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Re: Using Weapon Sights
Hi,
Opinions about the quality of American marksmanship during the war, not surprisingly, varied. In any event, the level of "marksmanship practice" in the Federal or Confederate armies was generally not comparable to what was conducted in Europe (most notably Prussia which, as I recall, required troops to fire at least 50 rounds in formal target practice per annum).
Nevertheless, as I stated, opinions varied. The following item extracted from the 29 August 1863 "United States Army and Navy Journal" may be of some interest.
WASTE OF AMMUNITION.
The following is extracted from a recently published book of campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland, by Captain GEORGE F. NOYES:
[Note: Actual title of the work is: Noyes, George F. (1824-1868). The Bivouac and the Battlefield, or, Campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland. New York: Harper & Bros, 1863. xi, 13-339p. This is available in microform.]
The great disproportion in our battles between the number of ball cartridges discharged and the number of killed and wounded was due mainly to the want of presence of mind in our raw troops; but the very limited investigation I have been enabled to make has convinced me that our troops take much better aim, and consequently waste far less ammunition than is usual in European warfare.
During the wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire—NAPOLEON’S wars—according to GASSENDI, a French general of artillery, the infantry fired 3000 cartridges for every enemy killed or wounded. PIOBERT admits the same thing. DECKER, a Prussian general, and one of the best military writers in German, estimates that not less than 10,000 cartridges are burned for every enemy killed or wounded.
At the battle of Vittoria the British are supposed to have killed or wounded one of the enemy for every 800 balls fired. An English officer states that at the battle of Cherubusco the Mexicans killed or wounded an American for every 800 balls fired, and that the Americans killed or wounded a Mexican for every 125 balls fired.
The heroic ROSECRANS, in his account of the bloodily contested battle of Murfreesboro, declares, “ Of 14,560 rebels struck by our missiles, it is estimated that 20,000 rounds of artillery hit 728 men, and 200,000 rounds of musketry hit 13,833 men, averaging 27 cannon shots to hit one man, and 145 musket shots to hit one man.
In the battle of Gainesville there could not have been expended more than 100,000 cartridges, and the enemy admit[s] a loss of more than 1000 men, thus averaging 100 musket shots to each of the rebel killed or wounded. Of course all such statements only approximate the actual ratio, but it is sufficiently clear that great as is the waste of ammunition by our army, it is not only equalled, but excelled by those [armies] of Europe.
One trouble is that our men going into battle, are weighed down, overloaded with ammunition, having to stuff their pockets as well as their cartridge-boxes with the sixty or eighty rounds ordered. Of course very much of this is thrown away and wasted; but this is only a trifling evil compared with the encouragement thus given to the too prevalent idea among the men that he who fires the greatest number of rounds in battle is the best soldier. I have heard men boasting of their achievements in this regard, and the result of such an idea is a hurried loading and discharge without any regard to aim; a wasting upon trees and foliage of ammunition which, if used at all, should be used so as to defeat the enemy. I was struck with a remark made by a rebel prisoner to his captors, “We never carry more than forty rounds into action, and usually expend about ten.
“There is altogether too much of this wild, reckless firing, the men discharging their pieces before bringing them fairly down to a level, and utterly regardless of taking aim. Of course, there are periods when heavy, rapid, and continuous volleys are necessary; still it would be well if every man could be drilled as a sharpshooter, taught to shoot slowly, and always take aim, either at the enemy or his supposed locality.
“In the five battles of the late Italian campaign, it was estimated that about 8 per cent of the French and Sardinians, and 10 ˝ per cent of their enemies, the Austrians, were either killed or wounded. In the battles spoken of in these sketches our loss was not far from 10 per cent of the whole numbers engaged, while certain divisions and brigades lost one-third their number; and in the fearfully bloody fight at Gainesville two of our regiments lost more than one-third of their number engaged, as also did the 4th brigade
“The proportion between the killed and wounded is about as 1 to 5, and of the wounded about 1 in 10 never recovers. If this be even approximative to the truth, it certainly robs war of some of its presumed fatality. As I have before remarked, the escape of so large a majority of the men, amid such storms of bullets sweeping and yelling around their ears, has always been the great mystery of war.”
Regards,
Mark Jaeger
Hi,
Opinions about the quality of American marksmanship during the war, not surprisingly, varied. In any event, the level of "marksmanship practice" in the Federal or Confederate armies was generally not comparable to what was conducted in Europe (most notably Prussia which, as I recall, required troops to fire at least 50 rounds in formal target practice per annum).
Nevertheless, as I stated, opinions varied. The following item extracted from the 29 August 1863 "United States Army and Navy Journal" may be of some interest.
WASTE OF AMMUNITION.
The following is extracted from a recently published book of campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland, by Captain GEORGE F. NOYES:
[Note: Actual title of the work is: Noyes, George F. (1824-1868). The Bivouac and the Battlefield, or, Campaign sketches in Virginia and Maryland. New York: Harper & Bros, 1863. xi, 13-339p. This is available in microform.]
The great disproportion in our battles between the number of ball cartridges discharged and the number of killed and wounded was due mainly to the want of presence of mind in our raw troops; but the very limited investigation I have been enabled to make has convinced me that our troops take much better aim, and consequently waste far less ammunition than is usual in European warfare.
During the wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire—NAPOLEON’S wars—according to GASSENDI, a French general of artillery, the infantry fired 3000 cartridges for every enemy killed or wounded. PIOBERT admits the same thing. DECKER, a Prussian general, and one of the best military writers in German, estimates that not less than 10,000 cartridges are burned for every enemy killed or wounded.
At the battle of Vittoria the British are supposed to have killed or wounded one of the enemy for every 800 balls fired. An English officer states that at the battle of Cherubusco the Mexicans killed or wounded an American for every 800 balls fired, and that the Americans killed or wounded a Mexican for every 125 balls fired.
The heroic ROSECRANS, in his account of the bloodily contested battle of Murfreesboro, declares, “ Of 14,560 rebels struck by our missiles, it is estimated that 20,000 rounds of artillery hit 728 men, and 200,000 rounds of musketry hit 13,833 men, averaging 27 cannon shots to hit one man, and 145 musket shots to hit one man.
In the battle of Gainesville there could not have been expended more than 100,000 cartridges, and the enemy admit[s] a loss of more than 1000 men, thus averaging 100 musket shots to each of the rebel killed or wounded. Of course all such statements only approximate the actual ratio, but it is sufficiently clear that great as is the waste of ammunition by our army, it is not only equalled, but excelled by those [armies] of Europe.
One trouble is that our men going into battle, are weighed down, overloaded with ammunition, having to stuff their pockets as well as their cartridge-boxes with the sixty or eighty rounds ordered. Of course very much of this is thrown away and wasted; but this is only a trifling evil compared with the encouragement thus given to the too prevalent idea among the men that he who fires the greatest number of rounds in battle is the best soldier. I have heard men boasting of their achievements in this regard, and the result of such an idea is a hurried loading and discharge without any regard to aim; a wasting upon trees and foliage of ammunition which, if used at all, should be used so as to defeat the enemy. I was struck with a remark made by a rebel prisoner to his captors, “We never carry more than forty rounds into action, and usually expend about ten.
“There is altogether too much of this wild, reckless firing, the men discharging their pieces before bringing them fairly down to a level, and utterly regardless of taking aim. Of course, there are periods when heavy, rapid, and continuous volleys are necessary; still it would be well if every man could be drilled as a sharpshooter, taught to shoot slowly, and always take aim, either at the enemy or his supposed locality.
“In the five battles of the late Italian campaign, it was estimated that about 8 per cent of the French and Sardinians, and 10 ˝ per cent of their enemies, the Austrians, were either killed or wounded. In the battles spoken of in these sketches our loss was not far from 10 per cent of the whole numbers engaged, while certain divisions and brigades lost one-third their number; and in the fearfully bloody fight at Gainesville two of our regiments lost more than one-third of their number engaged, as also did the 4th brigade
“The proportion between the killed and wounded is about as 1 to 5, and of the wounded about 1 in 10 never recovers. If this be even approximative to the truth, it certainly robs war of some of its presumed fatality. As I have before remarked, the escape of so large a majority of the men, amid such storms of bullets sweeping and yelling around their ears, has always been the great mystery of war.”
Regards,
Mark Jaeger
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