Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

[Dale Beasley]

Gentlemen, I yield my post to COL HORNE, 377th Theater Support Command, Command Chaplain

To All Who Have Responded to Our Question,

Gentlemen, we who are deployed in this very hot theater of war (hotter, I daresay, than even the Vicksburg or Petersburg lines or in the countless Union vessels standing blockade in the summer calm) do thank you for your help in solving our little conundrum about Gen’l Lee’s rank insignia. You have brought us interesting suggestions to think about, but more than that, some comradery and solidarity with us on station in the Persian Gulf region. For this we are most appreciative.

But we beg your help on another matter that interests us at this time – a judgment call, so there may be more than one good answer.

The events of April 2004 in Iraq included a major increase in interdiction of supply lines and attack on convoys – enough to change Coalition re-supply patterns, create some local shortages, and divert combat troops to the priority of protecting the logistics base. It was enough to delay the rotation of forces, ( of which LTC Beasley and I were highly engaged) and called many back into the fight who had turned over their mission to other units and were processing to leave the theater. We of the current impromptu roundtable are looking for some parallels from the War Between the States to help us think through our current situation.

OUR NEW QUESTION: What action, be it raid, or feint, maneuver or battle, aimed at the Army’s logistical support of either the North or the South, had the greatest effect or success in diverting forces and altering the opponents’ campaign strategy or operational freedom? Said another way, what attack or threat on the enemy’s supply base had the greatest effect on that enemy commander’s thinking and dispositions? I suppose we would like to identify the best candidate from the Union effort and the best candidate from the Confederate forces. What say you?

We are chewing on this one ourselves, but we thought we would make use of the erudition and experience of any who wish to help us.

HORNE
377th Theater Support Command
Command Chaplain

[K Bartsch]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

Gentlemen, I yield my post to COL HORNE, 377th Theater Support Command, Command Chaplain

To All Who Have Responded to Our Question,

Gentlemen, we who are deployed in this very hot theater of war (hotter, I daresay, than even the Vicksburg or Petersburg lines or in the countless Union vessels standing blockade in the summer calm) do thank you for your help in solving our little conundrum about Gen’l Lee’s rank insignia. You have brought us interesting suggestions to think about, but more than that, some comradery and solidarity with us on station in the Persian Gulf region. For this we are most appreciative.

But we beg your help on another matter that interests us at this time – a judgment call, so there may be more than one good answer.

The events of April 2004 in Iraq included a major increase in interdiction of supply lines and attack on convoys – enough to change Coalition re-supply patterns, create some local shortages, and divert combat troops to the priority of protecting the logistics base. It was enough to delay the rotation of forces, ( of which LTC Beasley and I were highly engaged) and called many back into the fight who had turned over their mission to other units and were processing to leave the theater. We of the current impromptu roundtable are looking for some parallels from the War Between the States to help us think through our current situation.

OUR NEW QUESTION: What action, be it raid, or feint, maneuver or battle, aimed at the Army’s logistical support of either the North or the South, had the greatest effect or success in diverting forces and altering the opponents’ campaign strategy or operational freedom? Said another way, what attack or threat on the enemy’s supply base had the greatest effect on that enemy commander’s thinking and dispositions? I suppose we would like to identify the best candidate from the Union effort and the best candidate from the Confederate forces. What say you?

We are chewing on this one ourselves, but we thought we would make use of the erudition and experience of any who wish to help us.

HORNE
377th Theater Support Command
Command Chaplain

US: On the operational level, the obvious answer was the Federal blockade of the southern coast, control of its major rivers and accompanying threats to the Confederacy's ports.

CS: Again, on the operational level, probably the CS cavalry raids and interdiction campaigns conducted at different times and places by Stuart, Morgan and Forrest.

I'll leave the tactical level to someone else...opinions will probably vary widely.

Cordially,

Cordially,

[coffee boiler]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

Moby's activities in the Shenandoah valley.

[Tom Ezell]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

OUR NEW QUESTION: What action, be it raid, or feint, maneuver or battle, aimed at the Army’s logistical support of either the North or the South, had the greatest effect or success in diverting forces and altering the opponents’ campaign strategy or operational freedom? Said another way, what attack or threat on the enemy’s supply base had the greatest effect on that enemy commander’s thinking and dispositions? I suppose we would like to identify the best candidate from the Union effort and the best candidate from the Confederate forces. What say you?

We are chewing on this one ourselves, but we thought we would make use of the erudition and experience of any who wish to help us.

LTC B:

For a southern outlook, I would look no farther than the Magnolia State, and Earl Van Dorn's raid on the Federal base cluster at Holly Springs, Mississippi in the early spring of 1863. Losses here pretty much stopped Grant's overland campaign against Vicksburg, and forced the Feds to restructure their supply routes along the Mississippi.

Significantly, this was Earl Van Dorn's greatest victory. And being the sort of fellow who could make Gideon Pillow look like a military genius, the most significant thing that the Holly Springs Raid taught Sam Grant was that he could subsist his army off the Mississippi countryside without the need for traditional lines of supply... something he would remember and put to use at the end of the following April.


For a Union example, I would offer Grant's campaign and seizure of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, coupled with the resulting loss of Nashville to the Confederate cause. Those three weeks tied a knot in Jeff Davis' panties that he was never able to un-snarl...

Tom

[dusty27]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

One obvious example would be Jackson's holding Federal troops from the Pennisula campaign in 1862 in the Shenandoah Valley.

[Chad Teasley]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

I would concur with Tom's choice of Van Dorn's raid against Grant's supply base at Holly Springs. There were any number of dazzling cavalry raids against logistic support resources carried out by Forrest, Wheeler, Morgan, Stuart, et. al., but relatively few had the effect of causing a theater commander to drastically alter his campaign plans. Van Dorn's raid forced Grant to altogether cancel his planned link-up with Sherman to attack Vicksburg. From a strategic point of view, I believe it was the most effective cavalry raid of the War.

Too bad for the Confederacy that it was about the ONLY effective operation Van Dorn carried out. :confused_

[Tom Ezell]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

Too bad for the Confederacy that it was about the ONLY effective operation Van Dorn carried out.

The man's greatest contribution to the Confederate Cause would have been to stay in the U.S. Army.

It took pert near ever' bit of what little moral fiber I have left to refrain from swinging by the cemetery over at Port Gibson and whizzing on Van Dorn's last repose... or maybe it was just that I was too parched to pee.

Tom
(Well, there's always 2006...)

[marine05]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

I too would opine that the Federal Naval blockade had a significant impact on the Confederacy's ability to wage war.

Some of the aforementioned posts are tactical in nature, but from a strategic view point, the devastation in the Shenandoah wreaked havoc with re-victualling the southern armies. Additionally Sherman's southern campaign, or march to the sea, interjected the LOS as his troops lived off the land, thus consuming or destroying a fair percentage of subsistance for the southern armies and the population of the region. Not to mention the destruction of a considerable portion of the transportation infrastructure. If you can't move it much of what is in warehouses will spoil or go to waste.

Both of the latter items did interfere with the southern armies freedom of action and I feel that the destruction of the transportation infrastructure had a severe impact. For instance, when Longsteet's Corps was detached for service in Tennessee, it took somewhere in the area of a fortnight to move near 20,000 troops and equipment over the few operational railways. Much moved by road march, wearing out troops and rolling stock. The Union forces moved as many troops and equipment to the same location in 1/2 the time due to the robustness of the rail network.

s/f

DJM

LtCol USMC

[billwatson]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

For the greatest psychological impact -- which I suspect is of some relevance to what's happening in Iraq right now -- I think the March to the Sea and the Carolinas Campaign have some relevance. Both ripped apart not only communications and supply lines, both demonstrated -- to the citizens, the people who needed convincing -- that the Union army could go where it wanted and do what it wanted deep in the South. That is a devastating blow to people clinging to the hope that all they needed to do was defend themselves and they'd have a nation.

I think Coalition forces in Iraq are kind of in the unenviable position of the Confederate citizens of 1864/65 in terms of having an untenable situation demonstrated to them by their opponents. If the Iraqi combatants are demonstrating that they can interdict supplies and conduct assassinations and political abductions almost at will (or it seems that way from this far away) then they are indeed striking a mighty psychological blow.

That may not be a happy parallel, sorry.

Wishing you all a safe return home over and above everything else.

[1stMaine]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

Comrades,

In a sense, Lee's 1st Maryland Raid was both a political and morale success for the south, as well as a military success in that it accomplished the mission. Lee's planw as NOT to take the fight to the Federals, as many claim, but to divert Federal forces from threatening the Capital at Richmond, and, more importantly, to remove the threat to the harvest in Northern Virginia.
Those crops were desperately needed, and to allow time for them to be harvested, Lee moved north, drawing Federal forces away from the area, and placing himself in a threatening position towards several Federal cities and rail hubs, mandating through his actions that the Federals respond to him.
Despite the hardships and casualties Lee's men suffered, his operation must be considered a success. He captured an entire garrisson at Harper's Ferry, along with a huge amount of Quartermaster, Commissary and Ordnance stores. At Sharpsburg, his army enflicted severe casualties on the Federal forces engaged. In fact, the blow, both physically and psychologically, was so great that the Fied Command of the Federal Army was virtually paralysed for weeks. In the end, it cost the General in Command his job.
True, this was a GREAT raid, in the numbers involved, and was of both strategic and political importance, and was designed to preserve the Confederate supple chain, rather than destroy or threaten the enemy's, but it worked, and worked very well, and IMHO ought to be considered here as well.
Respects,

[hiplainsyank]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

My only disagreement with citing Lee's invasion of 1862 would be that the strategic Union victory allowed Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. This change in the purpose of the war, in addition to the strategic loss, pretty much guaranteed that the European powers wouldn't intervene on behalf of the Confederacy. France was very important to the United States' ability to win in the Revolutionary War, and losing that European support was a critical blow to the Confederate cause.

While, of course, Lincoln only freed the slaves in the places not under Union control, everyone knew that if the north won after this, it would be the death knell of slavery. Look at how many officers, and some men, grumped and threatened mutiny because they didn't want to fight to free the slaves.

Joanna Norris Grimshaw

[Johan Steele]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

I'm not certain there is really a corelation between what has happened w/ supply lines in Iraq and in the US Civil War. Primarily in that the Civil War lacked such nastiness as car bombs and IED's on a profesional scale. That said...

Grierson's raid from the US standpoint and Sherman's march to the sea would be the epitome of supply snarls.

From the CSA perspective... well raiders like Forrest & Mosby etc would be the obvious answers. Though the 1862 Dakota War might be more appropriate from the terror standpoint.

THe problem is that the terrorists in Iraq have never approached the effectiveness of Forrests smallest raid... I thank God the modern enemy of the US soldier has nothing like a leader of Forrests character and skill.

[Chaphorne]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

I am grateful to all who have responded to our query about what might be the most effective action against the opposing army's supply or logistics base. Every answer has been thought provoking and of some use to us.

Some of you, if I may say, would not get past the Army War College graders because you did not fully grasp or speak to the question. In your defense, maybe the question was not pointed enough to be easily answerable. Mea culpa.

Last respondent first: terrorist is a label, and militarily I suppose that it is a category of operation and applicable to some of the activities currently in Iraq. But those attacks aimed at logistics supply lines also can be seen militarily as not terror, but classic interdiction and harrassment of an opposing force. Deep cavalry actions of both sides during the Civil War had similar effects.

If you want an example of terror warfare from the Civil War, I would offer the operations of Stand Watie. Yet he did not primarily target logistics per se. Evoking terror seemed to be the goal. And his forces were accomplished in achieving it.

I am intrigued by some other answers. I had not considered Van Dorn's raid, but I think it may be the case that it had perhaps the largest effect on the enemy commander's scheme of maneuver, just as the respondents have stated. And here I thought Van Dorn never did ANYTHING well! :wink_smil

As to Sharpsburg/Antietam. Respondents have somewhat confused the operational and the strategic levels in their answers. I believe that the disruption that the Army of Northern Virginia crossing into Maryland caused in the eastern theater was monumental, and may itself have had the biggest southern impact on the opposing force's logistics and overall security in a theater. So it deserves consideration, though it was not a raid but a campaign, prematurely ended by the Union "success" in battle and Lee's narrow escape back across the Potomac. An army better trained in recovery and reconstitution after battle than the Army of the Potomac could have brought a much quicker end to the war. But we must be fair -- the enormous shock and trauma of major battle (Antietam, Shiloh) was more than either side could quickly recover from and return to aggressive maneuver.

Strategically I believe it to be the turning point of the war, though much blood and the bulk of momentous battles lay ahead. it was the high point of world opinion for the South, especially the foreign policy and economic dependency of France and Great Britain, and also the low point of northern confidence in its own ability and will to withstand Southern armies. And, by reframing the war in terms of emancipation and end of slavery, Lincoln masterfully used the Antietam 'success' to marshal the direction of history to the Union cause. I do not see the campaign as an attempt by Lee to attack primarily the logistics base of the enemy, though it did have that effect to a limited degree (Harpers Ferry).

I want to disqualify Sherman's march to the sea as an answer to our question, because it seems to me that the opposing forces were never strong enough to mount a serious threat to Sherman's freedom of action, regardless of their logistics arrangements (or lack thereof). Certainly Sherman's own logistics plan (living off the land, with his logistics base IN FRONT of him at Savannah) is considered by some, including the Army's former logistics historian Huston, as one of the most daring campaigns ever in terms of logistics. I would disqualify it because Sherman was just too strong to be stopped, he used his cavalry as much if not more effectively than the Confederates, and the South had very few options but to shadow, raid, and retire. It was a campaign of brute force. It is instructive that the South lacked the means to attack HIS logistics in any meaningful way, much less his main forces.

Jackson in the Valley Campaign indeed held down large numbers of troops which McClellan wanted for the Peninsula Campaign, but it was not so much a threat to logistics for the Army of the Potomac as it was the threat to Washington itself as a political objective which kept the Union forces running every which way to corner him. McClellan, so careful and painstaking about his logistics, may have been his own worst enemy in the degradation of combat power and ultimately the reluctance to use it because of logistics risks.

What about Stuart's ride around the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula Campaign? I wonder if that action, more than the big battles of the campaign, so unnerved McClellan that he faltered and fell back long before he should have.

I don't think Mosby tied down enough enemy troops nor destroyed or captured enough stores to be our Southern winner. But he certainly was a royal pain to the Army of the Potomac and put the north on notice that anywhere south of the Potomac was not safe for a Federal. In that sense, maybe Mosby is a worthy comparison to the anti-Coaltion forces in Iraq, for that is their message in the continuing attacks on convoys and logistics nodes. You guys relying on the secular media don't hear the half of it.

Sorry for going on so. Again, we in the burning sands East 'o Suez do thank you for your company.

[marine05]

Re: Civil War vs Coalition Re-Supply Patterns

As to Sharpsburg/Antietam. Respondents have somewhat confused the operational and the strategic levels in their answers. I believe that the disruption that the Army of Northern Virginia crossing into Maryland caused in the eastern theater was monumental, and may itself have had the biggest southern impact on the opposing force's logistics and overall security in a theater. So it deserves consideration, though it was not a raid but a campaign, prematurely ended by the Union "success" in battle and Lee's narrow escape back across the Potomac. An army better trained in recovery and reconstitution after battle than the Army of the Potomac could have brought a much quicker end to the war. But we must be fair -- the enormous shock and trauma of major battle (Antietam, Shiloh) was more than either side could quickly recover from and return to aggressive maneuver.

Your original post asked for all operational conditions, raid, battle, campaign, etc. so many of the respondents answered according to those parameters. I disagree with the your opinion of Sharpsburg/Antietam, it was, logistically speaking, a loss for the ANV. The prior loss of the stores at Manassas did not have a long lasting effect, and Little Mac was able marshall his combat power and CSS trains to blunt the Lee's point of attack. Lee did relieve pressure on Richmond, which was the primary intent. However, his (Lee's) loss in men and materiel would never be made up.

Strategically I believe it to be the turning point of the war, though much blood and the bulk of momentous battles lay ahead. it was the high point of world opinion for the South, especially the foreign policy and economic dependency of France and Great Britain, and also the low point of northern confidence in its own ability and will to withstand Southern armies. And, by reframing the war in terms of emancipation and end of slavery, Lincoln masterfully used the Antietam 'success' to marshal the direction of history to the Union cause. I do not see the campaign as an attempt by Lee to attack primarily the logistics base of the enemy, though it did have that effect to a limited degree (Harpers Ferry).

I want to disqualify Sherman's march to the sea as an answer to our question, because it seems to me that the opposing forces were never strong enough to mount a serious threat to Sherman's freedom of action, regardless of their logistics arrangements (or lack thereof). Certainly Sherman's own logistics plan (living off the land, with his logistics base IN FRONT of him at Savannah) is considered by some, including the Army's former logistics historian Huston, as one of the most daring campaigns ever in terms of logistics. I would disqualify it because Sherman was just too strong to be stopped, he used his cavalry as much if not more effectively than the Confederates, and the South had very few options but to shadow, raid, and retire. It was a campaign of brute force. It is instructive that the South lacked the means to attack HIS logistics in any meaningful way, much less his main forces.

What your original post implied, to a logistician, is the disruption of the ability to supply an army (armies) in war. Any impact on the methods and means of transporting supplies to the warfighter limits his ability to fight. Sherman's intent was "to make Georgia howl." In this he was extremely successful and his "Sherman neckties" severely damaged the transportation infrastructure that was used to supply the Confederate armies.

Jackson in the Valley Campaign indeed held down large numbers of troops which McClellan wanted for the Peninsula Campaign, (McClellan always wanted more troops as his intel was faulty and he always felt outnumbered) but it was not so much a threat to logistics for the Army of the Potomac as it was the threat to Washington itself as a political objective which kept the Union forces running every which way to corner him. McClellan, so careful and painstaking about his logistics, may have been his own worst enemy in the degradation of combat power and ultimately the reluctance to use it because of logistics risks.

What about Stuart's ride around the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula Campaign? I wonder if that action, more than the big battles of the campaign, so unnerved McClellan that he faltered and fell back long before he should have.

The above has nothing to do with logistics.

I don't think Mosby tied down enough enemy troops nor destroyed or captured enough stores to be our Southern winner. But he certainly was a royal pain to the Army of the Potomac and put the north on notice that anywhere south of the Potomac was not safe for a Federal. In that sense, maybe Mosby is a worthy comparison to the anti-Coaltion forces in Iraq, for that is their message in the continuing attacks on convoys and logistics nodes. You guys relying on the secular media don't hear the half of it.

Sorry for going on so. Again, we in the burning sands East 'o Suez do thank you for your company.[/QUOTE]

Chaplain,

As an aside, your original post may have been just this side of breaching opsec standards as this is a fairly open forum. You never want to let the enemy know about successes or failures.

Also, prior to the Moderators saying anything, you have to sign your posts.

v/r

DJM

[JustRob]

Cracker Line

I'm surprised no one mentioned this earlier. I'd vote for the seige of Chattanooga that began in September 1863 and ended with the the establishment of the "Cracker Line" on October 29, 1863.

Here's a quick synopsis:

After the Battle of Chickamauga in mid-September 1863, Union Major General William S. Rosecrans led his battered Army of the Cumberland to nearby Chattanooga for protection. Seeking refuge, he found a death trap instead.
Confederate General Braxton Bragg quickly took control of the mountains surrounding Chattanooga (including Lookout Mountain), blocked all major roads and railways leading to the city, and cut off all traffic on the Tennessee River.

For the next six weeks Union wounded went without vital medical supplies, thousands of animals perished, and food and ammunition dwindled to perilously low levels -- as the army teetered on the brink of disaster.

Near the end of October, Union troops under new command launched a daring counterattack driving Confederates from their mountain strongholds. The moment had arrived. On 29 October 1863, two Quartermasters, Colonel William G. LeDuc and Captain Arthur Edwards, launched their homemade steamboat, Chattanooga, on her maiden voyage up river -- thus opening Grant’s "Cracker Line."

With his supply line now securely in place General Sherman could make ready his famed march through Georgia.

See also: ngeorgia.com/history/crackerline.html