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Re: Effective Tactics
I jump in this discussion very late, but made my way through most all of the dialog. Forgive me if I repeat anything already said, but this is my two cents.
I as well as all of you have long considered the significance the rifled musket had during the Civil War as well. I was taught at one time - through the USMC that indeed tactics could not keep up with the technological advances of the rifle, but over time I have reconsidered this as well.
Not that scientifically the rifled musket and minnie ball didn't make a significant difference in the range a bullet could reach out and touch you, but due to the ammo. load of infantry at that time, a commander may be less apt to have you fire at a range that you could potentially miss an individual target.
As Ken pointed out earlier, massing your fire on a specific target -while en masse- could well have created casualties, although not alot, at a much greater distance than muskets, and compounded the psychological stress of conducting an attack. As it was, most of the greater range casualties were inflicted by artillery, but imagine being massed for an attack 450 yards from the enemy's line and receiving a mass fire from a regiment in your front. Even if only five or ten men are hit - this is at a range that you are not normally receiving small arms casualties unless from a sharpshooter. At any rate this wasn't adopted by commanders and probably rightfully so for the simple problem of the ammo. load.
More significant than the rifled musket and minnie ball is the regular use of defensive works as the war wore on. But this in itself has direct correlation to the firle and minnie, as it was a tactical adaptation to the effectiveness and range of the threat. Naturally the defender will recieve fewer casualties as he is protected by breastworks, trees, etc. The attacker is in non-stop motion and likelihood of resupply is low. They fire less and inflict fewer casualties.
I also agree with Ken's assumption that many more wounds could have been reported as saber or bayonet wounds, as reading through the surgeon general's report, it is obvious a large number of the described wounds had to be inflicted by either edged or pointed weapons.
I have traditionally been told that most men had thrown away their bayonets after a while - seeing no use for them because they would never "let a Yank get that close" or what not. But, an 1864 inspection report of Cheatham's Division shows that of the 3,576 effective men for duty, only 505 lacked bayonets. That means - literally - that 6 out of 7 men were still carrying them.
Interesting discussion nonetheless.
Jamie Gillum
I jump in this discussion very late, but made my way through most all of the dialog. Forgive me if I repeat anything already said, but this is my two cents.
I as well as all of you have long considered the significance the rifled musket had during the Civil War as well. I was taught at one time - through the USMC that indeed tactics could not keep up with the technological advances of the rifle, but over time I have reconsidered this as well.
Not that scientifically the rifled musket and minnie ball didn't make a significant difference in the range a bullet could reach out and touch you, but due to the ammo. load of infantry at that time, a commander may be less apt to have you fire at a range that you could potentially miss an individual target.
As Ken pointed out earlier, massing your fire on a specific target -while en masse- could well have created casualties, although not alot, at a much greater distance than muskets, and compounded the psychological stress of conducting an attack. As it was, most of the greater range casualties were inflicted by artillery, but imagine being massed for an attack 450 yards from the enemy's line and receiving a mass fire from a regiment in your front. Even if only five or ten men are hit - this is at a range that you are not normally receiving small arms casualties unless from a sharpshooter. At any rate this wasn't adopted by commanders and probably rightfully so for the simple problem of the ammo. load.
More significant than the rifled musket and minnie ball is the regular use of defensive works as the war wore on. But this in itself has direct correlation to the firle and minnie, as it was a tactical adaptation to the effectiveness and range of the threat. Naturally the defender will recieve fewer casualties as he is protected by breastworks, trees, etc. The attacker is in non-stop motion and likelihood of resupply is low. They fire less and inflict fewer casualties.
I also agree with Ken's assumption that many more wounds could have been reported as saber or bayonet wounds, as reading through the surgeon general's report, it is obvious a large number of the described wounds had to be inflicted by either edged or pointed weapons.
I have traditionally been told that most men had thrown away their bayonets after a while - seeing no use for them because they would never "let a Yank get that close" or what not. But, an 1864 inspection report of Cheatham's Division shows that of the 3,576 effective men for duty, only 505 lacked bayonets. That means - literally - that 6 out of 7 men were still carrying them.
Interesting discussion nonetheless.
Jamie Gillum
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