Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

[Rear Guard]

I started this thread before, but somehow it's gone missing:

I have read that the rebs were better marksman than the yanks, conserving their fire, carefully aiming at their target, while the yanks strategy seemed to be fire off more rounds in a hurry! Anyone read any accounts of markmanship, north vs. south? Or documented accounts of effectiveness of fire.

[markj]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

The following item is quite long, but includes some observations about the efficacy of Confederate fire at Richmond KY (30 August 1862):

Aurora IN Weekly Commercial, 4 September 1862

Letter from the 16th Regiment.
__________________

LOUISVILLE, KY., Sept. 13, 1862.

DEAR SIR: --Thinking that you and the people of Dearborn [county] would like to hear from the Sixteenth, I concluded I would write you a slight sketch of its movements since we left Indiana. We went from Covington to Lexington on a freight train, stopping at Lexington one night. Next day we were ordered to leave our knapsacks, roll up our blankets, put them on our shoulders, take one day’s rations and march. When we halted we found ourselves at Nicholasville, fourteen miles from Lexington.
We camped in a beautiful woodpasture, timbered principally with blue ash. We remained in camp until Sunday evening, when we got orders to take two days’ rations and hold ourselves in readiness to march at a minute’s notice. About 6 o’clock P. M., we received marching orders, and were moved off at a lively rate, for nearly twelve miles, most of the road being rough, and part of it (near the Kentucky river) the roughest I ever traveled. A great number of soldiers fell out before we got to the Kentucky river, and after crossing that stream there were numerous stragglers who were unable to keep in the ranks. About 2 o’clock A. M., the column was halted, and slept about two hours, when we resumed our march for Richmond, halted one-half mile before reaching Richmond. We camped in a piece of ground very unsuitable for the purpose, the water being very poor, and little or no shade.
Next day we marched one and half miles [to] the other side of Richmond where we camped until Friday afternoon, when we received marching orders. We advanced about three miles and were thrown into line of battle, where we halted a few minutes observing the (our) artillery fire, which was immediately on our right. The enemy retreated, and the 16th was thrown forward nearly a mile forming the advance infantry. We slept on our arms all night, dreaming of seeing secesh skedaddle in confusion, for we had captured one piece of artillery. Next morning (Saturday) we marched at quite an early hour, for the scene of action. Before we had advanced one-half mile, the boom of artillery greeted our ears, but all were eager for the fray, and Co. E determined to go in on their muscle. Co. E, I am ashamed to say, had one man who fell out of the ranks before reaching the field. I shall refrain from mentioning his name, at least for the present.
The artillery was stationed in the road, and we formed on the left of it, and a little in the rear. Presently the 16th was ordered forward and took its position in and to the left of a hollow, just behind a tall stake and rider fence. Companies A and B were sent out as skirmishers and took position on our left, bringing on the engagement. The small arms on our left keeping a continual rattle, and the artillery playing over our heads, made things “quite interesting.” After lying for one half hour or so, the regiment received orders to about face, left wheel, when the flank companies crowded too much in the centre, throwing the regiment into confusion, nor worse, however, than they would have been on regimental drill. Our field officers doing all in their power to get the men in order, but a flanking fire from a vastly superior enemy, and the rush of one or more regiments retreating in confusion, rendered all their efforts unavailing.
When the 16th reached the road, Capt. [William H.] Terrill shouted for Co. E to rally and prepare for a cavalry charge; there were some fifteen or twenty who answered to his call. We crossed the road and double quicked it for four or five hundred yards, rallying round our colors. The cavalry did not charge, and our Lieut. retreated in [toward?] Richmond; where we again formed and fought, losing several of Co. E’s boys. We retreated to a hollow where acting Adjutant Cox caught the colors and waved them over his head crying to the boys not to desert their colors. Lieut. Stevenson and squad stood by him, also some others, but finding that there was good order with his squad, giving secesh a round before again reaching the road.
After getting on the road, we filed left keeping on the road for a few rods, then filed right across an open field, where there was a perfect shower of bullets.—
Great numbers of our men fell on this field, mostly wounded, however, for the secesh aimed low, taking our men about their arms and legs. Sergeant Barker was wounded in the arm, and Lieut. Stevenson had a bullet to cut his coat on his guard arm, also, another struck a gun he picked up and lodged between the clothing and lining of his coat, near the wrist; no more of the squad were touched.
After crossing the field we obliqued to the left and marched about three-fourths of a mile, when we formed in line and halted some time. We retreated again in good order, and formed on precisely the same ground we occupied the previous evening. Here the second battle was fought, our right only being engaged. It was outflanked and driven in, and the 16th was ordered to retreat, which it did in four ranks in splendid order, notwithstanding the Cincinnati Commercial’s special to the contrary. Here let me say his [the Commercial reporter’s] account of the battle is pretty good, but in this statement he erred, or was willfully impartial, for the 16th never did better marching, even on dress parade, than it did in the second retreat.
We formed in line once more before reaching [Richmond but it being] not enough to do any good, he [our commander?] retreated. Alas, he is no more! His actions on that day justly mark him as the “bravest of the brave.” Lieut. Col. [Joel] Wolfe, who was bravery personified, also bit the dust. Indeed, I do believe that there never was a regiment of men who had braver or bet[ter] field officers than the 16th.
After passing through Richmond, Co. E formed across the road to prevent stragglers from passing. It stood a few minutes, then formed into sections retreating in good order until the enemy placed their [sic] artillery to rake the road, when we were ordered to file left and take the field (which was a woodpasture,) for shelter. We kept in the fields on the side of the road for nearly a mile, entered the road again, and presently the enemy opened on our advance. Lieut. Stevenson gave the command file left, and we instantly obeyed him getting over a high fence in double quick, and forming in a cornfield on top of the hill, expecting every moment that we would be attacked.
Presently the firing ceased, and we thought our troops had surrendered. Being determined not to surrender, we started for Lexington and marched until about 12 o’clock that night, slept until about 4 o’clock next morning; started forward again, crossing the Kentucky river about 9 o’clock, and reaching Lexington at dark that night, having marched upward of 30 miles from Richmond to Lexington, and not getting over one meal from Saturday morning until we got into Lexington, where we got hot coffee and a good supper, which we much needed, as the last two miles’ marching was through the heaviest kind of rain. Next day at noon, we left Lexington for this place [Louisville], forced marching all the way, and troops on half rations. After getting here we were all worn out, but now we are recruited up physically, and Co. E generally enjoys good health.
There are a great many cases of diarrhœa and ague in camp, no serious ones however. No more at present.

E. J., HIGH PRIVATE.
Co. E, 16th Reg’t, Ind. Vols.

Note: Reported 16th IVI casualty figures for this engagement were 25 killed, 120 wounded, and 395 captured out of approximately 1,000 engaged. Official records show General William “Bull” Nelson's loss was 206 killed, 844 wounded, and 4,303 missing, for a total of 5,353. Confederate General Edmund Kirby Smith's loss was 98 killed, 492 wounded, and at least 10 missing, for a total of 600. Tactically, the Confederates' victory was one of the most complete of the entire war, but it was negated by failure to coordinate their forces in the campaign that ended at Perryville.



Regards,

Mark Jaeger

[markj]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Something else I found in my pile of stuff:

Army & Navy Journal, 29 August 1863:

WASTE OF AMMUNITION.

The following is extracted from a recently published book of campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland, by Captain GEORGE F. NOYES:

[Note: Actual title of the work is: Noyes, George F. (1824-1868). The Bivouac and the Battlefield, or, Campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland. New York: Harper & Bros, 1863. xi, 13-339p. This is available in microform.]

The great disproportion in our battles between the number of ball cartridges discharged and the number of killed and wounded was due mainly to the want of presence of mind in our raw troops; but the very limited investigation I have been enabled to make has convinced me that our troops take much better aim, and consequently waste far less ammunition than is usual in European warfare.
During the wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire—NAPOLEON’S wars—according to GASSENDI, a French general of artillery, the infantry fired 3000 cartridges for every enemy killed or wounded. PIOBERT admits the same thing. DECKER, a Prussian general, and one of the best military writers in German, estimates that not less than 10,000 cartridges are burned for every enemy killed or wounded.
At the battle of Vittoria the British are supposed to have killed or wounded one of the enemy for every 800 balls fired. An English officer states that at the battle of Cherubusco the Mexicans killed or wounded an American for every 800 balls fired, and that the Americans killed or wounded a Mexican for every 125 balls fired.
The heroic ROSECRANS, in his account of the bloodily contested battle of Murfreesboro, declares, “ Of 14,560 rebels struck by our missiles, it is estimated that 20,000 rounds of artillery hit 728 men, and 200,000 rounds of musketry hit 13,833 men, averaging 27 cannon shots to hit one man, and 145 musket shots to hit one man.
In the battle of Gainesville there could not have been expended more than 100,000 cartridges, and the enemy admit[s] a loss of more than 1000 men, thus averaging 100 musket shots to each of the rebel killed or wounded. Of course all such statements only approximate the actual ratio, but it is sufficiently clear that great as is the waste of ammunition by our army, it is not only equalled, but excelled by those [armies] of Europe.
One trouble is that our men going into battle, are weighed down, overloaded with ammunition, having to stuff their pockets as well as their cartridge-boxes with the sixty or eighty rounds ordered. Of course very much of this is thrown away and wasted; but this is only a trifling evil compared with the encouragement thus given to the too prevalent idea among the men that he who fires the greatest number of rounds in battle is the best soldier. I have heard men boasting of their achievements in this regard, and the result of such an idea is a hurried loading and discharge without any regard to aim; a wasting upon trees and foliage of ammunition which, if used at all, should be used so as to defeat the enemy. I was struck with a remark made by a rebel prisoner to his captors, “We never carry more than forty rounds into action, and usually expend about ten. “There is altogether too much of this wild, reckless firing, the men discharging their pieces before bringing them fairly down to a level, and utterly regardless of taking aim. Of course, there are periods when heavy, rapid, and continuous volleys are necessary; still it would be well if every man could be drilled as a sharpshooter, taught to shoot slowly, and always take aim, either at the enemy or his supposed locality.
“In the five battles of the late Italian campaign, it was estimated that about 8 per cent of the French and Sardinians, and 10 ½ per cent of their enemies, the Austrians, were either killed or wounded. In the battles spoken of in these sketches our less was not far from 10 per cent of the whole numbers engaged, while certain divisions and brigades lost one-third their number; and in the fearfully bloody fight at Gainesville two of our regiments lost more than one-third of their number engaged, as also did the 4th brigade
“The proportion between the killed and wounded is about as 1 to 5, and of the wounded about 1 in 10 never recovers. If this be even approximative to the truth, it certainly robs war of some of its presumed fatality. As I have before remarked, the escape of so large a majority of the men, amid such storms of bullets sweeping and yelling around their ears, has always been the great mystery of war.”

[END]

Regards,

Mark Jaeger

[Rear Guard]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Thanks for your postings Mark. They seem to support what I have also read. I recall that one author made the point that Rebels were more familiar with hunting and firearms before the war and embraced the manly and chivalrous ways more than their northern foe did. Those differences may indeed have played a role in the casualty rate gap.

[Fahlem]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

I think as a whole, you could find numerous accounts on both sides that support some regiments being more effective than others reguardless of north or south...I do know of a letter written by a member of the 2nd USSS to his father after Antietam that claims it (Antietam) was the worst fight he had ever been in. For certain he states that he had expended 32 rounds during their time in the cornfield, resting his rifle upon the lower boards of the fence along the Haggerstown Road. The tone of the letter let it be known that he clearly felt as if this was considered a tremendous amount of fire at the time. Quite a difference from what a modern reenactor would think was a lot of rounds. However, at Gettysburg Lt. Col. Casper Trepp stated in his after action report that the 100 man USSS recon to Pitzer's woods on the afterneeon of the 2nd had fired on an average of 95 rounds per man during a 20 minute fight with Cadmus Wilcox's brigade. I think the idea of encountering a whole brigade plus being a mile from the supports of the main line had something to do with throwing a whole lot of lead out of thier breachloaders. I wish I did, but I do not know what the men of the 3rd maine (a roughly 200 man support element sent with the SS to Pitzer's Woods) fired during the same time. I would think it was drastically less for they only engaged the rebs for about half the time and of course with Springfields.
I have always argued that as a reenacting community, we have a poor grasp upon the pacing of a civil war battle. There is too much blazing away, not enough time spent aiming, bad movments & at very unrealistic distances. I wish these were issues that people felt as strongly about improving as they do thier kit. If we really want to protray the best picture into the past, it's not just the clothes but the actions too. :)

Michael Fahle

[Rob Weaver]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

I believe that bit about the Confederates being more experienced with firearms is a bit of a myth, as well as the chivalry part :) . OK - I've spent the better part of 2 hours and have given up. I am almost positive that among the voluminous pages of Lord's Encyclopedia there is a marvelous quote that says exactly that Confederates drilled at a slower rate of fire with attention to accuracy, while Federals trained for volume of fire. However, I can't produce the quote beyond that general citation. (I will add, however, that I suspect that may be a little bit of "Lost Cause" mythos as well. Making every bullet count, and all.)

[Fahlem]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Just an assumption, but maybe having a limited ability to supply had a big influence on the volume of rebel fire. Also, if you carry 40 rds. and blow them away carelessly, if you need a few down the road, you are now up the creek without a paddle so to speak. I think that it all came down to circumstances and regiment involved, north or south.

Michael Fahle

[LWhite64]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Check out THIS BLOODY CRUCIBLE OF WAR, which goes into depth about tactics, etc. To sum it up though a Military RIFLED MUSKET was very different from the country hunting rifle. A Hunting rifle fires on a straighter trajectory than does a Rifled Musket which would throw a bullet in an arch. Now if you know the yards to the enemy line and you know how to set the rear sights(something that most soldiers on both sides are woefully lacking) then you can hit the line, but such training isnt standard until later in the war, remember that smoothbores are very common in CS ranks through the later stages of 63.

Lee

[Matthew.Rector]

Re: Munfordville Battle

Below is the text from a letter in my personal collection.

October the 20th 1862
Camp Thomas Ohio
Mr. read
i let you know that I am well and hope that you are the same further i let you know that i was in a Battle near mumfortville KY and was taken prisoner and then I seen hard times for two weeks now they are good a gain in Camp Thomas for i am cooking for this company and am waiting for my four month pay if i get them then i try and get a furlough and come home to see you that’s if i can one if caint get one i have to stay Here but i let you know it in my next and next thing is i have seen the tail of the elephant and seen the shells burst near me but they all missed me but the damed rebels they shoot so damed awkeward they would just as soon hid a fellow in the Head as not i think this is all for this time but i still remain your friend
Jonathan Harp
To
W W Reed
Direct to me Co H
2 Batt 18th U S infantry
Camp Thomas Colum
bus Ohio in care of
Capt. Tenykt

[Csayankee]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Matt.

Regarding the first letter about Richmond Ky, and what is your opinion. If my memory serves met right from working at the site, majority of the Federal troops at Richmond Ky were very new to the Army, some only mustered in a month or so before. I know that it was noted the Federal troops were using smoothbore muskets, while the more experience CS troops had enfields, etc.

I if you look at a particular battle you my be able to determine if one unit was more experienced then the other.

[neocelt]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Lee,

Did you mean "The Bloody Crucible of Courage" (by Brent Nosworthy)? In any event, your point is well taken.

Cheers,

[Gary of CA]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

While the Southern Country boy was definitely a superior marksman to his Yankee factory worker or store-clerk counterpart, especially if that factory worker or clerk was unaccustomed to firearms, the same cannot be said of the Yankee farmer or woodsman. Additionally, the midwestern farmer was equally adept with firearms. As far as I can tell, neither side held a monopoly on marksmanship and amazing shots were made by men on both sides.

[Roger Hansen]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Gents
Quoting general officers on their firing counts may not be good practice. The ordnance officers reported "rounds expended". These reports were assembled at regimental, brigade, division levels and then compared to casualty counts. Two problems:

1. Large numbers of rounds were dropped and never fired. Ask any relic hunter. I found an entire case (1000 rounds) behind the CS lines on one battlefield back in 1985. I am sure this was included in the number of "rounds expended" for the battle (about 200 were .555 pritchets, 600 Selma arsenal .560 enfield bullets, and the remaider - .565 three ringers; and one Sharps carbine).

2. The commanders reported casualties based on the list given to them by their Chief Surgeon. After reviewing these reports for several battles, I have found entire regiments were left off the list in almost all cases (on both sides). This is explained with further research - immediately after the battle, the missing regiments had been re-assigned to other commands and never filed reports with mother units.

Roger Hansen

[Dan Munson]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Getting back to the topic of this thread, Thomas Livermore's "Numbers and Losses in the American Civil War" (1900) has section that purports to measure relative marksmanship on the basis of number of casualties inflicted per 1,000 men engaged -- what Livermore called his "hits per thousand" ratio. In most engagements measured by Livermore, the Confeds come off at least a little better. You can look at Livermore's work and critique his methodology (and it has been critiqued), but it was at least a try. I do not presently have an attribution, but I recall reading a post-war comment from an ex-Confed officer to the effect that Confed infantry in his experience tended to go less with volley fire than with "fire by file" (which of course immediately morphs into a fire at will), whereas -- in this officer's recall -- the Yanks he faced tended to continue with repeated volley fire. We all know how much wobble there can be in trying to keep a rifle sighted on target while standing in ranks. Others with greater credentials than myself have made the point that volley fire is inherently less accurate than a fire-at-will procedure. The latter allows one to pull trigger when the sights seem best aligned; the former drives you to pull trigger on command...which may not coincide with an optimum sight alignment for many of the shooters. If there is some general truth in this rebel's observation, the perceived difference in "marksmanship" may have had less to do with relative shooting skill and more to do with the chosen means of delivering fire.

Dan Munson
Co. K, 100th Penn'a V. I.
"The Roundhead Regiment"

[Charles Heath]

Re: Markmanship of Yanks vs. Rebs

Tim,

As a newbie to this forum, it may bode well to post less and read much more.

Thanks in advance.