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**Iron Scout** · 01-26-2004, 09:18 AM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Greg,

Thanks for posting this most interesting information. I think your hypothesis is correct in that a blockade runner's first order of priority was profit. I've searched manifests from Charleston and the Charleston Mercury and was shocked by the sheer number of commercial goods being brought in for resale. The Relic Room also has some records concerning this you may want to tap into. Stephen Wises' book on blockade running may also be a resource. Keep it coming, great stuff.

Regards,

Neill Rose
PLHA
Love & Wienges

**SCTiger** · 01-26-2004, 10:48 AM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Thanks Neil:

I appreciate your support of my post. I have often heard many lame excuses that "this just arrived from the blockade runners" to justify imported gear among living historians/reenactors without any solid research or paper trail to back it up. Concerning the 100 English uniforms for sale, that advertisement ran for 6 weeks during the winter of 1864.

I haven't convinced many of my brethren yet but, I am very convinced that imported uniforms and gear were less common from December 1863 to May of 1865. The Confederate clothing bureaus and depots were making plenty of uniforms and did not have to pay for the exorbitant BR prices, the same could be said for the powder, ammunition, infantry, artillery and cavalry equipment.
They had to switch to painted cloth accouterments, not for any lack of leather, only because they couldn't afford the stuff. Same theory for the home made comforters versus imported foreign blankets.

An account of the wrecking of the blockade runner "Presto" on February 12th, 1864 at Fort Moultrie details the contents of the steamer whe she ran a ground. Confederate soldiers and local ladies were risking their lives under Union naval fire to salvage the fancy goods, cases of champagne, smoked salmon, civilian shoes, taffeta dresses etc. Two Charlestonian women lost their lives along with several soldiers.

I think it's quite a stretch to suppose that every item that was imported made its way to the common soldier. I don't believe it's PEC for every reenactor to have imported knapsacks, accouterments, uniforms, weapons etc. One could make a stronger case that the homespun and CSA arsenal items were more prevelant than any fancy European goods. It was simple matter of economics, the price wasn't right, so it sat in the warehouses and on the docks . Lots of ships made it through the blockade on a regular schedule. The CS government and states just didn't have the gold bars to buy it.

**Vuhginyuh** · 01-26-2004, 11:25 AM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Many docks were privately owned as were the shipyards and the running craft.
Importation of goods was a necessity as well as luxury before, during and after the war.

State, Navy and central government owned runners did carry many domestic goods.

One can certainly agree with the distaste for some private owners and Captains forfeiting badly needed heavy military goods for high-end domestic goods. This brings to mind the rich-get-richer and poor-mans-fight arguments. But as exotic as many of these imported items sound, they were needed.

Perhaps gouging is a greater crime than meeting the needs of natural supply and demand.

Now the contributions of the running fleet cannot be discounted. The blockading fleet was formidable and the runners did their best. During the war, 130 vessels were lost; wrecked, captured, or destroyed while trying to run the blockade at Wilmington alone. This resulted in an estimated loss of one million cubic feet of cargo. This does not include the loss of life.

Blockade running did remain highly profitable despite being highly dangerous. Enough so that The Clerk of the Confederate War Office stated that, "About one in every four steamers is captured by the enemy. We can afford that."
During the period from January 1863 to October 1864, the estimated export trade of Wilmington was estimated to be well over sixty-five million dollars. Imports lagged behind exports simply because the return journey into southern ports was more perilous than the outward trip.

The gold standard in the Confederacy was never established. Trade with foreign nations that had this gold advantage upped the Condeferacy's stock so to speak. The southern mercantile system was building itself on profits from free and open trade. Profits that bought gold!
Running the blockade with gold to build the standard ( again, gold bought with free-trade profits and tariffs) is perhaps the best reason for the Confederate government to engage in such reckless activities.
The federal government thought enough of this venture that it was worthy of a complete blockade of all southern ports.

It is also easy to forget that during war life goes on�.again there was demand for these goods.

These vessels were unarmed. They attempted to make entry with many needed goods while avoiding both the blockading squadron and the treacherous coastline itself, usually at night and without lights. But to support your argument, people will do anything for money.

An early privately-funded blockade runner Columbia was captured with Austrian 6-pounder Howitzers on board. Here is a brief of her capture and abstract of her holdings.

U.S.S. SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Key West, August 6, 1862

Sir: I have the honor to report the capture of the Steamer Columbia,
on the 3d of August, by the Santiago de Cuba, cruising off the N.E.
Providence Channel. The Columbia was captured after a chase of six
hours, in latitude 28[degrees] N., longitude 76 [degrees] 35" W., the N.E. end of
Abaco bearing south, distant 75 miles. She had left Nassau the day
previous, ostensibly bound for St. Johns; was under British colors,
but had no register whatever.
She was loaded with contraband and munitions of war, cannon,
rifles, powder, shell, cartridges, army blankets, and iron plates. She
is a new, fast propeller, of iron, provided with ports, and probably
intended for a Confederate gunboat. This is her first attempt at run-
ning the blockade, and she had on board Charleston, Savannah, and
Bahama pilots. Her captain, officers, and passengers claim generally
to be British subjects.
Thinking these facts justified a seizure, I took possession of and
sent her into this port for adjudication, under charge of a prize master
and crew.
I send herewith a list of officers and men belonging to the Santiago
de Cuba at the time of the capture, no other vessel of war being in sight.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D.B. Ridgely,
Commander, U.S. Navy

Hon. Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

**DougCooper** · 01-26-2004, 02:29 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Risk = Reward

The obvious economics of blockade running support the notion that if I have an excellent chance of not making it (100% loss on 1 of 4 trips), I had better have the most profitable stuff on board to make it worth that risk....and blankets and guns don't get it.

It might be fascinating to try to figure out what % of manifests were war material vs luxury goods at each port or region. What you may find is that the Gulf ports, esp western gulf, may have had a higher pct of useful war goods than the presumably more affluent Atlantic ports such as Wilmington.

It would also be useful to know how the individual states influenced this behavior. The Governor of NC is well known for taking care of his troops - maybe NC contracted for more luxury goods vs uniforms and such...because he didn't need it. Texas on the other hand was highly dependent on imported wool cloth...and earlier than most other areas based on shipments of BG kersey coming in 1862.

and....politicians like to get re-elected. A bit Machiavellian perhaps but it would not be crazy to make sure that your friends had a steady supply of European goods with you identified as the guy who makes it happen.

The other big part of this is the obvious - the European firms who were dependent on the US markets to an extent had to survive once war began and wanted to maintain those markets. If I feel that a couple of hundred cubic feet of guns and saltpeter per ship can buy favor with the CS govt (and protection for the runner) while still maintaining the market in luxury goods, that is a good business decision. There was probably a very detailed square foot formula worked out that pushed the evelope toward profit that was constantly being re-evaluated.

Just speculation of course - requires a full blown effort to sort all this out. Sounds like the info is there though. Great thread!!!

**Vuhginyuh** · 01-26-2004, 03:17 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Trade on the seas has always differed from interstate trade, the laws, ownership and exchange are governed by international admirility acts.

If a runner carried 2000 muskets that weighed, say, 18,000 pounds and two tons each of lead and iron plus another 500 pounds of gold or silver she would be riding high in the water with plenty of room for other non-contracted goods. No captain, even today, will leave a port with room in his holds to spare. They were loaded in many occasions with what ever a market could sustain. She certainly would not stay in port waiting for contracts to be bid then filled if she had another scheduled weigh.
A train could just drop a car or two. Ships have to load and move in the most economical fashion.

AND YES SIR, Wilmington, New Orleans and Charleston certainly can be catagorized as ''different'' places. The life in these urban centers was far different than the subsistance farms of the Tidelands,Piedmont and foothills. They relished the contact with the outside world and I think they fancied themselves to be in the league of London and Paris, already international cities.
These exotic goods were consumed locally by the Victorian upperclass and bourgeois daily.

I have mixed emotions about the role of the Vance. In the War of 1812, I think he would have been described as a privateer rather than the profiteer as we see him as.
I don't think a boy from Wayne County NC dieing in the dark with a hole in his belly cared too much about where his jacket came from, and I doubt seriously that he was no less a Confederate becase he was from an eastern state.

We are all forgetting ''King Cotton'' in this.

Lastly,In mercantilism the exports need to outweigh the imports by at least a third to suceed and again this is based a stable reserve of gold and silver,something the south never had.

**Michael Comer** · 01-26-2004, 03:18 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

I don't think there has ever been any doubt that greed and avarice was the main fuel of the blockade runner. Why, even old Rhett Butler would agree with that! :)

However, I don't think we should completely rule out the possibility of a decent quantity of military stores being run through also. The Confederacy did have representatives making purchases in overseas markets for war material. And we do know about the Tait uniforms and other British cloth coming in to the South so something was happening. And those Enfields were coming from somewhere besides battlefield pick-ups and captured arsenals.

I am not saying that the South could not have made its effort without blockade runners because I do not think they brought in enough to make them indispensable. However, I also don't think that perusing newspaper ads will give you an idea of what was coming in for military use. It would not be common practice to put an advertisement in the paper about military stores arriving in a port I would think because they were not going to be available to the general public. Plus, why let your enemy know about it?

**Vuhginyuh** · 01-26-2004, 03:24 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Greg, great topic.

I'll bet many boys laid cold and wet in the line at night and wondered some of the same things. ''Why Me'' or "Why not them"

Thanks

**Barclay** · 01-26-2004, 04:55 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Greg,

Excellent post. I am intriuged by your theory on CS usage of European (primarily British) uniforms and equipment in late 1863 through 1865. I enjoy reading new thought provoking takes on interpretation of CS material culture.

I have examined the original shipping and receiving logs of the Richmond Depot at the National Archives in Washington DC. One of the receiving logs contains extensive inventory of items received by the Richmond Depot from English blockade runners. The amount of British uniforms, cloth, equipment, and related military supplies is truly staggering.

I do not have a transcript of the entire log, but I do have a partial transcript of some of the blockade runner inventory sheets that the Richmond Depot had sent to it from Wilmington in the Fall 1863 through Spring 1864 time frame. I will try to dig it up in my research files and see if I can post it.

YOS,
Bret Sumner

https://www.wythegrays.org

Originally posted by SCTiger

Thanks Neil:

I appreciate your support of my post. I have often heard many lame excuses that "this just arrived from the blockade runners" to justify imported gear among living historians/reenactors without any solid research or paper trail to back it up. Concerning the 100 English uniforms for sale, that advertisement ran for 6 weeks during the winter of 1864.

I haven't convinced many of my brethren yet but, I am very convinced that imported uniforms and gear were less common from December 1863 to May of 1865. The Confederate clothing bureaus and depots were making plenty of uniforms and did not have to pay for the exorbitant BR prices, the same could be said for the powder, ammunition, infantry, artillery and cavalry equipment.
They had to switch to painted cloth accouterments, not for any lack of leather, only because they couldn't afford the stuff. Same theory for the home made comforters versus imported foreign blankets.

An account of the wrecking of the blockade runner "Presto" on February 12th, 1864 at Fort Moultrie details the contents of the steamer whe she ran a ground. Confederate soldiers and local ladies were risking their lives under Union naval fire to salvage the fancy goods, cases of champagne, smoked salmon, civilian shoes, taffeta dresses etc. Two Charlestonian women lost their lives along with several soldiers.

I think it's quite a stretch to suppose that every item that was imported made its way to the common soldier. I don't believe it's PEC for every reenactor to have imported knapsacks, accouterments, uniforms, weapons etc. One could make a stronger case that the homespun and CSA arsenal items were more prevelant than any fancy European goods. It was simple matter of economics, the price wasn't right, so it sat in the warehouses and on the docks . Lots of ships made it through the blockade on a regular schedule. The CS government and states just didn't have the gold bars to buy it.

**Vuhginyuh** · 01-26-2004, 05:29 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

I think one key feature of this has been overlooked, the consumption of military goods.

It matters little if it is in action or just a long winter camp, forty thousand soldiers in one place need a mountain of issue every day.
Armies by their nature consume and destroy. Battle devours.
When an campaign is in question you supply with reliable property, then re-supply and again if needed, without concern for it�s origin. That is the need.
But could the states really keep up with the demand? As (self)sufficient as NC was, it reached a critically low level of supply in the summer of �63. Supplemental procurement and issue was essential.

We will never read �We have enough rifles and food, don�t make or send us anymore.� Certainly Washington (DC) would not shy away from the purchasing and issuing of Enfields. This fact certainly does not discount the role of the U.S. Arsenals.

I don't know about the tinned pheasant and wine.

**Barclay** · 01-27-2004, 06:17 AM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Greg,

Can you list the sources you consulted? If you looked at advertisements, you have to realize the audience was for the general public, and not the Confederate Quartermaster Department.

There is extensive CS QM documentation at the National Archives that hundreds of thousands of uniforms, blankets, shoes, accoutrements, etc. made it through the blockade into CS ports (primarily Wilmington) and then the cargo was shipped via rail to the CS depots.

Advertisements in the newspapers will not reflect this cargo - rather, it is showing the items left for sale to the general public. The small quantity of uniforms is no doubt for officers, because until late 1864, officers were required to purchase their own uniforms. In fact, Quartermaster Lawton banned officers from drawing or purchasing uniforms or fabric from the CS Depots just after Lawton took over as QM after his predecessor Meyers was sacked. This order was not rescinded until late 1864 when line officers were allowed to draw clothing from the QM issues in the field.

Thus, it is my opinion that these newspaper adds are not meant as a complete cargo manifest of military goods.

Also, even with the massive quantities of English imports, Civilian clothing drives for the CS armies was quite commonplace throughout the war.

Not trying to pick a fight, just trying to engage in dialog. I do agree that the profits and profiteering were the primary motivation of the blockade runners and also that there was a disparity in the importation of consumer goods skewed towards the wealthy.

YOS,
Bret Sumner

**SCTiger** · 01-27-2004, 01:34 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Brent:

Not a fight at all. I love to disagree on this matter and I welcome a civilized debate. I am simply looking at the economics of the sutuation. Granted gear did make it to the docks of Charleston, Wilmington and Savannah. So how did the South pay for the gear after their gold and cotton reserves were depleted? Did those cargoes eventually work their way to the CSA Army or did they sit on the shelves? Although many BR's imported military gear, I don't believe this was their primary profit motive. I typed all through lunch on a rebuttal, then the lights went out.

My sources are Augusta newspapers and individual accounts spread throughout my library. The Chronicle and Sentinel is one. I have also found excerpts from Bern Anderson's "By Sea and River The Naval History of the Civil War." that reflect this theory. I will retype a mass of his conclusions tonight.

**SCTiger** · 01-27-2004, 01:48 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Also I don't feel that my accounts are "speculation", there are plenty of period accounts that state blockaded goods were expensive, hard to get and super rare and I seriously doubt that the Confedracy bought everything they imported.

A whole shipment of Mercede-Benz's could have arrived in Augusta today and the current U. S. Army might have bought a fleet of them, but you won't find me driving one.

**Barclay** · 01-27-2004, 01:50 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Greg,

I look forward to the additional information.

Regarding your inquiries on Confederate financing - you raise very good points. Financing was a constant source of difficulty, and there was also a CS foreign purchasing agent scandal in 1863 - leading to even more problems because foreign contractors did not want to do business with corrupt CS purchasing agents.

Most of the finance issues you raise are addressed in the Wise, Wilson, and Goff secondary sources that I provide citation for in my other thread.

best regards,
Bret (no "n") Sumner

Originally posted by SCTiger

Brent:

Not a fight at all. I love to disagree on this matter and I welcome a civilized debate. I am simply looking at the economics of the sutuation. Granted gear did make it to the docks of Charleston, Wilmington and Savannah. So how did the South pay for the gear after their gold and cotton reserves were depleted? Did those cargoes eventually work their way to the CSA Army or did they sit on the shelves? Although many BR's imported military gear, I don't believe this was their primary profit motive. I typed all through lunch on a rebuttal, then the lights went out.

My sources are Augusta newspapers and individual accounts spread throughout my library. The Chronicle and Sentinel is one. I have also found excerpts from Bern Anderson's "By Sea and River The Naval History of the Civil War." that reflect this theory. I will retype a mass of his conclusions tonight.

**SCTiger** · 01-27-2004, 03:06 PM

Re: Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Here we go. Although I found this in my local library. I didn't use it as the basis of my original thread. Since we are going to use secondary sources, I will cite it.

Bern Anderson "By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War."
1962. Da Capo Press

Quote: Page 218

Profit was the motive that built up the system of blockade running. The inbound cargoes consisted mainly of luxury goods- French wines, brandies, silks and similar items which found a ready market in the South. The cargo was auctioned in port and was brought up by speculators. Cotton costing six to eight cents per pound was then loaded for the outward run. It brought increasingly high prices inh Nassau or Bermuda, from twenty-five cents to as much as a dollar a pound at one stage. Most of the blockade runners granted a portion of their cargo space to the Confedrate government, but several public agencies found it necessary to own or have an interest in some ships.
Greed often limited the amount of cargo space alloted to the government, but this was put under strict regulation early in 1864.

Page 221 Union records show that over 1,400 ships and crafts were captured or destroyed while engaged in blockade running, 295 of them steamers.

"Abuses and regulation"

The cost of the operation ran high, reflecting in part at least the risk involved.
A captain or pilot got as much as $5,000 in gold for a single round trip and a seaman received $150 per month with a bonus for a successful trip. Freight rates were correspondingly high, ranging from $300 to $1000 per ton. By the middle of 1863, when organized blockade running was at or near it's peak, the monthly expenses of a typical runner were about $80,000. If it made two succesful round trips it stood to gain $170,000 from cotton, other freight and passengers.

With such large and fast profits as a motive , the
inbound cargo consisted of goods which commanded the highest prices in southern ports. The needs of the Confederacy became secondary except in ships operated by Fraser and Company or for the Confederate government. Since payment for goods was demanded in gold or cotton, the blockade-running trade made a substantial contribution to the inflation which plagued the Confederate economy.

The very high prices which the scarce goods brought denied them to all but the wealthy and those in favored positions. Visitors to Charleston or Fort Fisher during this time wrote of what was jokingly reffered to as a "blockade dinner", with ample food and fine wines. In constrast to such glimpses of luxury the diaries of many Southern women reveal the hardships caused by the blockade; they mention doing over old dresses, weaving homespun cloth or improvising substitutes for coffee and tea. Their moving descriptions vivdly reveal the lack of what had been normal daily necessities but which had not been produced in the South. Adequate supplies of such materials were simply not coming into the country and could no tbe found. One captain realized a fantastic profit on his account of a chance shipment of a few boxes of common yellow soap.

Page 226:

the demand for essential as well as luxury goods was far greater in the South during the Civil War than for liquor during prohibition. It was this demand and the huge profits to made that to be made from staisfying it that attracted the speculators and produced the specialized blockade runners, Except for the naval officers that commanded the government-operated runners there was litte patriotic motive in this activity .

page 230

The best index of the effect of the blockade on the South is what happened to the Southern economy. By insisting on being paid in gold for their imports, the blockade running companies helped to drain the Confederacy's slim gold reserves and reduced it to trade by barter, with cotton as the principal medium. But even the substantial amount of cotton run out through the blockade was but a fraction of prewar exports

Cotton plantings were greatly reduced in the war years, and in April 1863 Jefferson Davis issued a plea for the people to grow food instead of cotton and tobacco. For this and other reasons there was much less cotton to export, but with the Southern economy geared to this staple, the Union blockade did deal it a crippling blow.

Not only cotton but the entire economy of the South was directly affected by the blockade. Ordinary necessities of life such as shoes, clothing and housewares were unobtainable except at prohibitive prices.

In the early years of the war a substantial quantity of arms ammunition was run through the blockade, and the Confederate Army was adquately armed, at least until the final few months of the war. The lion's share of the credit for this must go to Brigadier general Josiah Gorgas, Chief of Army Ordnance, who performed a miracle in the field by building and operating aresenals in the South. His diary reveals the difficulty of obtaining machinery and equipment and his concern whenever a blockade runner was lost.

End Quote"

So we have two type of runners, the govenrment owned and operated to include the Fraser and Company and the specialized BR's . A government owned or operated ship would have been loaded to deck with military stores.
The civilian specialzed BR was more likely to carry a token amount of military goods to satisfy the CSA regulations, but according to Anderson was more than likely to carry luxury goods.

I will provide further accounts, but it seems to me that the Union did capture a lot of the Confederacy's ships, if the 1400 captured claim is correct.

With the prices being charged and the lack of gold/cotton available, the ships that were captured and the events on the homefront, it's not much of a deduction that imported goods were hard to come by. One example of "speculation" is assuming that any goods at the ports, quatermaster warehouses, depots and arsenals were automatically sent to the troops in the field. The internal logistics are another ripe topic field. Just because the stuff made it from point A to B, doesn't mean that it automatically made it to C.

Greg "Historical Speculator" Deese

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Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

Deprivation in a land of plenty CSA 1863-65

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