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Historians look at multifaceted Lee
October 14, 2006 12:50 am
AUDACITY PERSONIFIED: THE GENERALSHIP OF ROBERT E. LEE. Peter S. Carmichael, editor. Louisiana State University Press. Illustrations, footnotes, index. 174 pages. $24.95.
P ETER S. CARMICHAEL opens this short but excellent book of essays by addressing a question that might possibly have entered readers' minds: Why do we need another book on Gen. Robert E. Lee?
Carmichael acknowledges Douglas Southall Freeman's classic four-volume "R.E. Lee" as the standard biography, mentions other works, then asserts that deeper interpretations of certain aspects of Lee's career, based on new research in primary sources, can add to our understanding of Lee's generalship.
In his own contribution to the volume, Carmichael asserts that, unlike most other Confederate and Union generals, Lee never accepted the fact that Civil War armies were incapable of inflicting overwhelming defeat upon their opponents on the battlefield. Instead, Lee maintained an aggressive posture far beyond the point at which the practice began to eat away at the army's substance.
Carmichael asserts that the Southern public was far more willing than Lee to countenance defensive tactics and strategy, which would have saved lives, in the last year of the war. If Lee had employed defensive tactics more often, he would have done more to defeat the Northern war effort by providing no means of raising morale prior to the 1864 presidential election.
William J. Miller looks at Lee's intentions in June 1862 in light of General Orders No. 75, which coordinated the movements of Confederate forces during the Seven Days Battles. Miller concludes that Lee originally intended for the left wing of his army simply to maneuver behind Union forces in order to threaten supply lines.
However, events did not unfold according to plan, and fighting replaced maneuver as the means of setting the Union retreat in motion. Subsequent developments produced situations in which large portions of the Union army might have been destroyed. At the conclusion of the fighting, Lee could legitimately say that his army had at times been in a position to annihilate the enemy, although he had not initially envisioned such a possibility.
In the volume's third essay, Gordon C. Rhea clearly demonstrates that Lee possessed no superhuman ability to divine the intentions of his opponents. Discussing the Overland Campaign, Rhea shows how Lee reacted to available information in determining his own response to Union movements. Lee's success in maintaining a successful blocking posture was, in fact, brought about by a combination of skillful prognostications, Union mistakes and chance actions by Lee's subordinates.
Rhea notes that Lee also made occasional mistakes that worked to the Union commanders' advantage, but his amazing ability to improvise in crises always redeemed the situation.
Robert E.L. Krick contributes an essay on Lee's efforts to institute professional staff work within the Army of Northern Virginia. The general tried to set an example for other commanders, some of whom kept massive retinues, by keeping his own personal staff small. Krick largely dismisses postwar complaints of staffer Walter H. Taylor that Lee's personal staff would have functioned more efficiently with one or two additional officers as the whining of an overworked bureaucrat. The distinction between Lee's personal staff and the much larger general staff that dealt with such regular army matters as ordnance, artillery, quartermaster and commissary supplies, and military engineering is clearly made.
Krick concludes that Lee himself performed a number of functions, such as intelligence evaluation, handled by permanent staff in modern armies, and that historians have unjustly faulted the general for not achieving staffing perfection in what was in fact a fledgling military establishment.
Max R. Williams' study of the relationship between Lee and North Carolina Gov. Zebulon B. Vance reveals that Lee was willing to step outside the normal chain of command through the Confederate government to appeal directly to a state figure when he considered such direct intervention necessary to preserve the strength of his army or to bolster the defense of Confederate territory.
Williams also demonstrates that Vance, far from holding to an extreme states'-rights position that had a negative impact on Confederate defensive capabilities, was happy to cooperate with Lee on matters that affected North Carolina's contribution to the Confederate war effort or the state's participation in local defense measures.
In the volume's final essay, Mark L. Bradley traces Lee's relationship with Gen. Joseph E. Johnston from early February 1865, when Lee was named general in chief of Confederate armies, until Johnston's surrender to Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in late April. Bradley notes that Lee realized the hopelessness of the Confederacy's military situation and tried to persuade his civilian superiors to undertake serious peace negotiations in the late winter of 1865.
He also overrode Confederate President Jefferson Davis' objections to employing Johnston on active service again, and gave Johnston as much support as circumstances allowed. Johnston responded to Lee's vote of confidence by directing the forces under his command with a higher degree of competence than he had displayed as an independent commander.
Each of the essays in this small volume is an individual gem. Peter Carmichael deserves the thanks of the historical community for putting together a work that really is a needed new book on Robert E. Lee.
DANE HARTGROVE formerly of Stafford County, is a freelance writer living in Salisbury, N.C. Send e-mail to his attention to
Email: gwoolf@freelancestar.com.
------------------
Copyright 2006 The Free Lance-Star Publishing Company.
Online at: http://www.fredericksburg.com/News/F...0142006/228598
October 14, 2006 12:50 am
AUDACITY PERSONIFIED: THE GENERALSHIP OF ROBERT E. LEE. Peter S. Carmichael, editor. Louisiana State University Press. Illustrations, footnotes, index. 174 pages. $24.95.
P ETER S. CARMICHAEL opens this short but excellent book of essays by addressing a question that might possibly have entered readers' minds: Why do we need another book on Gen. Robert E. Lee?
Carmichael acknowledges Douglas Southall Freeman's classic four-volume "R.E. Lee" as the standard biography, mentions other works, then asserts that deeper interpretations of certain aspects of Lee's career, based on new research in primary sources, can add to our understanding of Lee's generalship.
In his own contribution to the volume, Carmichael asserts that, unlike most other Confederate and Union generals, Lee never accepted the fact that Civil War armies were incapable of inflicting overwhelming defeat upon their opponents on the battlefield. Instead, Lee maintained an aggressive posture far beyond the point at which the practice began to eat away at the army's substance.
Carmichael asserts that the Southern public was far more willing than Lee to countenance defensive tactics and strategy, which would have saved lives, in the last year of the war. If Lee had employed defensive tactics more often, he would have done more to defeat the Northern war effort by providing no means of raising morale prior to the 1864 presidential election.
William J. Miller looks at Lee's intentions in June 1862 in light of General Orders No. 75, which coordinated the movements of Confederate forces during the Seven Days Battles. Miller concludes that Lee originally intended for the left wing of his army simply to maneuver behind Union forces in order to threaten supply lines.
However, events did not unfold according to plan, and fighting replaced maneuver as the means of setting the Union retreat in motion. Subsequent developments produced situations in which large portions of the Union army might have been destroyed. At the conclusion of the fighting, Lee could legitimately say that his army had at times been in a position to annihilate the enemy, although he had not initially envisioned such a possibility.
In the volume's third essay, Gordon C. Rhea clearly demonstrates that Lee possessed no superhuman ability to divine the intentions of his opponents. Discussing the Overland Campaign, Rhea shows how Lee reacted to available information in determining his own response to Union movements. Lee's success in maintaining a successful blocking posture was, in fact, brought about by a combination of skillful prognostications, Union mistakes and chance actions by Lee's subordinates.
Rhea notes that Lee also made occasional mistakes that worked to the Union commanders' advantage, but his amazing ability to improvise in crises always redeemed the situation.
Robert E.L. Krick contributes an essay on Lee's efforts to institute professional staff work within the Army of Northern Virginia. The general tried to set an example for other commanders, some of whom kept massive retinues, by keeping his own personal staff small. Krick largely dismisses postwar complaints of staffer Walter H. Taylor that Lee's personal staff would have functioned more efficiently with one or two additional officers as the whining of an overworked bureaucrat. The distinction between Lee's personal staff and the much larger general staff that dealt with such regular army matters as ordnance, artillery, quartermaster and commissary supplies, and military engineering is clearly made.
Krick concludes that Lee himself performed a number of functions, such as intelligence evaluation, handled by permanent staff in modern armies, and that historians have unjustly faulted the general for not achieving staffing perfection in what was in fact a fledgling military establishment.
Max R. Williams' study of the relationship between Lee and North Carolina Gov. Zebulon B. Vance reveals that Lee was willing to step outside the normal chain of command through the Confederate government to appeal directly to a state figure when he considered such direct intervention necessary to preserve the strength of his army or to bolster the defense of Confederate territory.
Williams also demonstrates that Vance, far from holding to an extreme states'-rights position that had a negative impact on Confederate defensive capabilities, was happy to cooperate with Lee on matters that affected North Carolina's contribution to the Confederate war effort or the state's participation in local defense measures.
In the volume's final essay, Mark L. Bradley traces Lee's relationship with Gen. Joseph E. Johnston from early February 1865, when Lee was named general in chief of Confederate armies, until Johnston's surrender to Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in late April. Bradley notes that Lee realized the hopelessness of the Confederacy's military situation and tried to persuade his civilian superiors to undertake serious peace negotiations in the late winter of 1865.
He also overrode Confederate President Jefferson Davis' objections to employing Johnston on active service again, and gave Johnston as much support as circumstances allowed. Johnston responded to Lee's vote of confidence by directing the forces under his command with a higher degree of competence than he had displayed as an independent commander.
Each of the essays in this small volume is an individual gem. Peter Carmichael deserves the thanks of the historical community for putting together a work that really is a needed new book on Robert E. Lee.
DANE HARTGROVE formerly of Stafford County, is a freelance writer living in Salisbury, N.C. Send e-mail to his attention to
Email: gwoolf@freelancestar.com.
------------------
Copyright 2006 The Free Lance-Star Publishing Company.
Online at: http://www.fredericksburg.com/News/F...0142006/228598