could be enough to make him give up his position. As I believe James McPherson has pointed out, firing off all of ones' ammunition towards the enemy from relative santuary could be fight enough to suit a soldier and his comrades if not his officers. That makes fun of some of the statistics we're trying to play with.

[sauguszouave]

Re: Effective Tactics

For what it's worth, one of the first times my friends and I fired our rifle-muskets "live" it was in a competition with some other black-powder groups and it wasn't that big a shake to hit a man-sized target at 300 yards.

Kevin,

That’s pretty good shooting. I agree with H. W. S. Cleveland that a six-inch group at 100 yards shooting off-hand with open sights is very respectable.

“For instance, if a gun is reliable for a six-inch bulls eye at 100 yards, I deem it of trifling consequence whether the average distance of its shots from the central point of that bull’s eye is an inch more or less; for, except with a dead rest, not one man in a thousand but would make a greater variation than that, in firing a series of shots with the most perfect weapon that could be made. This statement will be doubted by very many persons who know nothing practically about rifle shooting, but who entertain a vague idea of the existence of a race of men somewhere “out west,” who can shave off either ear of a squirrel at 100 yards without otherwise injuring him. But any experienced rifleman will call it a superior performance for off-hand shooting with open sights, to put a series of shots into a six-inch ring at that distance, and a moment’s reflection will show that such work is quite nice enough for any sporting service. For it would be pretty certain death to a partridge, which I take it is as small game as any rifleman would ever spend ammunition upon, and there are very few men who would ever shoot at such game at more than half that distance. This assertion will also be scouted by many readers, even among men accustomed to shooting, but it is true, nevertheless, as any ordinary sportsman may convince himself by taking pains to pace the distance of some of his shots at game, which (unless he has been in the habit of making such measurements) he will find is rarely so much as he thinks it is.” (H. W. S. Cleveland, “Hints to Riflemen.” New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864. pp. 200-2001.)

A six-inch group at 100 yards equals an angular width of 1.67 milliradians. The width of a man’s shoulders at 300 yards is 1.85 mils, so if you can hold that group you can reliably hit a man at 300 yards, assuming two things. First you have to be able to see the man. That is not a trivial problem in combat. The US Army Operations Research Office discovered during Project SALVO that the probability of noticing a man standing at 300 yards under field conditions was under 20%. Civil War soldiers made it a little easier by bunching together, and waving flags and yelling, but that still didn’t make it a given that you could see your target.

Secondly, you had to correctly estimate range. As Cleveland points out, and as modern studies have confirmed, even experienced shooters tend to over-estimate range, usually by about 50%. In other words most shooters think a target at 50 yards is at 75 yards, a target at 100 yards is at 150 yards, and a target at 200 yards is at 300 yards. Because the ball drops faster the farther it gets from the gun, correctly estimating range gets more important the greater the range. For example, modern, high-velocity round like a 165 gr. flat based .30” bullet with a muzzle velocity of 2,700 f/s and a max point blank of 225 yards will drop 7 inches from 225 to 300 yards, 16 inches from 300 to 400 yards, 27 inches between 400 and 500 yards, 38 inches between 500 and 600 yards, 52 inches between 600 and 700 yards, 70 inches between 700 and 800 yards, 100 inches between 800 and 900 yards, and 120 inches between 900 and 1,000 yards (the max range of the ladder sight on a M-1855 rifle musket). Unfortunately, the Ordnance Dept report on the M-1855 only gives the ballistic trajectory for 200 yards, so I can’t directly compare the drop on a Springfield to the drop of a modern round. However, it does give the sight elevations for different ranges. To aim at 200 yards, you elevate the sight 4.31 mils. (Milliradians as a unit of angular measure hadn’t been invented at the time of the Civil War. They’re what we use nowadays because the math is easier with them than when using degrees. I had to convert the 1855 Ordnance Dept data into mils.) To aim at 300 yards, you elevate the sight an additional 4.92 mils. To aim at 400 yards you elevate the sight another 5.54 mils. To aim at 500 yards you elevate another 6.76 mils. A 5’ 8” tall man standing at 300 yards is 12.6 mils high. The difference between the 200 yard sight elevation and the 400 yard elevation is 10.46 mils, or almost the height of a man. That’s why it was so easy for an untrained observer who over-estimates range by 50% to overshoot a man-sized target with an accurate gun. The gun’s not the problem.

The stuff I quoted from Cleveland is talking about hunting, but he also talks about military shooting:

“It will be seen that my selection is made solely with reference to sporting service. My ideas with regards to guns for military use may be gathered from preceding pages. From the great variety of opinions I have heard expressed by different officers, I am satisfied that a great deal yet remains to be decided in regard to the most efficient weapon for field service. In precision and range the Springfield rifle seems to answer every possible demand, but theoretically it seems incredible that it should not ere long be superseded by some of the breech-loading arms, which are quite equal to it in those respects, and so far superior in facility of manipulation.” (ibid. p. 215.)

It was less than two years before his prediction was proved right.

Best Regards,

Paul Kenworthy

[neocelt]

Re: Effective Tactics

For what it's worth, one of the first times my friends and I fired our rifle-muskets "live" it was in a competition with some other black-powder groups and it wasn't that big a shake to hit a man-sized target at 300 yards.

Kevin,

With all due respect, how far had you marched (on short rations, with a full field pack and cartridge box full of live ammunition) that morning prior to firing those groups into man-sized targets at 300 yards? And more importantly, were those targets firing back? Makes all the difference...

Cheers,
Nick

[Kevin Hall]

Re: Effective Tactics

Concerning an earlier post referencing ammunition usage one book might come in handy after dusting it off. Livermore's Numbers and Losses which I believe was released in 1959. It lists per engagement the amount of casulties per 1000 and the amount of lead used. Provided my memory is not as dusty as the book which unfortunately is not in front of me. Anyway the point that I would like to make is in regards to ammo usage. Ordinance use was tracked on paper by the issue not a real life count. Just think of all those dropped balls that are found with the metal detectors. In many areas the number of dropped balls is so great that the battle line is easily charted. Long story short just because 10,000 rounds are fired with a low enemy casualty count we might not want to assume that their accuracy was totally horrible when we are comparing it to a ordinance bean counters report.

Kevin Hall's words for the birds

[Kevin O'Beirne]

Re: Effective Tactics

Secondly, you had to correctly estimate range.

I think we properly estimated the range. It was on a rifle range used by the Canadian army, near Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario. Even given the potential for round-off error of converting from S.I. (meters) to English units (yards), I'd say we were pretty danged spot on 300 yards. Shooting was done at ranges of 100 yards, 200 yards, and 300 yards, as marked out by the range master.

Unsolicited Advice: Use shorter paragraphs when you write.

[Bob 125th NYSVI]

Re: Effective Tactics

I think that we are fogging up the effectiveness/range discussion with the concept of individual aiming.

I don't have to see an individual at 300 or 500 yards to kill him because I'm not SHOOTING at an individual.

I am throwing lead at a large target consisting of several hundred individuals that is pretty easy to see on an open field (like Gettysburg or Cold Harbor).

Whoever gets killed/wounded is more unlucky than I am a skilled marksman.

The difference between a smootbore and a rifled musket is that the rifled weapon has the ability to get a round that far down range with a killing velocity. Something a smooth bore doesn't have the ability to do.

Conceptually the aiming part is not significantly different than what an artillery piece is doing. A cannon is not picking out one guy, its picking out a large group of them and throwing a projectile in their direction. Get the aim right and somebody over there is getting hurt.

If we step back a couple of wars, American riflemen were feared not for the amount of rounds they could put out but for their ability to kill individual targets at a signifcantly longer range than the smoothbore. Once things closed up the smoothbore got the upper hand because it could fire faster and take a bayonet.

The beauty of the Minie Ball is that it combined range, accuracy, killing power, rate of fire and the bayonet into one weapon.

[KyCavMajor]

Re: Effective Tactics

I think that we are fogging up the effectiveness/range discussion with the concept of individual aiming.

I don't have to see an individual at 300 or 500 yards to kill him because I'm not SHOOTING at an individual

I am throwing lead at a large target consisting of several hundred individuals that is pretty easy to see on an open field (like Gettysburg or Cold Harbor).

Whoever gets killed/wounded is more unlucky than I am a skilled marksman..

I could agree with the last statement, but I think the effectiveness of the Rifled musket has been overstated versus the smoothbore. Is the rifle inherently more accurate? Of course it is, if properly handled by a well trained soldier. The truth is the number of hits did not jump all that much per rounds fired in the transition to rifles.
Why? No one reason covers it all, some were;
The soldiers were not that well trained.
They were under extreme stress, they were being shot at in return.
The file next to them was bumping in to them, jostling in the ranks
Obscured vision, low hanging smoke, for example
Terrain variations

The difference between a smootbore and a rifled musket is that the rifled weapon has the ability to get a round that far down range with a killing velocity. Something a smooth bore doesn't have the ability to do.

Conceptually the aiming part is not significantly different than what an artillery piece is doing. A cannon is not picking out one guy, its picking out a large group of them and throwing a projectile in their direction. Get the aim right and somebody over there is getting hurt.
..

Some study into the ballistics for the Minnie rifle of that period reveals some interesting facts. They were NOT a high velocity weapon. The Brow Bess produced a Muzzle Velocity of 1500 FPS. For SHORTER distances the Brown Bess shot FLATER than the Enfield. In British test the Enfield produced about 1115 FPS versus the Modern M16 at 3250 FPS. The friction of the rifling slowed the projectile by 33% versus the older smoothbores. Now at distance of course the projectile from a smoothbore will fall off much more rapidly than the one fired from a rifle.
The result of the lower initial velocity of the rifle was a rainbow trajectory that actually had a narrow "Dangerous Space" as the Europeans called it in the period. So that lead to the adjustable rear sight. The problem with an adjustable rear sight is that it requires accurate range estimation by under trained troops in very stressful situations. Add in terrain that was not flat, the odds of you hitting even massed troops. The British found that for a bullet to strike a target at 200 yards it had to be aimed some 21 inches above the line of sight, as opposed to 42 Inches at 300 Yards. What this means is that a bullet aimed at a target at 300 yards will completely miss everybody between 100 and 225 yards or so, going over their heads. A soldier who miss judges distance by as little as 33 feet at roughly 500 yards will miss a ten foot high target.
The upshot was that you were very nearly as likely to miss with a rifled Musket as a smoothbore, one hit in 120 rounds on average, for a smoothbore versus 1 in 100 or so for a rifle.
The adjustment made in tactics was to decrease the DEPTH of the formation, given the above facts the depth of a Column was more susceptible to casualties than a shallower line.

If we step back a couple of wars, American riflemen were feared not for the amount of rounds they could put out but for their ability to kill individual targets at a signifcantly longer range than the smoothbore. Once things closed up the smoothbore got the upper hand because it could fire faster and take a bayonet.

The beauty of the Minie Ball is that it combined range, accuracy, killing power, rate of fire and the bayonet into one weapon.

all that is true, in theory but... the truth is the increased accuracy POTENTIAL of the rifle did not make as big an impact on battlefield casulaties as some suppose.

[Bob 125th NYSVI]

Re: Effective Tactics

Some study into the ballistics for the Minnie rifle of that period reveals some interesting facts. They were NOT a high velocity weapon. The Brow Bess produced a Muzzle Velocity of 1500 FPS. For SHORTER distances the Brown Bess shot FLATER than the Enfield. In British test the Enfield produced about 1115 FPS versus the Modern M16 at 3250 FPS. The friction of the rifling slowed the projectile by 33% versus the older smoothbores. Now at distance of course the projectile from a smoothbore will fall off much more rapidly than the one fired from a rifle.
The result of the lower initial velocity of the rifle was a rainbow trajectory that actually had a narrow "Dangerous Space" as the Europeans called it in the period. So that lead to the adjustable rear sight. The problem with an adjustable rear sight is that it requires accurate range estimation by under trained troops in very stressful situations. Add in terrain that was not flat, the odds of you hitting even massed troops. The British found that for a bullet to strike a target at 200 yards it had to be aimed some 21 inches above the line of sight, as opposed to 42 Inches at 300 Yards. What this means is that a bullet aimed at a target at 300 yards will completely miss everybody between 100 and 225 yards or so, going over their heads. A soldier who miss judges distance by as little as 33 feet at roughly 500 yards will miss a ten foot high target.

I am aware of both the lower velocity of the round and its ballistic arc of the rifled musket.

And in some terrain the soldiers would have a tendency to shoot either high or low.

And there are a lot of factors that go into the ability of a soldier to hit a target (visibility, terrain, distance, individual abilities, etc) now some of those issues are not a factor with smoothbores. The weapon is just not used at a long enough range to be effected by them.

One of the arguments that keep rattling around in my head as very VERY similiar to the points being made here (against the rifle) was the Army's refusal to purchase breechloading magazine type weapons.

The men will waste ammo, their not accurate, etc, etc.

Yet any unit that got it's hands on repeaters was instantly more effective than its rifled musket armed counterparts.

This seems to indicate the Army didn't go in for anything that was 'new' or 'better' that showed up on the market just because. It had to fit a requirement.

The desire of units to trade in their smoothbores for rifled muskets and the Army no longer purchasing quantities of smoothbores seems to indicate to me that the men in the war considered the rifle a superior weapon.

Why would that have been?

At short ranges the stopping power of a .69 is certainly greater than a .58. The rate of fire is similiar (3-4 rounds a miniute). Bayonets go on the end of both.

The only difference between the smoothbore and the rifle is lethal range. How much farther away you can consistantly hit and incapacitate your target?

Did soldiers and officers use it to the max of its capabilities, no but then very few weapons ever have been in their first war. It's long range killing capabilities were signifcant enough and pronounced enough, in the minds of the men who had to fight and win with them, that the rifled musket is what they wanted.

[sauguszouave]

Re: Effective Tactics

I think we properly estimated the range. It was on a rifle range used by the Canadian army, near Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario. Even given the potential for round-off error of converting from S.I. (meters) to English units (yards), I'd say we were pretty danged spot on 300 yards. Shooting was done at ranges of 100 yards, 200 yards, and 300 yards, as marked out by the range master.

I had guessed that you were on a military range. Civilian ranges that long are fairly uncommon.

I'm not doubting that you correctly estimated the range, or more properly, that you knew in advance the actual range. I'm doubting that the soldiers in the Civil War were correctly estimating the range. When you read an AAR where the CO says they opened fire at 300 yards, what is the chance that the enemy was really at 300 yards? You have to train at range estimation to be good at it. Simple shooting is not training at range estimation. Most of the time you can't see your rounds going down range when you shoot a Springfield. Once in awhile the lube catches fire and you get a beautiful spiral tracer, but most of the time you don't even see the hits on targets clearly.

Artillery had an advantage at range estimation because they could frequently see the flight of the shot and the effect of the hit.

Best Regards,

Paul Kenworthy

[1stMaine]

Re: Effective Tactics

Paul,

The problem with artillery is having to compare smoothbores with rifled guns. Not only are they different beasts, bronze versus iron guns, which difference is reflected in the expansion of the barrel during firing, but the types of rounds are different as well.

Rifled rounds are generally percussion fused, whereas smoothbores fire projectiles with times fuses.

Where the rifled gun may, generally, be more accurate, it is hampered by a smaller sized projectile, bursting in a more flat-trajectory cone. The smoothbore has a more arced trajectory, with a larger projectile and bursting sharge, exploding more OVERHEAD and down, rather than straight and down.

Additionally, of there is any sort of solidity to the ground, the guuners of the smoothbores can work their peices to skip the round solid shot across the surface and disrupt massed formations, where the rifled bolts tended to "furrow" the ground and dig in.

Respects,

[KyCavMajor]

Re: Effective Tactics

Yet any unit that got it's hands on repeaters was instantly more effective than its rifled musket armed counterparts..

I think a lot of the newly found effectivness may have been mental outlook as well as technical superiority

The desire of units to trade in their smoothbores for rifled muskets and the Army no longer purchasing quantities of smoothbores seems to indicate to me that the men in the war considered the rifle a superior weapon...

I have no doubt the rifle was in fact a superior weapon, but I think it was not utilized to its fullest capabilities. Thank God considering the huge casualty list the Civil War creatd as it was! The rifle was the weapon of the future, but they were still figuring out haow to use it so the hit pecentage wasn't that much higher than the smooth bore.

[Kevin O'Beirne]

Re: Effective Tactics

When you read an AAR where the CO says they opened fire at 300 yards, what is the chance that the enemy was really at 300 yards? You have to train at range estimation to be good at it.

Either that, or you need to have had a civilian life before joining the army, where perhaps you had a clue about how to estimate distance. Even farmers weren't that bad at such estimations, I'd "reckon". Certainly the engineers and surveyors in the ranks knew how to do it as well as probably lots of other men, including--perhaps--laborers who typically worked in constructiion.

I've never been in the military but I believe I have the ability to estimate ranges; perhaps not spot on, but sufficient enough to know when I'm talking about 200 yards instead of 300 yards, or 100 yards. I will admit I'm not familiar enough with what the average citizen-soldier of the Civil War knew or did not know to say that the "P/E/C" soldier was or was not able to properly estimate distance.

[john duffer]

Re: Effective Tactics

Here's someone that has some experience at this point in the war but still choses the old ways at times. There may be more to tactics and fighting than we armchair generals consider. From "LEE'S LIEUTENANTS", Marse Robert to John Gregg as the Texas Brigade is about to attack at the Wilderness:

“…. When you go in there, I wish you to give those men the cold steel. They will stand and fire all day, and never move unless you charge them.”