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You may find the following helpful as I know some will be attending Pickett's Mill this spring.
David Culberson
Hazen's Account from his book A Narrative of Military Service (1885)
Pickett's Mills
This engagement was bought toward evening on the 27th of May, 1864, near Dallas, Georgia, and has generally been confounded with the action at New Hope Church, fought two days before. It takes its name from a mill situated half a mile in a rear of where the action took place, and was fought under the chief demand of Major-General O.O. Howard. It is scarcely noticed in any of the reports of the Union commanders, and is ignored by Sherman in his memoirs; but it was the most fierce, bloody, and persistent assault by our troops in the Atlanta campaign, and the Confederates, who were victorious, have described it at length. The purpose of this engagement was to find the enemy's right flank, and then drive it in, double it back, and assail the Confederate rear. Unfortunately the day was too far spent when the attack was made, to give the best promise of success.
My command was withdrawn for this attack from a position into line where for 48 hours it had been very actively gauge. Many felt that this imposed on a span additional service of very great severity out of our turn. General Woods report shows that he protested stubbornly. In a conversation with General Howard, our core commander, when we were given the advance, he said to me that he had selected before she thought gave the greatest promise of succeeding in the work in hand. This remark for stalled any objection on my part. We proceed from 10 in the morning through a dense would tilt 2 p.m., and been halted for two hours in the half. I was Edward to form for the attack at the.8, as shown in the sketch, the two other brigade forming similarly in my rear; in all, six lines.
The accompanying map was accurately drawn by my topographical officer on the spot, two or three days after the battle. It represents only my command and the enemy in our front. The attack was to have been by column. Our approach was through a dense wood, and our advance in the attack was through a wood so thick that we could keep our direction only by the compass; and in moving, the rear line made distance to the left by just its front, and came into action on the prolongation of the front line. No attack could have been made in better form, nor persisted in with more determination; but as a column attack it was a failure. The several brigades, instead of striking in such a rapid succession that each might benefit by the advantage gained by those before it, were put in at intervals of 40 minutes. This resulted in separate attacks by detachments, with ample warning to the enemy to get ready and repair damage. Just as I was about to move, General Wood in my presence remarked to General Howard, " We will put in Hazen, and see what success he has." This was a revelation to me, as it was evident there was to be no attack by column at all. The attack was made, however, with the belief on the part of the man that it was by column, which made the long interval before relief came seen in excuse will to many. When my command had worn itself out in a close fight of just 45 minutes, losing over 500 men, and I had sent back all my staff and several other officers to hurry up the other lines, we began to fall back man by man, company by company, and regiment by regiment, from sheer necessity; for, as General Wood said in his report, "no troops could stay there and live." The command all fell back in this manner, sifting through the dense wood, except about 300 men, who, as it proved afterward, could not get away without uncovering from positions they had taken in the immediate front of an overpowering enemy, who by this time had been reinforced by Cleburne's division. The brigade mostly fell back along the depression where the little brook is shown on the map as emptying into Pumpkin-Vine Creek, just below the mill. I had taken my position, and had remained during all the fight at B, on the map, under very great exposure, where I could see all the left of the line and some of the right. The whole fight was terrific and the slaughter immense. The left flank fell back along the fence near my position running at right angles to the line of battle, as shown on the map, and here fired with great execution upon the enemy advancing across the cornfield from our left. The enemy came on in fine style, coming up from the ravine beyond; but after one volley from our men along the fence they were out of sight, to a man, in 20 seconds. Our next brigade to advance (Gibson's) was met as we fell back about two hundred yards from the front line as represented on the map. My command was re-formed with great difficulty near Pumpkin-Vine Creek. I rode rapidly to each place where I saw a regimental color, and halting it would order the bearer to stand in his position, and then, with my aides, orderlies, and the staff of other officers, would direct the men one by one to their colors. It was slow work, as the men were in the bad humor, and felt that they had not been properly supported. They went into the fight with the implied promise of immediate support that a column attack always gives, and they felt, as they expressed it, that they had been "sold out." As soon as I had gotten together a small fragment of three or four of my nine regiments, I was taken, by General Howard's order, to a new position on the right. Everybody was morose, and found fault with his superior,--- the men with their captains, the captains with their colonels, and so on all the way up.
This battle was the subject of a great deal of criticism and fault-finding. The two fatal mistakes, as they appeared to me, were the two hours' halt after arriving on the flank of the enemy— who were alert, and knew what we were doing— and to the abandonment of the column movement in attacking, after the two hours had been wasted in getting ready for it. In confirmation of this opinion, and to show the desperate character of the assault, I clothed the following extracts from the account of the engagement by General Joseph E. Johnston, our opposing commander-in-chief:--
" The Federal troops extended their entrenched line so rapidly to their left that it was found necessary, on the morning of the 27th, to transfer Cleburne's division of Hardee's corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongation of Polk's line.... Between five and 6 o'clock in the afternoon Kelly's skirmishers were driven in by a body of Federal cavalry, whose advance was supported by the Fourth Corps. This advance was retarded by the resistance of Kelly's troops fighting on foot behind unconnected little heaps of loose stones. As soon as the noise of this contest revealed to Major-General Cleburne to the maneuver to turn his right, he brought the right brigade of his second line (Granberry's) to Kelly's support by forming it on the right of his first line, when the thin line of dismounted cavalry, that had been bravely resisting masses of infantry, gave place to the Texan brigade.
"The Fourth Corps came on in deep order, and assailed the Texans with great vigor, receiving their close and accurate fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in the actions of this campaign. They had also to endure the fire of Govan's right, including two pieces of artillery, on their right flank. At the same time Kelly's and a part of Hume's troops, directed by General Wheeler, met the Federal left, which was following the movement of the main body.... The united forces continued to press forward, however, but so much delayed by the resistance of Wheeler's troops as to give time for the arrival on that part of the field of the 8th and 9th Arkansas Regiments under Colonel Bancum, detached by General Govan to the assistance of the cavalry. This little body met the foremost of the Federal troops as they were reaching the prolongation of Granberry's line, and charging gallantly, drove them back, and preserved the Texans from an attack in flank which must have been fatal. Before the Federal left could gather to overwhelm Bancum and his two regiments, Lowry's brigade, hurried by General Cleburne from its position as left of his second line, came to join them; and the two, formed abreast of Granberry's brigade, stopped in the advance of the enemy's left, and successfully resisted its subsequent attacks. The contest of the main body of the Fourth Corps with Granberry's brigade was a very fierce one. The Federal troops approached within a few yards of the Confederates, but at last were forced to give way by their storm of well-directed bullets, and fell back to the shelter of a hollow near and behind them. They left hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of the Confederate line. When the United States troops paused in their advance within 15 paces of the Texan front rank, one of their color-bearers planted his colors 8 or 10 feet in front of his regiment, and was instantly shot dead. A soldier sprang forward to his place, and fell also as he grasped the color-staff. A second and third followed successively, and each received death as speedily as his predecessors. A fourth, however, seized and bore back the object of soldierly devotion.
"About 10 o'clock at night Granberry ascertained that many of the Federal troops were still in the hollow immediately before him, and charged and drove them from it, taking to hundred and thirty-two prisoners, 72 of whom were severely wounded.
"The Federal dead lying near our line were counted by many persons, officers and soldiers. According to those counts there were 700 of them.... We found about 1200 small arms on the field..... In the affair at New Hope Church, two days before, greater forces were engaged."
The following is from General Hood, commanding the Confederate Corps on their left:--
"Headquarters Hood's Corps, in the field, 1864.
General Joseph E. Johnston, Macon, Georgia:
General.-- Agreeable to the directions of the commanding General, I have the honor herewith to submit the operations of my command since the seventh of May.... On the morning of the 27th the enemy were known to be rapidly extending their left, attempting to turn my right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them; and at half past 5 p.m. a very stubborn attack was made on his division, extending to the right, where Major-General Wheeler with his cavalry division was engaging them. The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler.... About 10 o'clock at night Brigadier-General Granberry, with his brigade of Texans, made a dashing charge upon the enemy, driving them from the field....
Respectfully,
J. B. Hood.
I witnessed the attack of the two brigades following my own, and none of these advanced nearer than 100 yards of the enemy's works. They went in at a run, and as organizations were broken in less than a minute.
May 28. Remained in position of last night, strengthening our lines. Annoyed someone by Rebel artillery. Willich is on our right, and King's brigade, of Johnson's division, on our left.
May 29. Still occupying same position. Fusilade last night. Artillery continued to annoy us.
May 30. No sleep last night, the pickets keeping up a constant fusilade. Our skirmishers moved forward about 50 yards this evening, and dug pits for their protection.
May 31. Shortly after day light this morning the enemy's pickets were advanced, apparently for the purpose of occupying the crest, which our troops fortified last night. Meeting with a fire from our main line, they hastily retreated. Two prisoners fell into our hands.
June 1. Still occupying same works. Brigade lost last month 726 men, of whom 142 were killed and 537 wounded.
June 2. All quiet. Less picket-firing than usual. Severe thunderstorm about noon, during which two men of the First Ohio were killed and two disabled by lightning. The two disabled were sent to hospital.
June 3. Withdrew our pickets and struck tents. Troops close behind their works. Object,-- to deceive the enemy into the idea that the works were evacuated. Not successful.
June 4. Nothing of importance transpired to-day.
June 5. Enemy retired last night. We are remaining quietly in camp to-day.
June 6. Moved at about 8 o'clock in the direction of Acworth. Went into camp at noon, having marched 7 miles. Roads very muddy, and marching difficult.
June 7. Remained in camp to-day.
June 8. Full rations for two days. Brigade inspected by brigade acting-inspector-general.
June 9. Ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning.
Cleburne's Report
Headquarters Cleburne's Division
Paulding County, Ga. May 30, 1864
Colonel: In compliance with orders, I submit the following account of the operations of my division on the afternoon and night of the 27th instant:
About two or three clock of the afternoon of the 26th I arrived with my division on the extreme right of the then line of the army, when I was sent to support Major-General Hindman. And that point our lines, the general bearing of which was North and South, retired for a few yards to the East. In continuation of this retiring line I placed Polk's brigade (of my division) in and diagonally across it, upon a ridge in echelon by battalion to avoid an artillery enfilade from a neighboring position held by the enemy. Resting on Polk's right was placed Hotchkiss' artillery, consisting of 4 Napoleons, four Parrott guns, and four howitzers. Supporting Hotchkiss on the right hand was one regiment of Govan's, of my division. The remainder of my division was disposed in rear as a second line in support of Hindman's right brigades and my first line. Intrenchments were thrown up in the afternoon and night of the 26th and in the morning of the 27th. The position was in the main covered with trees and undergrowth, which served as a screen along our lines, concealed us, and were left standing as far as practicable for that purpose. On the morning of the 27th, and about 7 o'clock, Govan was sent to the north front on a reconnaissance, with directions to swing to the left in his advance. From time to time, while engaged in this reconnaissance, Govan sent me word that the enemy was moving to the right– his own left. At 11 a.m., upon my order to that effect, Govan came in, leaving his skirmishers about 3/4 of a mile in front. I at once placed him on the right of Polk, where he covered himself in rifle-pits. About 4 p.m., hearing that the enemy's infantry in line of battle were pressing the cavalry on my right (they had already driven in my skirmishers), I placed Granbury on Govan's right. He had but just gotten into position, and a dismounted cavalry force, in line behind a few disconnected heaps of stones loosely piled together, had passed behind him, when the enemy advanced. He showed himself first, having driven back my skirmishers, in the edge of an open field in front of Govan, about 400 yards across, where he halted and opened fire. From the point on the ridge where Govan's right and Granbury's left met, there made off a spur, which, and about 100 yards from it, turned sharply to the northeast, running then in a direction almost parallel with it and maintaining about an equal elevation. Between this spur and the parent ridge, beginning in front of Granbury's left, was a deep ravine, the side of which next to Granbury was very steep, with occasional benches of rock up to a line within 30 or 40 yards of Granbury's men, where it flattened into a natural glacis. This glacis was well covered with well grown trees and in most places with thick undergrowth. Here was the brunt of the battle, the enemy advancing along this front in numerous and constantly re-enforced lines. His man displayed a courage worthy of an honorable cause, pressing in steady throngs within a few paces of our men, frequently exclaiming, "Ah, damn you, we have caught you without your logs now." Granbury's men, needing no logs, were awaiting them, and throughout awaited them with calm determination, and as they appeared upon the slope slaughtered them with deliberate aim. The piles of his dead on this front, pronounced by the officers in this army who have seen the most service to be greater than they had ever seen before, were a silent but sufficient eulogy upon Granbury and his noble Texans. In the great execution here done upon the enemy, Govan with his two right regiments, disdaining the enemy in his own front, who were somewhat removed, and Key with two pieces of artillery ran by hand upon my order to a convenient breach made in our breast-works, materially aided Granbury by a right-oblique fire which enfiladed the masses in his front. In front of a prolongation of Granbury's line and abutting upon his right was a field about 300 yards square. The enemy, driving back some cavalry, at this point advanced completely across the field and passed some 40 or 50 yards in its rear. Here, however, they work and fronted by the 8th and 19th Arkansas (consolidated), commanded by Colonel Baucum, hastily sent by Govan upon Granbury's request and representation of the exigency. In a sweeping charge Baucum drove the enemy from the ridge in his front, and with irresistible impetuosity forced him across the field and back into the woods, from which he had at first advanced. Here he fixed himself and kept up a heavy fire, aided by a deadly enfilade from the bottom of the ravine in front of Granbury. When Baucum was about to charge, Lowrey, of my division, who had been hastened up from his distant position upward of a mile and a half from my right as finally established, came into line, throwing his regiments in successively, as they unmasked themselves by their flank march. His arrival was most opportune, as the enemy was beginning to pour around Baucum's right. Colonel Adams, of the 33rd Alabama, which was the first of Lowrey's regiments to form into line, to position on Baucum's right and advanced with him, his seven left companies being in the field with Baucum, and his other four in the woods to the right. Baucum and Adams, finding themselves suffering from the enemies direct and oblique fire, withdrew, passing over the open space of the field behind them. The right companies of Adams, which were in the woods, retired to a spur which rises from the easterly edge of the field about 200 yards from its southerly edge, where Baucum's and Adams' left companies rested. Here they halted. Captain Dodson, with fine judgment perceiving the importance of the position– it would have given the enemy an enfilading fire upon Granbury, which would have dislodged him– and making his company the basis of alignment for the remainder of Lowrey's, now coming into position. This retrograde movement across the field was not attended with loss as might have been expected, the enemy not advancing as it was made. It was mistaken, however, for a repulse, and some of my staff officers hearing that my line had broken hastened forward Quarles' brigade, of Stewart's division, just then providentially sent up by General Hood to re-establish it. Lowrey, being under the same impression, detached his two right regiments (which had not been engaged) under Colonels Tison and Hardcastle, and had them quickly formed in support of Baucum and Adams. The error, however, was soon discovered, and my line being ascertained to remain in its integrity, Quarles' brigade was conducted to the rear of Lowrey, and formed as a second line. The Fourth Louisiana, Colonel Hunter, finding itself opposite an interval between the two regiments of Lowrey's line (caused by Baucum's resting closer upon Granbury on his return from the advance, than he had done at first), under the immediate superintendence of General Quarles, advanced with great spirit into the field, halted, and delivered a very effective fire upon the enemy in his front. After some minutes Quarles withdrew this regiment and formed it behind the field, where they continued their fire across it. General Quarles and his brigade have my thanks. During these movements of battle continued to rage on Granbury's front, and was met with unflagging spirit. About the time of Quarles getting into position night came on, when the combat lulled. For some hours afterward a desultory dropping fire, with short, vehement bursts of musketry, continued, the enemy lying in great numbers immediately in front of portions of my line, and so near it that their footsteps could be distinctly heard. About 10 p.m. I ordered Granbury and Lowrey to push forward skirmishers and scouts to learn the state of things in their respective fronts. Granbury, finding it impossible to advance his skirmishers until he had cleared his front of the enemy lying up against it, with my consent, charged with his whole line, Walthall with his brigade, from Hindman's division, whom I sent to his support, taking his place in the line as he stepped out of it. The Texans, their bayonets fixed, plunged into the darkness with a terrific yell, and with one bound were upon the enemy, but they met with no resistance. Surprised and panic-stricken many fled, escaping in the darkness, others surrendered and were brought into our lines. It needed but the brilliancy of this night attack to add luster to the achievements of Granbury and his brigade in the afternoon. I am deeply indebted to them both. My thanks are also due to General Lowrey for the coolness and skill which he exhibited in forming his line. His successive formation was the precise answer to the enemy's movement in the extending his left to turn our right. Time was of the essence of things, and his movement was the quickest. His line was formed under heavy fire, on ground unknown to him and of the most difficult character, and the stern firmness with which he and his men and Baucum's regiment drove off the enemy and resisted his renewed attacks without doubt saved the right of the army, as Granbury had already done before.
During the progress of the battle much service was rendered by the rifle battery and two remaining howitzers of Key's battery, in position on Polk's right. They were trained in enfilade upon the enemy's reserves massed behind the hill in front of the spur we occupied. I regretted I did not have more guns for this service. I had sent the Napoleon guns to the right, where they were unable to find positions, and so were useless.
During these operations Polk was not engaged, but it was a source of strength and confidence to the rest of the division to know that he had charge of the weakest and most delicate part of our line.
It is due to the following officers of my staff that I should acknowledge the industry, zeal, and activity they manifested in the battle: Maj. Calhoun Benham, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. K. Dixon, assistant inspector-general; Captain Irving A. Buck, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Robert McFarland, Lieutenant's L. H. Mangum, S. P. Hanly, and J. W. Jetton, aides- de camp, and Captain C. H. Byrne, volunteer aide-de-camp. They did their full duty with ability, gallantry, and enthusiasm. I am indebted to them for their cooperation. My ordnance, under Captain C. S. Hill, and my medical department, under Surg. D. A. Linthicum, and my artillery, under Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss, were well administered.
My casualties in this battle were few. I had 85 killed, 363 wounded, carrying into the engagement 4,683 muskets. The enemy's losses were very heavy. The lowest estimate which can be made of his dead is 500. We captured 160 prisoners who were sent to army headquarters, exclusive of 72 of his wounded carried to my field hospital. He could not have lost in all less than 3000 killed and wounded. I took upward of 1200 small arms.
This battle was fought at a place known as the "Picket Settlement", and about two miles northeast of New Hope Church.
Very respectfully,
P. R. Cleburne,
Maj. Gen.
David Culberson
Hazen's Account from his book A Narrative of Military Service (1885)
Pickett's Mills
This engagement was bought toward evening on the 27th of May, 1864, near Dallas, Georgia, and has generally been confounded with the action at New Hope Church, fought two days before. It takes its name from a mill situated half a mile in a rear of where the action took place, and was fought under the chief demand of Major-General O.O. Howard. It is scarcely noticed in any of the reports of the Union commanders, and is ignored by Sherman in his memoirs; but it was the most fierce, bloody, and persistent assault by our troops in the Atlanta campaign, and the Confederates, who were victorious, have described it at length. The purpose of this engagement was to find the enemy's right flank, and then drive it in, double it back, and assail the Confederate rear. Unfortunately the day was too far spent when the attack was made, to give the best promise of success.
My command was withdrawn for this attack from a position into line where for 48 hours it had been very actively gauge. Many felt that this imposed on a span additional service of very great severity out of our turn. General Woods report shows that he protested stubbornly. In a conversation with General Howard, our core commander, when we were given the advance, he said to me that he had selected before she thought gave the greatest promise of succeeding in the work in hand. This remark for stalled any objection on my part. We proceed from 10 in the morning through a dense would tilt 2 p.m., and been halted for two hours in the half. I was Edward to form for the attack at the.8, as shown in the sketch, the two other brigade forming similarly in my rear; in all, six lines.
The accompanying map was accurately drawn by my topographical officer on the spot, two or three days after the battle. It represents only my command and the enemy in our front. The attack was to have been by column. Our approach was through a dense wood, and our advance in the attack was through a wood so thick that we could keep our direction only by the compass; and in moving, the rear line made distance to the left by just its front, and came into action on the prolongation of the front line. No attack could have been made in better form, nor persisted in with more determination; but as a column attack it was a failure. The several brigades, instead of striking in such a rapid succession that each might benefit by the advantage gained by those before it, were put in at intervals of 40 minutes. This resulted in separate attacks by detachments, with ample warning to the enemy to get ready and repair damage. Just as I was about to move, General Wood in my presence remarked to General Howard, " We will put in Hazen, and see what success he has." This was a revelation to me, as it was evident there was to be no attack by column at all. The attack was made, however, with the belief on the part of the man that it was by column, which made the long interval before relief came seen in excuse will to many. When my command had worn itself out in a close fight of just 45 minutes, losing over 500 men, and I had sent back all my staff and several other officers to hurry up the other lines, we began to fall back man by man, company by company, and regiment by regiment, from sheer necessity; for, as General Wood said in his report, "no troops could stay there and live." The command all fell back in this manner, sifting through the dense wood, except about 300 men, who, as it proved afterward, could not get away without uncovering from positions they had taken in the immediate front of an overpowering enemy, who by this time had been reinforced by Cleburne's division. The brigade mostly fell back along the depression where the little brook is shown on the map as emptying into Pumpkin-Vine Creek, just below the mill. I had taken my position, and had remained during all the fight at B, on the map, under very great exposure, where I could see all the left of the line and some of the right. The whole fight was terrific and the slaughter immense. The left flank fell back along the fence near my position running at right angles to the line of battle, as shown on the map, and here fired with great execution upon the enemy advancing across the cornfield from our left. The enemy came on in fine style, coming up from the ravine beyond; but after one volley from our men along the fence they were out of sight, to a man, in 20 seconds. Our next brigade to advance (Gibson's) was met as we fell back about two hundred yards from the front line as represented on the map. My command was re-formed with great difficulty near Pumpkin-Vine Creek. I rode rapidly to each place where I saw a regimental color, and halting it would order the bearer to stand in his position, and then, with my aides, orderlies, and the staff of other officers, would direct the men one by one to their colors. It was slow work, as the men were in the bad humor, and felt that they had not been properly supported. They went into the fight with the implied promise of immediate support that a column attack always gives, and they felt, as they expressed it, that they had been "sold out." As soon as I had gotten together a small fragment of three or four of my nine regiments, I was taken, by General Howard's order, to a new position on the right. Everybody was morose, and found fault with his superior,--- the men with their captains, the captains with their colonels, and so on all the way up.
This battle was the subject of a great deal of criticism and fault-finding. The two fatal mistakes, as they appeared to me, were the two hours' halt after arriving on the flank of the enemy— who were alert, and knew what we were doing— and to the abandonment of the column movement in attacking, after the two hours had been wasted in getting ready for it. In confirmation of this opinion, and to show the desperate character of the assault, I clothed the following extracts from the account of the engagement by General Joseph E. Johnston, our opposing commander-in-chief:--
" The Federal troops extended their entrenched line so rapidly to their left that it was found necessary, on the morning of the 27th, to transfer Cleburne's division of Hardee's corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongation of Polk's line.... Between five and 6 o'clock in the afternoon Kelly's skirmishers were driven in by a body of Federal cavalry, whose advance was supported by the Fourth Corps. This advance was retarded by the resistance of Kelly's troops fighting on foot behind unconnected little heaps of loose stones. As soon as the noise of this contest revealed to Major-General Cleburne to the maneuver to turn his right, he brought the right brigade of his second line (Granberry's) to Kelly's support by forming it on the right of his first line, when the thin line of dismounted cavalry, that had been bravely resisting masses of infantry, gave place to the Texan brigade.
"The Fourth Corps came on in deep order, and assailed the Texans with great vigor, receiving their close and accurate fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in the actions of this campaign. They had also to endure the fire of Govan's right, including two pieces of artillery, on their right flank. At the same time Kelly's and a part of Hume's troops, directed by General Wheeler, met the Federal left, which was following the movement of the main body.... The united forces continued to press forward, however, but so much delayed by the resistance of Wheeler's troops as to give time for the arrival on that part of the field of the 8th and 9th Arkansas Regiments under Colonel Bancum, detached by General Govan to the assistance of the cavalry. This little body met the foremost of the Federal troops as they were reaching the prolongation of Granberry's line, and charging gallantly, drove them back, and preserved the Texans from an attack in flank which must have been fatal. Before the Federal left could gather to overwhelm Bancum and his two regiments, Lowry's brigade, hurried by General Cleburne from its position as left of his second line, came to join them; and the two, formed abreast of Granberry's brigade, stopped in the advance of the enemy's left, and successfully resisted its subsequent attacks. The contest of the main body of the Fourth Corps with Granberry's brigade was a very fierce one. The Federal troops approached within a few yards of the Confederates, but at last were forced to give way by their storm of well-directed bullets, and fell back to the shelter of a hollow near and behind them. They left hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of the Confederate line. When the United States troops paused in their advance within 15 paces of the Texan front rank, one of their color-bearers planted his colors 8 or 10 feet in front of his regiment, and was instantly shot dead. A soldier sprang forward to his place, and fell also as he grasped the color-staff. A second and third followed successively, and each received death as speedily as his predecessors. A fourth, however, seized and bore back the object of soldierly devotion.
"About 10 o'clock at night Granberry ascertained that many of the Federal troops were still in the hollow immediately before him, and charged and drove them from it, taking to hundred and thirty-two prisoners, 72 of whom were severely wounded.
"The Federal dead lying near our line were counted by many persons, officers and soldiers. According to those counts there were 700 of them.... We found about 1200 small arms on the field..... In the affair at New Hope Church, two days before, greater forces were engaged."
The following is from General Hood, commanding the Confederate Corps on their left:--
"Headquarters Hood's Corps, in the field, 1864.
General Joseph E. Johnston, Macon, Georgia:
General.-- Agreeable to the directions of the commanding General, I have the honor herewith to submit the operations of my command since the seventh of May.... On the morning of the 27th the enemy were known to be rapidly extending their left, attempting to turn my right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them; and at half past 5 p.m. a very stubborn attack was made on his division, extending to the right, where Major-General Wheeler with his cavalry division was engaging them. The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler.... About 10 o'clock at night Brigadier-General Granberry, with his brigade of Texans, made a dashing charge upon the enemy, driving them from the field....
Respectfully,
J. B. Hood.
I witnessed the attack of the two brigades following my own, and none of these advanced nearer than 100 yards of the enemy's works. They went in at a run, and as organizations were broken in less than a minute.
May 28. Remained in position of last night, strengthening our lines. Annoyed someone by Rebel artillery. Willich is on our right, and King's brigade, of Johnson's division, on our left.
May 29. Still occupying same position. Fusilade last night. Artillery continued to annoy us.
May 30. No sleep last night, the pickets keeping up a constant fusilade. Our skirmishers moved forward about 50 yards this evening, and dug pits for their protection.
May 31. Shortly after day light this morning the enemy's pickets were advanced, apparently for the purpose of occupying the crest, which our troops fortified last night. Meeting with a fire from our main line, they hastily retreated. Two prisoners fell into our hands.
June 1. Still occupying same works. Brigade lost last month 726 men, of whom 142 were killed and 537 wounded.
June 2. All quiet. Less picket-firing than usual. Severe thunderstorm about noon, during which two men of the First Ohio were killed and two disabled by lightning. The two disabled were sent to hospital.
June 3. Withdrew our pickets and struck tents. Troops close behind their works. Object,-- to deceive the enemy into the idea that the works were evacuated. Not successful.
June 4. Nothing of importance transpired to-day.
June 5. Enemy retired last night. We are remaining quietly in camp to-day.
June 6. Moved at about 8 o'clock in the direction of Acworth. Went into camp at noon, having marched 7 miles. Roads very muddy, and marching difficult.
June 7. Remained in camp to-day.
June 8. Full rations for two days. Brigade inspected by brigade acting-inspector-general.
June 9. Ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning.
Cleburne's Report
Headquarters Cleburne's Division
Paulding County, Ga. May 30, 1864
Colonel: In compliance with orders, I submit the following account of the operations of my division on the afternoon and night of the 27th instant:
About two or three clock of the afternoon of the 26th I arrived with my division on the extreme right of the then line of the army, when I was sent to support Major-General Hindman. And that point our lines, the general bearing of which was North and South, retired for a few yards to the East. In continuation of this retiring line I placed Polk's brigade (of my division) in and diagonally across it, upon a ridge in echelon by battalion to avoid an artillery enfilade from a neighboring position held by the enemy. Resting on Polk's right was placed Hotchkiss' artillery, consisting of 4 Napoleons, four Parrott guns, and four howitzers. Supporting Hotchkiss on the right hand was one regiment of Govan's, of my division. The remainder of my division was disposed in rear as a second line in support of Hindman's right brigades and my first line. Intrenchments were thrown up in the afternoon and night of the 26th and in the morning of the 27th. The position was in the main covered with trees and undergrowth, which served as a screen along our lines, concealed us, and were left standing as far as practicable for that purpose. On the morning of the 27th, and about 7 o'clock, Govan was sent to the north front on a reconnaissance, with directions to swing to the left in his advance. From time to time, while engaged in this reconnaissance, Govan sent me word that the enemy was moving to the right– his own left. At 11 a.m., upon my order to that effect, Govan came in, leaving his skirmishers about 3/4 of a mile in front. I at once placed him on the right of Polk, where he covered himself in rifle-pits. About 4 p.m., hearing that the enemy's infantry in line of battle were pressing the cavalry on my right (they had already driven in my skirmishers), I placed Granbury on Govan's right. He had but just gotten into position, and a dismounted cavalry force, in line behind a few disconnected heaps of stones loosely piled together, had passed behind him, when the enemy advanced. He showed himself first, having driven back my skirmishers, in the edge of an open field in front of Govan, about 400 yards across, where he halted and opened fire. From the point on the ridge where Govan's right and Granbury's left met, there made off a spur, which, and about 100 yards from it, turned sharply to the northeast, running then in a direction almost parallel with it and maintaining about an equal elevation. Between this spur and the parent ridge, beginning in front of Granbury's left, was a deep ravine, the side of which next to Granbury was very steep, with occasional benches of rock up to a line within 30 or 40 yards of Granbury's men, where it flattened into a natural glacis. This glacis was well covered with well grown trees and in most places with thick undergrowth. Here was the brunt of the battle, the enemy advancing along this front in numerous and constantly re-enforced lines. His man displayed a courage worthy of an honorable cause, pressing in steady throngs within a few paces of our men, frequently exclaiming, "Ah, damn you, we have caught you without your logs now." Granbury's men, needing no logs, were awaiting them, and throughout awaited them with calm determination, and as they appeared upon the slope slaughtered them with deliberate aim. The piles of his dead on this front, pronounced by the officers in this army who have seen the most service to be greater than they had ever seen before, were a silent but sufficient eulogy upon Granbury and his noble Texans. In the great execution here done upon the enemy, Govan with his two right regiments, disdaining the enemy in his own front, who were somewhat removed, and Key with two pieces of artillery ran by hand upon my order to a convenient breach made in our breast-works, materially aided Granbury by a right-oblique fire which enfiladed the masses in his front. In front of a prolongation of Granbury's line and abutting upon his right was a field about 300 yards square. The enemy, driving back some cavalry, at this point advanced completely across the field and passed some 40 or 50 yards in its rear. Here, however, they work and fronted by the 8th and 19th Arkansas (consolidated), commanded by Colonel Baucum, hastily sent by Govan upon Granbury's request and representation of the exigency. In a sweeping charge Baucum drove the enemy from the ridge in his front, and with irresistible impetuosity forced him across the field and back into the woods, from which he had at first advanced. Here he fixed himself and kept up a heavy fire, aided by a deadly enfilade from the bottom of the ravine in front of Granbury. When Baucum was about to charge, Lowrey, of my division, who had been hastened up from his distant position upward of a mile and a half from my right as finally established, came into line, throwing his regiments in successively, as they unmasked themselves by their flank march. His arrival was most opportune, as the enemy was beginning to pour around Baucum's right. Colonel Adams, of the 33rd Alabama, which was the first of Lowrey's regiments to form into line, to position on Baucum's right and advanced with him, his seven left companies being in the field with Baucum, and his other four in the woods to the right. Baucum and Adams, finding themselves suffering from the enemies direct and oblique fire, withdrew, passing over the open space of the field behind them. The right companies of Adams, which were in the woods, retired to a spur which rises from the easterly edge of the field about 200 yards from its southerly edge, where Baucum's and Adams' left companies rested. Here they halted. Captain Dodson, with fine judgment perceiving the importance of the position– it would have given the enemy an enfilading fire upon Granbury, which would have dislodged him– and making his company the basis of alignment for the remainder of Lowrey's, now coming into position. This retrograde movement across the field was not attended with loss as might have been expected, the enemy not advancing as it was made. It was mistaken, however, for a repulse, and some of my staff officers hearing that my line had broken hastened forward Quarles' brigade, of Stewart's division, just then providentially sent up by General Hood to re-establish it. Lowrey, being under the same impression, detached his two right regiments (which had not been engaged) under Colonels Tison and Hardcastle, and had them quickly formed in support of Baucum and Adams. The error, however, was soon discovered, and my line being ascertained to remain in its integrity, Quarles' brigade was conducted to the rear of Lowrey, and formed as a second line. The Fourth Louisiana, Colonel Hunter, finding itself opposite an interval between the two regiments of Lowrey's line (caused by Baucum's resting closer upon Granbury on his return from the advance, than he had done at first), under the immediate superintendence of General Quarles, advanced with great spirit into the field, halted, and delivered a very effective fire upon the enemy in his front. After some minutes Quarles withdrew this regiment and formed it behind the field, where they continued their fire across it. General Quarles and his brigade have my thanks. During these movements of battle continued to rage on Granbury's front, and was met with unflagging spirit. About the time of Quarles getting into position night came on, when the combat lulled. For some hours afterward a desultory dropping fire, with short, vehement bursts of musketry, continued, the enemy lying in great numbers immediately in front of portions of my line, and so near it that their footsteps could be distinctly heard. About 10 p.m. I ordered Granbury and Lowrey to push forward skirmishers and scouts to learn the state of things in their respective fronts. Granbury, finding it impossible to advance his skirmishers until he had cleared his front of the enemy lying up against it, with my consent, charged with his whole line, Walthall with his brigade, from Hindman's division, whom I sent to his support, taking his place in the line as he stepped out of it. The Texans, their bayonets fixed, plunged into the darkness with a terrific yell, and with one bound were upon the enemy, but they met with no resistance. Surprised and panic-stricken many fled, escaping in the darkness, others surrendered and were brought into our lines. It needed but the brilliancy of this night attack to add luster to the achievements of Granbury and his brigade in the afternoon. I am deeply indebted to them both. My thanks are also due to General Lowrey for the coolness and skill which he exhibited in forming his line. His successive formation was the precise answer to the enemy's movement in the extending his left to turn our right. Time was of the essence of things, and his movement was the quickest. His line was formed under heavy fire, on ground unknown to him and of the most difficult character, and the stern firmness with which he and his men and Baucum's regiment drove off the enemy and resisted his renewed attacks without doubt saved the right of the army, as Granbury had already done before.
During the progress of the battle much service was rendered by the rifle battery and two remaining howitzers of Key's battery, in position on Polk's right. They were trained in enfilade upon the enemy's reserves massed behind the hill in front of the spur we occupied. I regretted I did not have more guns for this service. I had sent the Napoleon guns to the right, where they were unable to find positions, and so were useless.
During these operations Polk was not engaged, but it was a source of strength and confidence to the rest of the division to know that he had charge of the weakest and most delicate part of our line.
It is due to the following officers of my staff that I should acknowledge the industry, zeal, and activity they manifested in the battle: Maj. Calhoun Benham, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. K. Dixon, assistant inspector-general; Captain Irving A. Buck, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Robert McFarland, Lieutenant's L. H. Mangum, S. P. Hanly, and J. W. Jetton, aides- de camp, and Captain C. H. Byrne, volunteer aide-de-camp. They did their full duty with ability, gallantry, and enthusiasm. I am indebted to them for their cooperation. My ordnance, under Captain C. S. Hill, and my medical department, under Surg. D. A. Linthicum, and my artillery, under Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss, were well administered.
My casualties in this battle were few. I had 85 killed, 363 wounded, carrying into the engagement 4,683 muskets. The enemy's losses were very heavy. The lowest estimate which can be made of his dead is 500. We captured 160 prisoners who were sent to army headquarters, exclusive of 72 of his wounded carried to my field hospital. He could not have lost in all less than 3000 killed and wounded. I took upward of 1200 small arms.
This battle was fought at a place known as the "Picket Settlement", and about two miles northeast of New Hope Church.
Very respectfully,
P. R. Cleburne,
Maj. Gen.