Alot of people have been inquiring so I thought I would post how the Confederate communications network operated at the Into the Wilderness event.
Through pre-event visits and careful surveying of the terrain it became clear to the Confederate Staff that the Federals had a clear advantage in terms of high ground, a base camp of operations by that high ground, and quick access into the Wilderness. The large hill by the Federal rear, which the Confederates named Federal Hill commanded a view of hundreds of acres, the entire East side of the property, in reality the majority of the operating theatre. No successful Confederate operation could take place on the East side of the property if an observation post was set up on this hill. Also the fields just southwest of this hill gave quick access into the Wilderness and trails, the principle one which we named The Dinky Trail which lead directly into the Confederate rear once we entered the Wilderness.
We were instructed by the event host that when the Confederate force entered the Wilderness we were to keep our left anchored on the Green Mill Road (Brock Road for the purposes of the event). If this was carried out, which we honored and did at the event, our right flank was open and vulnerable for a quick thrust from a field which we named the Hickman Pasture. This field and the one directly to its south provided trails to a field we named the Wood’s Cut, the field to the south of the Wilderness, directly in our rear once the thicket was entered.
A decision was made that the tactical odds had to be evened. The help of Wayne Arvo was solicited. Wayne has been a contributor to the reenacting community for years, and drew us up excellent topographical maps, giving each terrain feature a name so that when we communicated at the event we would clearly understand what we were telling each other. We enlisted the help of Walt Mathers, an old friend, and the guru of signals and telegraph within the reenacting community here in the East, for as long as anyone can remember. Too often Walt’s talents have been overlooked and his cry’s to make these period tools functional within the reenacting community unheeded. Walt, after surveying the property developed the concept of forward advance posts, hidden, where observers with period telescopes could watch Federal movements in the open territory to the East, and telegraph those movements back to a hidden area near the Woods’ Cut. Over 1 ½ miles of telegraph wire was run to accomplish our objectives.
Telegraphers were recruited from civilian life, to round out Walt's team, that had worked during their lifetime for the railroad and knew the old codes, and more importantly could read and send fast. One was an 82 year old Korean War Veteran. They were outfitted in period Civilian attire. From our forward posts no Federal movement in the open during the event went unviewed. The camp was viewed, the headquarters, movement of couriers, civilians, even the location of watering sources. And even when Federals were in the woods smoke from fires was visible. Posts were also developed for the use of signals, but the telegraph was our principle tool, along with cavalry and infantry patrols. It was decided if the Federals were going to control the luxury of the high ground, then we were going to control the hell of the Wilderness.
But once intelligence was gathered how was it going to get to the Confederate force in a timely fashion? Jay Oullette, adjutant for Pridgeon’s Shenandoah Legion was established as our principle communications officer and placed in the Woods’ Cut. From there he received communications from our head signal officer Tom McDonald, the telegraphers, and the Cavalry under Tom Peterman. Jay had a guard detail posted on him the entire event with orders not to allow him to be captured. From this position Jay commanded a team of couriers that would run the messages to Confederate command up in the Wilderness. Pioneers were extensively used to cut a trail for couriers wherever we advanced in the woods, and trees were blazed and strips of white cotton cloth marked the way for new couriers who rotated and replaced old, the distances run wearing them down quickly. How effective was the system? We had a lag time of about 20 minutes from the observation stations in the north to view the Federal activity, telegraph it to the south, write the message down on paper, get it to Jay, then run it all the way up to the front via the couriers, about 7/8 of the way up into the Wilderness.
As our force advanced through the Wilderness, when the first firing was heard to our left front and right rear, we simply continued ahead with the main bodyand did not detach forces, because we knew the main Federal force had yet to enter the Wilderness. And when the Federals entered the Wilderness we planned our tactics accordingly, because we knew where they had entered. We continued to run cavalry patrols all day on the Dinky Trail and detached Bill Russell’s infantry company to guard this approach to our rear. It may be safe to say the Confederates controlled 90% of the Wilderness terrain. Our force was able too and did move our base of operations within the Wilderness several times. Again the pioneers made this possible by cutting trails to the Brock road, our water source. By later Saturday afternoon we even commanded a good portion of the southeastern edge of the Wilderness proper, will full view of the Federal position we called Willow Grove.
Hope this gives you an idea of some of the ways we operated. I like to think of last weekend as a page out of the Don Patterson school of tactical fighting and will never forget the whooping he used to give Terry Daley at Spruce Hollow up at the Allentown events. Don provided many of us that served with him the finest moments we ever had as reenactors. If we accomplished only a fraction of what Don used to do up at Allentown then we were truly successful last weekend.
-Dave Pridgeon
Pridgeon's Shenandoah Legion
(formally Fifth Battalion)
Through pre-event visits and careful surveying of the terrain it became clear to the Confederate Staff that the Federals had a clear advantage in terms of high ground, a base camp of operations by that high ground, and quick access into the Wilderness. The large hill by the Federal rear, which the Confederates named Federal Hill commanded a view of hundreds of acres, the entire East side of the property, in reality the majority of the operating theatre. No successful Confederate operation could take place on the East side of the property if an observation post was set up on this hill. Also the fields just southwest of this hill gave quick access into the Wilderness and trails, the principle one which we named The Dinky Trail which lead directly into the Confederate rear once we entered the Wilderness.
We were instructed by the event host that when the Confederate force entered the Wilderness we were to keep our left anchored on the Green Mill Road (Brock Road for the purposes of the event). If this was carried out, which we honored and did at the event, our right flank was open and vulnerable for a quick thrust from a field which we named the Hickman Pasture. This field and the one directly to its south provided trails to a field we named the Wood’s Cut, the field to the south of the Wilderness, directly in our rear once the thicket was entered.
A decision was made that the tactical odds had to be evened. The help of Wayne Arvo was solicited. Wayne has been a contributor to the reenacting community for years, and drew us up excellent topographical maps, giving each terrain feature a name so that when we communicated at the event we would clearly understand what we were telling each other. We enlisted the help of Walt Mathers, an old friend, and the guru of signals and telegraph within the reenacting community here in the East, for as long as anyone can remember. Too often Walt’s talents have been overlooked and his cry’s to make these period tools functional within the reenacting community unheeded. Walt, after surveying the property developed the concept of forward advance posts, hidden, where observers with period telescopes could watch Federal movements in the open territory to the East, and telegraph those movements back to a hidden area near the Woods’ Cut. Over 1 ½ miles of telegraph wire was run to accomplish our objectives.
Telegraphers were recruited from civilian life, to round out Walt's team, that had worked during their lifetime for the railroad and knew the old codes, and more importantly could read and send fast. One was an 82 year old Korean War Veteran. They were outfitted in period Civilian attire. From our forward posts no Federal movement in the open during the event went unviewed. The camp was viewed, the headquarters, movement of couriers, civilians, even the location of watering sources. And even when Federals were in the woods smoke from fires was visible. Posts were also developed for the use of signals, but the telegraph was our principle tool, along with cavalry and infantry patrols. It was decided if the Federals were going to control the luxury of the high ground, then we were going to control the hell of the Wilderness.
But once intelligence was gathered how was it going to get to the Confederate force in a timely fashion? Jay Oullette, adjutant for Pridgeon’s Shenandoah Legion was established as our principle communications officer and placed in the Woods’ Cut. From there he received communications from our head signal officer Tom McDonald, the telegraphers, and the Cavalry under Tom Peterman. Jay had a guard detail posted on him the entire event with orders not to allow him to be captured. From this position Jay commanded a team of couriers that would run the messages to Confederate command up in the Wilderness. Pioneers were extensively used to cut a trail for couriers wherever we advanced in the woods, and trees were blazed and strips of white cotton cloth marked the way for new couriers who rotated and replaced old, the distances run wearing them down quickly. How effective was the system? We had a lag time of about 20 minutes from the observation stations in the north to view the Federal activity, telegraph it to the south, write the message down on paper, get it to Jay, then run it all the way up to the front via the couriers, about 7/8 of the way up into the Wilderness.
As our force advanced through the Wilderness, when the first firing was heard to our left front and right rear, we simply continued ahead with the main bodyand did not detach forces, because we knew the main Federal force had yet to enter the Wilderness. And when the Federals entered the Wilderness we planned our tactics accordingly, because we knew where they had entered. We continued to run cavalry patrols all day on the Dinky Trail and detached Bill Russell’s infantry company to guard this approach to our rear. It may be safe to say the Confederates controlled 90% of the Wilderness terrain. Our force was able too and did move our base of operations within the Wilderness several times. Again the pioneers made this possible by cutting trails to the Brock road, our water source. By later Saturday afternoon we even commanded a good portion of the southeastern edge of the Wilderness proper, will full view of the Federal position we called Willow Grove.
Hope this gives you an idea of some of the ways we operated. I like to think of last weekend as a page out of the Don Patterson school of tactical fighting and will never forget the whooping he used to give Terry Daley at Spruce Hollow up at the Allentown events. Don provided many of us that served with him the finest moments we ever had as reenactors. If we accomplished only a fraction of what Don used to do up at Allentown then we were truly successful last weekend.
-Dave Pridgeon
Pridgeon's Shenandoah Legion
(formally Fifth Battalion)