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  • The Federal point of view

    Hooker's comments about McCall are particularly interesting. As with the CS snippets, the number references the reports in the "Great Battles" section of the ORs on CD (Guild Press Version) and these are edited for brevity.

    #1
    July 15, 1862

    During the night of the 28th and 29th the divisions of Slocum and McCall were ordered across the White Oak Swamp, and were placed in position to cover the passage of the remaining divisions and trains. In the course of the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to fall back from their original position to an interior line resting upon Keyes' old intrenchments on the left and so arranged as to cover Savage Station. They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned; nevertheless the result was that two attacks of the enemy---one a very determined onset--were signally repulsed by Sumner's corps, assisted in the last by Smith's division, of the Sixth Corps. These are the two actions known as the affair of Allen's Field and the battle of Savage Station. The Third Corps crossed the swamp before dark, having left its position before the hour assigned and was not in action during that day (the 29th). The Second Corps and Smith's division safely crossed the swamp during the night with all their guns and materiel, and brought up the rear of the wagon train. In the night of the 29th and 30th the Fourth and Fifth Corps were ordered to move to James River, to rest on that river at or near Turkey Bend and occupy a position perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the wagon train, which was pushed as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's and Harrison's plantations.

    The remaining corps were moved in the same direction and posted so as to cover the main roads leading from Richmond as well as the crossings by which the army had passed the White Oak Swamp and to guard the passage of our large trains to the James River. When the troops were in position in the afternoon before the enemy attacked they were posted about as follows: Porter with two divisions (Morell's and Sykes') and the mass of the reserve artillery on Malvern Hill (the left of the position); next Couch, with one brigade of Peck's division in reserve; next Sedgwick; then McCall, Hooker, Kearny, Slocum, Naglee's brigade, Richardson, and Smith.

    During the actions which ensued at Turkey Bridge, on the New Market road (Glendale),and at White Oak Swamp, changes were made in this disposition. The result of the various actions of the 30th, during which our whole line was attacked, was that the enemy was everywhere repulsed except in his attack upon McCall's division, which, hard pressed by greatly superior numbers, and having lost three of its general officers, broke and lost most of its artillery. The gallant conduct of their comrades near by, especially Hooker's division, retrieved that mishap, and rendered it impossible for the enemy to reap any advantages from it.

    By this time the last of the trains had reached Haxall's Landing, and during the night the troops fell back to the vicinity of that place, all arriving in safety and unmolested at an early hour of the morning. They were promptly placed in position to offer battle to the enemy should he again attack, the left of the line resting on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with a brigade in the low ground to the left watching the road to Richmond; the line then following a line of heights nearly parallel to the river and bending back through the woods nearly to the James River on our right. On the left we relied upon the natural advantages of the position. On the right, where the natural strength was less, some little cutting of timber was done and the roads blocked.

    Although our force was small for so extensive a position it was necessary to hold it at any cost. When the battle commenced in the afternoon I saw that in the faces and bearing of the men which satisfied me that we were sure of victory.
    The attack was made upon our left and left center, and the brunt of it was borne by Porter's corps (including Hunt's reserve artillery and Tyler's heavy guns) and Couch's division, re-enforced by the brigades of Sickles and Meagher. It was desperate, brave, and determined, but so destructive was the fire of our numerous artillery, so heroic the conduct of our infantry, and so admirable the dispositions of Porter, that no troops could have carried the position. Late in the evening the enemy fell back, thoroughly beaten, with dreadful slaughter. So completely was he crushed and so great were his losses,that he has not since ventured to attack us.

    Previously to the battle of Malvern I had fully consulted with Commodore Rodgers, and with him made a hasty reconnaissance of the positions on the river. The difficulty of passing our transports above City Point was so great that I determined to fall back upon the position now occupied by the army; a position, too, much less extensive than that of Malvern, and therefore permitting me to give the men the rest they so much needed. Accordingly the army fell back during the night of the 1st and 2d of July, reaching this place at an early hour on the 2d. On the 3d the troops were placed essentially in their present positions.

    To the calm judgment of history and the future I leave the task of pronouncing upon this movement, confident that its verdict will be that no such difficult movement was ever more successfully executed; that no army ever fought more repeatedly, heroically, and successfully against such great odds; that no men of any race ever displayed greater discipline, endurance, patience, and cheerfulness under such hardships.

    My mind cannot coin expressions of thanks and admiration warm enough or intense enough to do justice to my feelings toward the army I am so proud to command. To my countrymen I confidently commit them, convinced they will ever honor every brave man who served during those seven historic days with the Army of the Potomac Upon whatever field it may hereafter be called upon to act I ask that it may never lose its name, but may ever be known as "The Army of the Potomac," a name which it never has nor ever will disgrace.

    I cannot conclude this report without expressing my thanks to the gallant and accomplished Commodore John Rodgers for the valuable assistance rendered this army in various ways, but especially by the fire of a portion of the flotilla upon the flank of the enemy attacking Malvern Hill on the 30th of June and 1st of July. Their fire was excellent and produced very beneficial results.

    GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

    #9

    July 4, 1862
    I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 30th ultimo I received an order from the commanding general to advance with my command to Glendale and halt there till further orders. At 12 o'clock m. I received a pressing application from General Franklin for re-enforcements at the bridge at White Oak Swamp. I sent off at once two brigades, leaving but one of my own brigades and two batteries on the field. General Hooker was in the woods on my left with his division and Kirby's battery was placed near my left. About 3 o'clock p.m. the action commenced by a determined assault of the enemy on McCall's division, which was some distance on my right and in front. The battle drew near. Many of McCall's division came flying into my lines, closely followed by the enemy. Just at this time I got back the two brigades which I had previously detached and they went into the battle splendidly, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field, and thus ended the battle of Glendale.

    During the contest the enemy would change his point of attack. Sometimes he would be in front of General Hooker and then again in front of General Sedgwick's division. Lieutenant Kirby again distinguished himself by the able manner in which he handled his battery. To Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, Burns, Dana, and Meagher, and Lieutenant Kirby the country is indebted for very important services in this action. General Richardson's division was engaged at the bridge, and will, of course, be embraced in General Franklin's report.

    The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks, and it gives me great pleasure to state that the troops engaged in it, with the exception of McCall's division, behaved most nobly. I cannot too strongly confirm every word the subordinate officers have said in praise of their officers and men.

    At 9 o'clock p.m. I received intelligence that General Franklin had retreated and that General Heintzelman was going to do it. This, of course, compelled me to retire at once, which I certainly should not have done without orders from the commanding general if these generals had not fallen back and entirely uncovered my right flank. My command reached the lines near James River about daylight.

    E. V. SUMNER, Brigadier-General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

    #14
    July 6, 1862.

    On the afternoon of Monday, the 30th, the brigade was exposed to a severe artillery fire at White Oak Swamp while supporting the batteries of Captains Hazzard and Pettit, and lost several in killed and wounded.

    Between 5 and 6 o'clock the same afternoon I was ordered forward to support General Kearny, who was engaged in a severe battle at Nelson's Farm. We moved forward at double-quick, and arrived on the ground in the hottest of the fight. I formed three regiments on the right of the road and the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers on the left. The Fifth New Hampshire and the Seventh New York, beyond a first volley, were not engaged. The enemy's fire had nearly ceased in their immediate front and darkness soon came on. The Seventh New York was soon withdrawn. The Fifth New Hampshire was advanced to within a few paces of the enemy, and there remained until withdrawn, about I o'clock a.m. of Tuesday, the 1st.

    The Sixty-first New York, Colonel Barlow, formed behind a fence on the border of an open field at the right of the wood. Other regiments were firing into the open field from behind this fence.

    After stopping the fire of the other regiments the Sixty-first, without firing a shot, charged over the fence and through the open field, driving the enemy in such haste and confusion before them that they abandoned their colors which were picked up by Colonel Barlow. On approaching the woods on the farther side of the open field the Sixty-first opened fire upon the enemy in the woods, which was vigorously returned. After the firing had continued for some time I ordered the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers to relieve the Sixty-first New York. Both regiments continued firing until their ammunition was nearly exhausted, when they took position on the right of the field near the fence, where they remained until withdrawn, about 1 a.m. of Tuesday.

    On the morning of Tuesday, July 1, the brigade was formed in line of battle at Malverton, being assigned its position by Captain Irwin, of General McClellan's staff. Here we were exposed to a severe artillery fire of the enemy, which killed and wounded several of my men. About the middle of the afternoon I moved my whole brigade to the support of General Couch's division, and while lying in reserve was again exposed to a violent artillery fire.

    Between 5 and 6 o'clock p.m. the brigade came into action, the Fifth New Hampshire supporting a battery on the right and the three other regiments engaging the enemy's infantry. The Fifth New Hampshire remained supporting a battery until withdrawn on the morning of the 2d. The Sixty-first New York and Eighty-first Pennsylvania I consolidated, and placed under Colonel Barlow. They engaged the enemy on the extreme right of General Couch's line, being drawn up in an open field, while the enemy were posted in the edge of a wood. These regiments, under the able command of Colonel Barlow, fought most splendidly. I do not think their steadiness and gallantry were ever surpassed. The Seventh New York Volunteers were on the left of the Sixty-first and Eighty-first, and fought gallantly. All these regiments fought till every round of ammunition was exhausted, and then stood without flinching the fire of the enemy when unable to return it. The brigade was withdrawn about midnight, and marched with the rest of the army to this place.

    JOHN C. CALDWELL, Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

    #15

    July 3, 1862.

    Monday, June 30, the regiment was formed as support to battery, and was under a very heavy artillery fire nearly all day, during which time we had 5 killed and 9 wounded. At about 7 p.m. went with the brigade to support General Kearny, then engaged about 2 miles to our left. On our arrival we formed line of battle on the left of the Seventh New York Volunteers in the road. We remained in this position subject to a musketry fire, but were unable to return it on account of a regiment of our men being in our front. Some time after the firing had ceased the regiment was ordered forward about 100 yards as picket. At about 2 a.m. I was ordered by General Caldwell to retire and join the brigade. In retiring I lost one first lieutenant and several men, who must have remained on the ground asleep and been taken prisoners.

    Tuesday, July 1, after forming the regiment in column, I was unwell and retired, and did not join it until Wednesday, at this camp. Herewith I forward a report of Captain Sturtevant, who was in command during my absence. A large number of the sick and wounded were left behind, and have probably fallen into the hands of the enemy. A day or two more and we can tell nearer how we stand.

    Respectfully,
    S. G. LANGLEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Fifth New Hampshire Vols.

    #24
    July 5, 1862.

    About 11 p.m. the march was resumed across Waite Oak Swamp, the crossing being successfully accomplished by about daybreak. After a brief rest the march was continued to the point known as Nelson's Farm, or Glendale. About 11 a.m. June 30, the enemy having made a strong attack with artillery upon Franklin's command, which had remained to defend the bridge across White Oak Swamp, Dana's and Gorman's brigades (the latter under command of Colonel Sully, First Minnesota) were sent, under Brigadier-General Dana, to Franklin's support, moving a part of the way at double-quick.

    About 3 p.m. a very fierce and strong attack was made upon McCall's division in the first line, which after a short resistance retired, thus bringing in direct contact with the enemy that portion of my command remaining with me. Burns went immediately to meet the enemy, and Dana's and Sully's brigades were recalled, again marching a part of the way at double-quick. The Nineteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hinks, was the first to arrive, and scarcely pausing to draw breath, gallantly dashed at the enemy. The others followed and went to the front as they came up as rapidly as their wearied condition rendered possible. Some temporary confusion arose among the regiments of Dana's brigade owing to their failure to advance equally with each other, and all these regiments suffered severely. The entire division was now hotly engaged, the greater part of it until night, and not only did these troops meet and repulse the assaults of the enemy, but were forced to withstand the demoralizing influence of the panic among those of the first line, who in many instances broke through our ranks in their haste to move out of reach of the enemy's fire.

    About 10 p.m. the regiments, which were lying upon- their arms in the positions occupied at the close of the fight, which lasted, as at Savage Station, until some time after dark, were called in, and preparations made to continue the march to Malverton, which we reached about daybreak.

    At 9 a.m. July 1 the enemy again attacked. My division took up a position under the orders of General Sumner, which was changed once or twice during the day, and was held in readiness to meet the enemy should he appear in our immediate front, or to give any assistance required on other parts of the line. It was exposed during a portion of the morning to a heavy fire of artillery, from which, however, surprisingly few casualties resulted, among them, unhappily, the death of Major Brown, Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers.

    Between 12 and 2 a.m. of the 2d instant my command was withdrawn from the hill, and took up the march down the River road to this point, arriving about 10 a.m.

    We have to deplore the loss of several valuable officers. Colonel Hinks, Nineteenth Massachusetts, fell, dangerously wounded, during the action at Glendale while gallantly leading his regiment. Major How, of the same regiment, fell at the same time. Colonel Charles, Forty-second New York, also fell, mortally wounded, at the head of his regiment.

    I cannot refrain from speaking with pride and satisfaction of the great resolution, cheerfulness, and good conduct of the men during the entire march. All were ready at all times, in spite of the severe and almost unparalleled fatigues they were compelled to undergo, to meet the enemy at a moment's notice. I would especially call the attention of the general commanding the corps to the gallantry of Brigadier-General Burns in the severe engagements both of Savage Station and of Glendale, in the former of which he was severely wounded, and in both of which he exhibited great daring and excellent judgment in the disposition of his troops.

    The conduct of Brigadier-General Dana and of Colonel Sully, though they were less conspicuously engaged, was in every way what was to be expected from their well-established reputation. I would also especially commend the firm and steady behavior of the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, which covered the movement from Fair Oaks to Allen's farm, repelling several attacks made by superior numbers most handsomely. Kirby's battery was of great service in the engagement at Glendale, and it is needless to say that officers and men fully sustained their well-earned reputation. Captain Tompkins' Rhode Island battery was also engaged upon the same occasion, and was worked with great spirit.

    I refrain from multiplying mention of good conduct, but refer for additional details to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders which I herewith submit. My personal staff, Capt. William D. Sedgwick, assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. Church Howe, aide-de-camp, as well as Col. C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery, were untiring in their exertions, and rendered me, as usual, constant and most valuable assistance. Maj. R. F. Halsted, volunteer aide, also behaved most handsomely, and rendered me important services. To Capt. R. N. Batchelder, assistant quartermaster, for his skill and indefatigable energy in the difficult undertaking of moving our transportation, the service is under great obligations.

    JOHN SEDGWICK, Brigadier-General, Volunteers, Commanding Division.

    #28
    July 6, 1862

    About 9 p.m. the regiments were withdrawn, and we took up our line of march through the White Oak Swamp; continued the march during the night and next day until we reached Nelson's farm. At the time some skirmishing was going on in front by troops of other divisions. Heavy artillery firing taking place in our rear, the brigade was ordered back to support Richardson's division. Being very unwell I remained behind, sending my staff with orders to send for me in case we got engaged.

    Soon after this the battle opened on the field where I was, the enemy driving large bodies of our troops (McCall's division, I believe), who ran to the rear panic-stricken. I did all I could to rally them, but without success. General Sumner told me he had sent for my brigade and wished me to lead it into action, keeping the First Minnesota as a reserve. The brigade soon after arrived, very much exhausted, having marched most of the way at double-quick. It was soon formed and marched to the front, the First Minnesota being placed in advance of our batteries. I rode to the right of our line and found that General Burns had ordered the Fifteenth Massachusetts and Thirty-fourth New York into the woods, to support some regiments hotly pressed by the enemy. The Eighty-second New York was placed in position on their right.

    Finding that the right of the line was very much exposed, owing to the fact that some regiments before stationed there had fallen back and the enemy were collecting a large force in our front, I sent back word to General Sumner and then went myself, in hopes of bringing up the First Minnesota Regiment, but I found that General Dana had ordered it into the thickest of the fight, to sustain some regiments of his brigade. This, I understand, they did most gallantly. The Fifteenth Massachusetts were ordered farther to the left by General Burns, to support part of his brigade. During the rest of the day they held the ground they were ordered to. The Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York also, maintained their position on the right till 12 at night, when all the regiments were withdrawn and we again took up our line of march. By sunrise we reached Malvern Hill, and the rest of the army, almost entirely broken down by fatigue, but not to rest. We were soon again under arms, and marching to the right formed line of battle, to support some batteries and be ready for an attack. After waiting there some time, exposed to a heavy fire of artillery, we moved by the right flank and joined Smith's left, where we remained in position until night, when we were again ordered to march, reaching this place about noon July 2.

    Where so many behaved well it is hard to mention names. Colonel Sutter, Thirty-fourth New York; Colonel Hudson, Eighty-second New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, First Minnesota; Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts, commanded their regiments with great coolness and bravery. Colonel Sutter, Thirty-fourth New York, recommends his adjutant, Lieut. George W. Thompson, for his efficiency. I cheerfully concur in this recommendation. My thanks are due to my staff, Captain Hebard, Lieutenants Raquet and Gorman, and Mr. E. L. Sproat, volunteer aide, acting on the staff, for the services rendered me in time of action. I beg leave to state to the general commanding that I can say with pride that in all these fights not a regiment of the First Brigade yielded one inch of ground to the enemy.

    ALF. SULLY, Colonel First Minnesota, Commanding Brigade

    #29
    July 5,1862

    On Monday, 30th ultimo, at 2.30 o'clock p.m., was ordered to form my regiment in the open field in front of headquarters at Nelson's Farm, heavy firing of artillery having opened on the right. After remaining about half an hour in this position was ordered to move to the right and report to General Dana. After proceeding half a mile in this direction was ordered to form my regiment in the field near the road. At this time Colonel Suiter took command of the brigade. At about 4 o'clock p.m. was ordered to the left of General Richardson's line of battle, forming a right angle with his line, in order to protect his left flank. At about 5 o'clock p.m. was ordered to return to my original position, a severe engagement having opened at that point. On the road I received orders direct from General Sedgwick, through Lieut. Church Howe, to use the utmost speed in reaching the field, as more troops were greatly needed at this critical moment. Almost exhausted by fatigue and heat, my men, unable to move rapidly, still came in in good order, and forming in the field advanced, by order of General Sumner, to the front.

    After advancing some 300 yards was ordered by General Burns to move by the right flank to the rear and support of Colonel Baxter. The firing becoming very heavy on the extreme left, was ordered by General Burns to proceed to the left of the First Minnesota Volunteers and then move forward to that point where the fire was the hottest. On reaching the front I relieved the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose ammunition had become exhausted. Before my arrival the fire had slackened and soon ceasing altogether was not renewed at that point. I remained in this position until 12 o'clock, when being ordered to withdraw quietly, did so, taking in my pickets. The loss to my regiment during this engagement was 6 wounded, which will be shown in the recapitulation of casualties.

    On Thursday, July 1, at 11 o'clock, the enemy having appeared in force, I was ordered to form in line of battle on the hill at Malverton as a reserve to the First Minnesota and Eighty-second New York Volunteers. When in this position received a severe fire from the enemy's artillery, and was soon ordered out of range and under cover of the woods.

    JOHN W. KIMBALL, Lieut. Col. Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry.

    #30

    July 5, 1862

    On Monday, about 8 o'clock, we were again put in march for Malverton. When arriving at Glendale we were halted to allow the train to pass us. About 11 o'clock the enemy attacked the troops of General Franklin at the bridge. General Sumner sent two of General Sedgwick's brigades back to his support, leaving but mine at Glendale. About 3.30 o'clock an attack was made on General McCall’s division in front of Nelson's house. Soon his left gave way and broke toward us in confusion. General Sumner made the disposition of my brigade, placing Colonel Baxter on the right, Colonel Owen in center, and Colonel Morehead left, the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Jones, in rear of Kirby's battery, in support. At the request of General Hooker, General Sumner forwarded Colonel Owen to the right of Hooker's first line and sent Colonel Morehead in reserve of General Hooker's right. I was then directed to lead Baxter to the wood on the right of the field, through which McCall's left retreated, as the enemy seemed to be moving that way to rid themselves of the terrible fire of Kirby's battery, which swept this field. Soon after General Dana's brigade came back from the bridge and went forward, filling the space between Colonel Owen's right and Colonel Baxter's left.

    Another heavy attack broke McCall's center and sent the fugitives shamefully through our ranks. Our line was advanced, and Colonel Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, unsupported, pursued the victorious rebels back over the ground through which they were passing and crowned the crest of the hill where McCall had lost his artillery. Gallant Sixty-ninth! The line followed this noble example, and McCall's position was held and the enemy discomfited. By direction of General Sedgwick I placed the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers and Nineteenth Massachusetts in support of the first line, in connection with Baxter's Seventy-second, Colonel Hudson's Eighty-second New York, Colonel Suiter's Thirty-fourth New York. While perfecting this line another attack was made on the left center, and I found that the Seventh Michigan and Forty-second New York had broken from the front line, the enemy rapidly advancing through the gap. I threw the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Jones, and Nineteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hinks, into the breach, and nobly did they redeem the faults of their comrades. These two noble regiments met the enemy face to face, and for nearly one hour poured into them such tremendous volleys that no further attack was had at that vital point.

    On going to the right I received a message from General McCall that he was wounded and hard pressed on his right. By authority of General Sumner I immediately forwarded the Thirty-fourth New York, Colonel Suiter, to the left of General Berry, at his request, and advanced our right, then in reserve, to relieve McCall, but before reaching him three staff officers came back, and informed me that the enemy had been taken in flank on the right and was in a fair way of being captured. I halted, our line, as it was growing late and I was fearful of firing upon friends coming from the right flank. Again Sedgwick's division was victorious. About 11 o'clock orders were given to fall back on Malverton, which was quietly done.

    At Malverton my brigade was exposed to a heavy enfilading fire of shells, in which 2 were killed. I refer to the reports of regimental commanders for individual good conduct. Colonel Baxter, Colonel Owen, Colonel Morehead, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones fulfilled my utmost expectations. I repeat my assertion at Fair Oaks--I am satisfied with the conduct of my brigade.

    WM. W. BURNS, Brigadier-General, Commanding

    #31
    July 5, 1862

    I was just leading my remaining regiment (the Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers) to the support of my two regiments on the right, when at about 9 p.m. I received an order to recommence the retreat, and immediately recalled my four regiments. The brigade marched about 10 p.m. across White Oak Swamp, and crossed the bridge at the swamp at about dawn of day of the 30th instant, slept on their arms about two hours, and then resumed the retreat, halting at Nelson's farm.

    About noon of this day a very heavy artillery fire was heard on our right at the White Oak Swamp, where General Franklin was posted with three divisions to hold the place. Soon after this an artillery fire commenced in our front. About 2 p.m. I was ordered to go with my brigade and with the First Brigade, under Colonel Suiter, to re-enforce General Franklin. Assuming command of these two brigades, I directed Colonel Lee, the senior officer, to assume command of my own brigade.

    On arriving at White Oak Swamp I was ordered to place one of my brigades on the left of French's brigade and hold the other in reserve. After remaining in this position about two hours a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry was heard in the position we had left two hours ago. Messengers came to me almost every moment from General Sumner to hurry up my command by regiments in double-quick time and to make all possible haste. Very many men broke down on the road, and those who arrived at Nelson's farm, although in excellent spirits, showed the marks of great fatigue. The regiments were formed and marched into the woods as rapidly as they arrived. The first three which arrived were under command of Colonel Lee. The last one which arrived was the First Minnesota, which I formed myself and marched forward to the woods. The first line, under Colonel Lee, advanced beyond support and was subjected to a tremendous fire. One of the regiments broke, but was afterward rallied, which compelled the Twentieth Massachusetts, which had advanced farther than any, to fall back, which they did in order.

    Soon after dark orders were given to withdraw the regiments and continue the retreat. The retreat was continued all night, and at dawn of day of the 1st instant we arrived at Malverton, where my brigade was formed in line of battle immediately in rear of Richardson's division. The enemy soon after commenced an attack, and we were exposed to a galling fire of artillery, but about 9 o'clock we moved to the right to occupy a road in the woods in the direction of Smith's division. Soon after this the One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers was sent to report to me, which connected my line with Smith's division. About 11 o'clock at night I received an order to again withdraw my regiments and continue the retreat, and arrived here about the middle of the forenoon.

    N.J. T., Brigadier-General, Commanding.

    #32

    In the morning June 30 I sent and destroyed the bridge at Brackett's Ford, and gave orders to fell trees across that road, as well as to obstruct the Charles City road in the same manner.

    After the commanding general passed on his way to James River he sent back an aide to inform me that General Sedgwick's division was close in rear of my corps, with instructions to furnish me with re-en-forcements, if needed.

    The left of General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road, at a point a short distance in front of the débouché of the Brackett's Ford road; General Kearny's right to connect with General Slocum's left, and to extend across to the Long Bridge road, which branches some 2 miles in advance into the Central and New Market roads. Beyond this was to be General Hooker's division. The object was to cover the Quaker road, upon which our wagons and artillery were crossing to James River.

    General Kearny's division took up a strong position very favorable for an advance upon Richmond, but much too far forward for the object we had in view. After much difficulty I got this division into its proper position. In the mean time General McCall's division took post to the left of the Long Bridge road, in communication with General Kearny's left. General Hooker was then forced to move still farther to the left and connect with the left of General McCall. This is the reason why General Hooker's division was not in its proper position. These delays brought it to the afternoon before General Kearny's division was in position.

    At I p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy artillery fire to the right, I afterward learned, at the White Oak Swamp Bridge. There was also an attempt made to cross at Brackett's Ford, but it was repulsed by the troops I sent to destroy the bridge and obstruct the road.

    At 2 p.m. General Berry reported the enemy advancing in force on the Charles City road. At 3.30 p.m. the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left. His artillery kept the enemy in check.

    About 5 p.m.--perhaps a little earlier--General McCall's division was attacked by the enemy in large force, evidently the principal attack. In less than an hour General McCall's division gave way. General Hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner and with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided, with his artillery and infantry, in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. The attack continued until some time after night. This attack commenced at 4 p.m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great skill, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy. Each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers.

    When General McCall's division gave way, as I felt satisfied that the attack on the Charles City road was not the serious one, I rode over to the open field in front of the house at Nelson's farm where General Sumner had his headquarters, to see for myself the situation of affairs, having previously ordered over Captain De Russy's battery to aid in checking the enemy. General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and commenced firing into the woods over the heads of the fugitives in front. I placed Captain De Russy's battery on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burns' brigade was then advancing to meet the enemy and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from White Oak Swamp Bridge, where they had been sent earlier in the day to sustain our defense of that point. Here, whilst looking on, I received a severe contusion on my left wrist, disabling my arm for several weeks.

    Seeing that the enemy were giving way I returned to the forks of the road, where I received a call from General Kearny for aid. Knowing that all General Sedgwick's troops were unavailable, I was glad to avail myself of the kind offer of General Slocum to send the New Jersey brigade of his division to General Kearny's aid. I rode out far enough on the Charles City road to see that we had nothing to fear from that direction, and returned to see theNew Jersey brigade enter the woods to General Kearny's relief. A battery accompanied this brigade. They soon drove back the enemy.

    It was now growing dark. I sent by three different aides of the commanding general a detailed verbal statement of the events of the day and of our situation. From the exhaustion of the men, want of ammunition and provisions, uncertainty as to the force and position of the enemy, I also gave my opinion that the troops had better be withdrawn. I had no fears of the force we had just defeated so signally, but of the fresh troops they could bring up against our worn-out men.

    Shortly after dark I heard that General Franklin was retiring. The right of my troops being so far in advance, and my being without orders, I could not believe it. Soon after General Seymour came and assured me that it was so. I sent Lieutenant Hunt, of my staff, to entreat him to hold on until I could hear from the commanding general, as I expected to do so every moment. Lieutenant Hunt returned, and reported that when he got there General Franklin's troops had already left; that three regiments of General Naglee's brigade were drawn up a short distance from the White Oak Swamp Bridge, waiting for the return of the general. It was now 12 o'clock, and I could not wait any longer. General Slocum was at my headquarters, waiting for me to decide what to do, he having also heard that General Franklin was leaving. We arranged for his division to leave immediately, to be followed by General Kearny's and then by General Sumner's. It was necessary for us to move promptly, as the enemy were busily engaged repairing the bridges, and would soon be enabled to cross in force on our rear. I hastened to General Sumner's headquarters, and informed him of what had been done. He concurred with me, and sent a note to the commanding general with the information. I then took the road and reached Malvern Hill at 1.30 a.m., and reported to the commanding general. Soon after daylight both of my divisions were on Malvern Hill.

    I cannot speak too warmly of the gallantry displayed by General Hooker and his division. Special mention is made of General Grover, the First Massachusetts, Sixteenth Massachusetts, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, Second New Hampshire, and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments. The colors captured by Captain Park, Company F, Second New York Volunteers, had "Williamsburg" and "Seven Pines" on them, and belonged to the Seventeenth Virginia Volunteers. They were sent to General Sumner's headquarters. This same company captured 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and 30 to 40 privates.

    General Kearny showed his usual gallantry and activity. The portion of his division engaged behaved most gallantly.

    The first of the attack fell on General Robinson's brigade, and continued five hours. General Robinson was particularly distinguished. Captain Thompson's battery was conspicuous from the admirable manner in which it was served. It was most admirably supported by Colonel Hays, with the Sixty-third Pennsylvania and half the Thirty-seventh New York. Attention is called to General Kearny's report of this part of the action. I gladly add my commendation.

    General Caldwell's brigade, sent by General Sumner, rendered valuable aid; also General Taylor's New Jersey brigade, volunteered by General Slocum. My thanks are due to both these officers for the promptness with which they gave this assistance.

    General Berry and his brigade behaved with their usual gallantry. Special attention is called to Major Fairbanks, who commanded the Fifth Michigan, and was dangerously wounded. The Twenty-fourth New York Volunteers, only 200 men, led by Lieutenant Greenhalgh, one of General Berry's aides, captured a stand of colors.

    I neglected to mention in the proper place that Captain Randolph, who commanded a battery, is highly commended.

    My staff, as usual, performed their duties to my satisfaction. Captain McKeever, chief of staff, was active in communicating orders to the left at a critical moment, and Lieutenant Hunt especially, in going to White Oak Swamp Bridge just before midnight to learn whether our troops had retired.

    All the reports received accompany this, and will give the names of those worthy of mention.

    I annex a statement of the losses in General Hooker's division this day, but cannot of General Kearny's, as the casualties of this day and the next are blended. The aggregate is 951 for the two days, of which I believe the greater part occurred on the 30th of June.

    S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
    .

    July 24, 1862

    On my arrival at Malvern Hill, at 1.30 a.m. of the 1st of July, I met the commanding general on horseback and reported to him what had been done. He directed me to see General Barnard, chief engineer, and General Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, and consult with them as to the position for the troops to occupy. I found them, but they were of the opinion that nothing could be done before daylight. As soon as it was light I saw General Barnard, and he rode out to make another examination of the ground. On his return he pointed to the direction where I was to post my troops. I gave the necessary orders, but before they could be carried out the commanding general returned, and I rode with him the whole circuit of the lines, leaving staff officers to place my two divisions in position--General Kearny's on the left, to connect with General Couch's right on the right of Kearny; General Hooker's division with General Sumner's corps on his right. It was near 10 a.m. when I returned via Haxall's to Malvern Hill. We now occupied a very strong position, but lacked some 20,000 men to be certain of holding it against the superior force I feared would be brought against us.

    Before my troops were all in position the rebels commenced an artillery fire, which we returned. Some of their shells exploded beyond the buck house on the hill and in the bottom beyond. This lasted about two hours. At 3.30 p.m. the attack was renewed with artillery and accompanied by infantry on the left of General Kearny, but principally on General Couch's division. By 5 p.m. this was repulsed. Later the attack was renewed on General Porter's front, extending to the right as far as General Kearny's, by artillery and infantry in large force. The firing continued until 9 p.m. The rebels were defeated with great slaughter.

    During the afternoon large bodies of troops were seen passing along our front toward the right in the edge of the woods. They were several hours passing. They disappeared, however, without any further demonstration. They passed beyond the range of our field artillery.

    Toward dusk General Porter sent to General Sumner for a brigade and battery of artillery. This was sent. I added another brigade and battery, to enable him to make the defeat more complete. I sent them, as it was now so late I did not anticipate any attempt on my right.

    All the troops under my command were exposed to this artillery fire. In General Kearny's division only the artillery and skirmishers were immediately engaged. "Captain Thompson managed his battery with the full genius of that arm, whilst Captain Randolph with his Parrott guns persecuted all that attacked him, silencing several times batteries that were sweeping our front or covering their columns of attack on General Couch to our left." The Fourth Maine was particularly distinguished for its coolness in holding a ravine and repulsing the enemy's skirmishers.

    In General Hooker's division the men behaved with their usual coolness. The batteries were so placed that they were enabled several times to enfilade the enemy's artillery and infantry advance. We have to deplore the loss of Captain Beam, a most gallant officer, commanding one of the batteries. He was killed by a shell.

    Captain De Russy, my chief of artillery, was quite distinguished. It was through his good management and personal attention that the batteries sent to the left later in the day were so effective.

    Quite late in the afternoon a staff officer from the commanding general informed me that we might fall back to another position farther down the river in the course of the night. At 10.50 p.m. I received orders to move in rear of General Couch's division. Before the road was clear for the leading brigade of my corps it was 3.40 a.m., and the rear did not leave till daylight.

    Soon after daylight a heavy rain set in, seriously injuring the road, but early in the day all the troops reached their camps.

    My whole corps made the march with its artillery and baggage wagons from Savage Station to the camp at Harrison's Bar without the loss of a single wagon. Our reported loss in missing is but 745, and of this number a portion of killed and wounded were left on the battlefields, and some have since come in. To show the endurance and fortitude of the troops, the Seventh and Eighth New Jersey Regiments did not lose a man in the whole march. Of these regiments one had 8 stragglers, of whom 3 were wounded. They have all since come in. The Seventh New Jersey did not have a field officer present. Captain Bartlett, Company C, commanded, with 1 captain, Frederick Cooper, and 3 lieutenants, Hillyer and Mullery, of Company K, and ------, of Company C.

    At Savage Station we received orders to reduce our baggage. We left our tents for the wounded and' the officers part of their personal baggage. This enabled me to place 500 pounds of ammunition in each wagon for the reserve artillery of the corps. Captain De Russy made good use of it at Malvern Hill.

    All the troops were exposed for several hours to a continuous fire of shells, which they bore with unflinching courage. Those exposed to the infantry fire behaved with their usual gallantry.

    General Sickles' brigade was sent late in the day to aid General Porter's command. How well it was done is well set forth in the general's report. The conduct of Colonel Taylor's regiment, the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, was brilliant.

    The officers of my staff performed their duties with their usual promptitude and energy. Dr. Milhau did all it was possible to do under our peculiar circumstances. Captain Weeks, assistant quartermaster, Captain McKelvy, chief commissary, and Lieutenant Dresser, ordnance officer, attended faithfully to the duties of their respective departments. To them I am indebted for the safety of every wagon, for ample supplies of provisions, and that the reserve ammunition was on the field at the proper moment. Captain McKeever's duties since the first day of the battle of Fair Oaks have been exceedingly arduous, and have been performed with great judgment and untiring energy, assisted by Captain Moses, assistant adjutant-general. Lieutenant Hunt I have mentioned in my previous report. Lieut. Henry Norton, one of my aides, particularly distinguished himself at Malvern Hill by communicating with General Couch at the extreme front during the hottest part of the engagement and previously, showing much personal gallantry.

    I beg leave especially to call the attention of the commanding general to the loss in battle of General Hooker's division since the 1st of June, 847 men, and since the opening of the campaign 2,589. As they have uniformly slept on the field of battle, no other evidence can be required of their gallantry and that of their distinguished commander.

    S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

    #36

    July 15, 1862.

    About daylight the following morning, 30th ultimo, the major-general commanding the corps communicated to me in person that it was his desire that my division should cover what is called the Quaker road, over which our troops, artillery, and trains were to pass in their retrograde march to James River. As Kearny's division was assigned the same duty, and as it was yet early in the morning, we mounted our horses, rode over the road we were required to defend, and examined the country and the approaches over which the enemy would be most likely to advance. The direction of Quaker road is nearly perpendicular to the general course of James River and crosses at nearly right angles the principal highways leading out of Richmond between the river and the Williamsburg road. Numerous by-roads connect these most traveled highways with the Quaker road, and it was determined that I should establish my division on the one which falls into the last-named road near Saint Paul's Church, the right resting on this cross-road, and the line nearly parallel with and half a mile or more in advance of the Quaker road. A forest covered the area between my position and this road. On my right was Sumner's corps in a cleared field, occupying the position which I had supposed was assigned to Kearny, and Kearny remained near where I had left him early in the morning.

    About 9 o'clock my line of battle was established, Grover on the right, Carr in the center, and Sickles' brigade on the left. In the mean time directions were given for all of my batteries to continue on their march to our proposed camp on James River, in order that they might be put in position there.

    About 11 a.m. some of our army wagons were observed in our front, which on inquiry were found to belong to McCall's division, which was the first intimation I had received of his being in my neighborhood, and on examination I found his division drawn up in line of battle, his left resting 500 or 600 yards from my right, and stretching off in an obtuse angle with the direction of my own. The woods in which this division was found extended to the immediate front of my right wing, narrowing in width as it approached my position.

    About 3 o'clock the enemy commenced a vigorous attack on McCall, and in such force that General Sumner voluntarily tendered me the services of a regiment, which was posted in an open field on my extreme right and under shelter from the enemy's artillery. This was the Sixty-ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Colonel Owen.

    Meanwhile the enemy's attack had grown in force and violence, and after an ineffectual effort to resist it, the whole of McCall's division was completely routed, and many of the fugitives rushed down the road on which my right was resting, while others took to the cleared fields and broke through my lines from one end of them to the other, and actually fired on and killed some of my men as they passed. At first I was apprehensive that the effect would be disastrous on my command and was no little relieved when they had passed my lines. Following closely upon the footsteps of these demoralized people were the broken masses of the enemy, furiously pressing them on to me under cover of the woods until they were checked by a front fire of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers and afterward by a diagonal fire on their right and left flanks from the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers and the left of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers; also, whenever the enemy ventured to uncover himself from the forest, a destructive fire was poured into him along my right wing.

    After great loss the enemy gave way, and were instantly followed with great gallantry by Grover, at the head of the First Massachusetts Regiment, while the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Regiment, heroically led by Owen, advanced in the open field on their flank with almost reckless daring.

    Grover was re-enforced by the Second New Hampshire and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments, but not until after he had suffered severely from the enemy's reserves. The enemy were rolled back through a part of McCall's camp, and passing Sumner's front, were by him hurriedly thrown over onto Kearny, where the fire was kept up to a late hour in the night.

    During all this time several of Sumner's batteries had been doing splendid execution in the rebel ranks and greatly contributed to our success. The troops under Grover were withdrawn from the pursuit at dark and restored to their places in our line of battle.
    Soon after this attack was made word was received from General Sickles that the enemy in his immediate front was preparing to turn our left, when all of our reserves were dispatched to strengthen him. No attack, however, in force was made, and Sickles' and Carr's brigades remained in position. The former reports the capture of 150 prisoners, in which are included 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and 40 enlisted men, taken by Captain Park, Company F, Second Regiment New York Volunteers, Carr's brigade. To these should be added one stand of colors, all of which were forwarded to the headquarters of General Sumner.

    The loss of the rebels in this battle was very severe. The field on which it was fought was one of unusual extent for the numbers engaged, and was almost covered with their dead and dying.

    From their torches we could see that the enemy was busy all night long in searching for his wounded, but up to daylight the following morning there had been no apparent diminution in the heart-rending cries and groans of his wounded. The unbroken, mournful wail of human suffering was all that we heard from Glendale during that long, dismal night.

    I was instructed to hold my position until Sumner and Kearny had retired over the Quaker road, and soon after daylight my command was withdrawn and followed them.

    Among others I have to deplore the loss of Colonel Wyman, of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, and, there is too much reason to believe, of Major Chandler, of the First Massachusetts Volunteers, both officers of singular merit and promise. Diligent search was made for the latter during the night without success, and no tidings of his fate have since been received by his regiment.

    JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division
    -----

    HEADQUARTERS, U.S. INSANE ASYLUM,
    Near Washington, D.C., November 8, 1862.

    Maj. Gen. GEORGE A. McCALL, Commanding, &c.:

    Your letter of the 30th ultimo(*) reached me day before yesterday, since which time my engagements have prevented reply, and even now I have not time to give it the consideration it requires.

    I regret extremely that you should have discovered any exceptionable statements in my report of the battle of Glendale, and if injustice has been done you or your command I shall be rejoiced to remove it, but before doing so I must be satisfied that I am in error.

    In rendering the report of Glendale my single object was to be just to my own division, and if I had felt that my desire admitted of execution without reference to your command I assure you no mention would have been made of it by me.

    You will excuse me, general, if I give you some of my reasons for supposing that your command had met with discomfiture at Glendale, and I believe I nowhere leave it to be inferred that it was not without abundant cause, for of that I had no opportunity of knowing. Sumner was on my right in an open field, where at one time not less than six or eight regimental colors were seen flying to the rear, while between my position and his the horses of the artillery, without their batteries, and the dragoons rushed down the road. Crowds of men were even running panic-stricken to the rear along the road, and far to the right and left of it I myself arrested an officer in his flight with a small body of men, who represented himself to be in command of the provost guard of your division, and ordered him to halt, form his guard: and check the flight of the runaways in his immediate vicinity, which he attempted, but was soon hurried to the rear by overwhelming numbers. He declared openly that this division had been all cut to pieces, that all the artillery was lost, and that several regiments had lost their standards. From my personal observation I must confess I was prepared to believe it all, and without knowing the impression of any great number of the officers of Sumner's and your own command, I never felt a doubt but that they confirmed my own. If it should become necessary their evidence can readily be procured, as well as that of officers of Kearny's command, on your right. In fact, I am more indebted to that officer for knowledge of the operations on the right than to any one with whom I have conversed. Of what related to the extreme right I know nothing from personal observation.

    You will remember where I met yourself and General Meade, in the vicinity of your batteries, early in the afternoon, and it was only from that visit that I had an opportunity to form an idea of your position. With regard to Sumner's views of our relative positions, as communicated through your letter, I can only say that his knowledge of them seems to be extremely limited. I hope that an opportunity will soon present itself, if it is a matter of doubt now, whether his opinions or mine are the correct ones.

    In calling it the Quaker road, I adopted the name by which it was called on every map furnished me from headquarters; and in referring to your position as a camp, it only referred to the place where I had seen your troops passing the day in like manner with my own. I had pitched no tents during my transit from Casey's camp to Harrison's Landing. Until I received your letter I was not aware that any troops except your own occupied the ground in advance of my position.

    But these are matters of but little or no consequence in the issue. I reported that your command was routed at Glendale, and if it was not I shall be rejoiced to be convinced to the contrary, that I may do your division "justice." I should be sorry to learn that I had ever done them injustice. I simply announced what I believed, and still believe, to be a fact, without reflecting upon the conduct of your men while engaged with the enemy or expressing an opinion of his force which required your command to give way before him.

    JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General,
    -----

    HEADQUARTERS, U.S. INSANE ASYLUM,
    Near Washington City, D.C., October 15, 1862.

    Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
    Assistant Adjutant-General:

    If you have no objection I request that you will substitute the inclosed report of the battle of Glendale for the one forwarded at the proper time. I desire it for the reason that the latter contained a reflection on the conduct of McCall's command which they nobly redeemed at South Mountain and Antietam. The language of my report was just and called for when made, but I do not think that it was so much the fault of the men as of other causes. I am now of opinion that the men were all right. In other regards the reports are identical.

    JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General

    More to come....
    [B]Charles Heath[/B]
    [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]heath9999@aol.com[/EMAIL]

    [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Spanglers_Spring_Living_History/"]12 - 14 Jun 09 Hoosiers at Gettysburg[/URL]

    [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]17-19 Jul 09 Mumford/GCV Carpe Eventum [/EMAIL]

    [EMAIL="beatlefans1@verizon.net"]31 Jul - 2 Aug 09 Texans at Gettysburg [/EMAIL]

    [EMAIL="JDO@npmhu.org"] 11-13 Sep 09 Fortress Monroe [/EMAIL]

    [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Elmira_Death_March/?yguid=25647636"]2-4 Oct 09 Death March XI - Corduroy[/URL]

    [EMAIL="oldsoldier51@yahoo.com"] G'burg Memorial March [/EMAIL]

  • #2
    Re: The Federal point of view

    The correspondence between McCall, a 35-year regular army veteran pressed into service for the Penna. Res. Division and Joe Hooker foreshadows some 1863 events. I'd love to find the records of the court of inquiry buried somewhere, and with as many copies as were made, surely they exist somewhere. The rejoinder on behalf of the Penna. Reserves is not in the ORs, but published elsewhere, and makes for interesting reading.


    #36 Continued -----

    HEADQUARTERS CENTER GRAND DIVISION,
    Camp near Potomac Creek, Va., December 7, 1862.

    Brig. Gen. GEORGE A. MCCALL,

    Washington, D.C.:

    Your letters of the 11th, 13th, and 19th of November, with inclosures, were duly received, as also that of the 2d instant, and if I have delayed making my acknowledgment I assure you it has been from no want of respect to yourself, or desire on my part to remove from your mind as early as possible any unfavorable impression you may have entertained respecting the accuracy of my official report of the battle of Glendale.

    From the perusal of your letter of the 13th ultimo, the impression left on my mind was that you did not look for answer until the "opportunity to ascertain from General Meade, and others of your division, the particulars of this hard-fought field" had been presented me, since which time my official engagements have more than ever before absorbed my attention. I only regret that I could not relieve your mind earlier, and that you have not furnished me with more evidence that I had been unkind or unjust in that part of my report which relates to your command at Glendale, for I had already assured you that it was my conviction that you had been "completely routed" on that field--not so much from the reports which were made me by the officers of your command, as you seem to convey in your letter of the 13th, as from my own personal observation. These only helped to confirm me in the opinion I had previously formed, from the falling back not of "stragglers" or the parts or whole of "one or two" regiments, but, I should judge, of the bulk of your command, in a flying, demoralized condition.

    The objectionable part of my report appears to be that which alleges that your division was completely routed, and yet I will venture to assert that neither General Reynolds, Meade, or Seymour will ever say that such was not the fact. Reynolds, since the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, has assured me that such was the case. I have had no opportunity to converse with Meade and Seymour on the subject, but do not doubt that if that specific question is put to either of them they will reply in the affirmative.

    In the extract from Meade's letter furnished me he seems to dwell on the fact "that if the whole division had run through my lines our army would have been destroyed." I certainly nowhere in my report declared that they did, for of these that fled to the rear but an inconsiderable portion crossed my line; a much greater proportion made their escape through the field occupied by Sumner. Generals Sumner and Sedgwick are good authority on that subject, for they had as good an opportunity to witness it as myself.

    The letter of Captain Clark is no less irrelevant to the point at issue, which is not that your men did not behave well, but that they were "completely routed." In announcing that fact I did not impeach their conduct, for of that I had not the same opportunity to know. Troops can be whipped, I take it, and still preserve their honor. The same remark is applicable to extracts from letters of other officers of your division. They all seem to mistake the point at issue. To arrive at the fact it would be much more conclusive and satisfactory to inquire of each whether or not your division was "completely routed" on that field. Generals Kearny, Berry, and Robinson informed me that such was the fact, on the extreme right. The two latter are now living and can testify for themselves. If any further doubt is felt on this point it would be well to refer to the record of the court of inquiry on young Randol, commanding battery.

    But of this--the testimony of my whole division--that of Sedgwick's and Kearny's---no matter. I assure you, general, that it is no agreeable task for me to accumulate proof to the prejudice of any companion in arms, and I have only written the above to satisfy you that I have not been unjust or untrue in my report of this battle. The crossing of my lines by your men filled me with apprehension--the approach of the rebels none. Justice and duty required that it should be placed on record at my hands, and from that consideration only I made mention of your command. This record must stand as it is, because it is true of yours and it is just of mine. I shall never refer to it again except in vindication of what I have stated.

    JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General, Commanding.
    -----

    July 18, 1862

    After withdrawing from Glendale our march was continued to the Malvern Hills without interruption, and about 10 o'clock a.m. my division was established in line of battle for the defense of our new position. Under a heavy fire of the enemy's artillery Grover's brigade was strongly posted on the right, Carr's on his left, and well sheltered. Subsequently Sickles' brigade, held in reserve, was posted in rear of my right, protected from the enemy's shots, and well in hand to re-enforce any part of my lines. Osborn's and Beam's batteries occupied higher ground, where they could reply to the enemy's artillery, or open upon his columns of infantry should he attempt to advance. Webber's and Bramhall's batteries were located in rear of these, and held in reserve.

    During the remaining part of the forenoon a brisk fire was kept up between the artillery, principally on the part of the enemy, without any decided effect, as far as could be discovered, on either side, the distance being about 1,500 yards. I regret, however, to state that it was in this artillery skirmishing that the gallant chief of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment [Second New Jersey Battery], Captain Beam, fell from a shell which pierced his body. About 3 o'clock this firing was resumed with more activity in the direction of Kearny's left. This exposed the rebel batteries to an enfilading fire from my position, a direct one from Kearny, and a diagonal one from several other batteries, which soon resulted in driving the rebel gunners from their pieces. Prior to this a heavy column of infantry had been seen passing to my right, which disappeared behind the forests in my front, and were not heard from again that afternoon. On the left an attack was made in great force, and the battle lasted until long after dark.

    About half an hour before sunset orders were sent me by General Sumner to dispatch a brigade of my command to the assistance of General Porter, and immediately General Sickles' brigade moved to that point.

    For a full account of the important services it rendered on the left I respectfully call the attention of the major-general commanding the corps to the report of its chief, herewith inclosed. I will especially invite his attention to that part of the report which relates to the brilliant conduct of Colonel Taylor's regiment, the Seventy-second New York Volunteers. The loss sustained by that regiment is the truest index of its services.

    The First and Third Brigades were not engaged during the day, and remained in their position until near morning, when orders were received to march in the direction of Harrison's Landing.

    I transmit herewith the reports of brigade, regimental, and battery commanders.

    I desire to make honorable mention of Capt. John S. Godfrey, the assistant quartermaster of the division, for his zealous, faithful, and meritorious services in the performance of all of his duties from the commencement of the campaign.

    As no official list has been furnished the major-general commanding the corps of the losses sustained by the division I have the honor to command since the 1st day of June last, I herewith forward it. The number, as will be seen, is 847, making the aggregate of my loss in battle since the opening of the campaign in the Peninsula 2,589.

    And in this connection I may be permitted to add, in justice and fidelity to the living and the dead, that the brave officers and men whose honor and welfare were confided to my care have uniformly slept on the field on which they have fought; that in all their encounters with the enemy, whether involving the whole force of the division or down to an affair between the pickets, they have inflicted heavier blows than they have received, and under all their toils, hardships, and privations have evinced a cheerfulness, obedience, fortitude, and heroism which will never fail to command the gratitude, reverence, and admiration of their chief.

    JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

    #39

    About 3 o'clock p.m. the enemy moved upon General McCall's lines in our front, and having broken them, came down in great force upon our position. The Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, being in position across and on the immediate left of the road along which the advance was made, received and repulsed the heaviest and most persistent attempts of the enemy to break the lines. The Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the left of the Sixteenth, were not hard pressed, and had not an opportunity to deliver its whole fire upon the enemy. The Eleventh Massachusetts was thrown upon the extreme left of our division lines, in anticipation of an attempt to turn our flank. As no such attempt, however, was made in force, this regiment did not become engaged during the day. The First Massachusetts and Second New Hampshire occupied a line in rear of the Sixteenth Massachusetts and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania

    Volunteers, but the steadiness and determination with which the first line met the enemy, not only checking his advance, but causing him to withdraw from this portion of the field, rendered any assistance at this time unnecessary from the second line.

    It had now become nearly sunset; the fury of the battle had shifted to the right of our position, and the strength of the enemy was evidently broken in our front. I was ordered with the First Massachusetts to drive what there remained of the enemy from our immediate front. That gallant regiment, with the greatest enthusiasm and rapidity, advanced to the front, driving before it whatever enemy still remained upon the ground, and advanced to the crest of a hill something like a quarter of a mile from our lines. Upon this high ground the smoke of the battle had settled heavily and obscured our view; still, upon advancing in line, the left of a body of our troops in line of battle on the right could be seen. On the left, somewhat nearer to our position, a column of infantry was moving by the flank to the right. Their colors were furled, and they wore the uniform of our troops, and were believed to be a regiment from the left of the Excelsior Brigade, moving to re-enforce the right of our position. Upon approaching nearer, however, this column halted, faced to its right, and fired a volley upon us. Fully assured still that it was one of our own regiments, I ordered the regiment to fall back under cover of the crest of the hill without returning the fire. Having withdrawn my men, I returned to assure myself of the facts of the case, and rode within about 100 yards of their colors, which had become partially loosened from the staff. It was a rebel regiment, and gave me a volley as soon as I was observed.

    At dark a portion of my brigade, the Second New Hampshire and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, re-enforced the line on our right of the road, where the fighting did not cease until about 9.30 p.m. These regiments did not, however, come into action. At about 10.30 p.m. the latter regiments were withdrawn to their first positions. At about 4 a.m. on the 1st of July we carefully withdrew our pickets and continued our march, making an early camp at Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 2d the march was continued to James River during a heavy rain and almost impassable roads. Since reaching this vicinity no incident worthy of notice has occurred.

    The conduct of the Sixteenth Massachusetts on the 30th was highly distinguished. Its gallant colonel lost his life and its lieutenant-colonel and adjutant were wounded.

    The First Massachusetts sustained the character it had previously won. It lost among many others its major.

    C. GROVER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

    #40

    July 11, 1862.

    I make to you the following report of the part taken in the battle of Nelson's Farm, near White Oak Swamp, by the First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, under my command, on Monday, June 30:

    The enemy in overwhelming numbers attacked a portion of our lines held by General McCall's division for the purpose of breaking our lines and completely destroying the rear of our army. This, it seems, was nearly accomplished, when General Hooker's division was ordered up and placed in such a position as to check their farther advance, and they were finally repulsed and put to flight with great slaughter. During this action I was ordered to charge on the enemy in front at considerable distance, which I did, passing over a fence across a field and through the woods, the rebels falling back before us; we still advanced through an open field. Here we advanced in line of battle, when a brigade of troops, dressed in our uniform and supposed by us to be our own, opened a terrific fire on our front and left flank, from which fire I lost many of my bravest and best men.

    ROBERT COWDIN, Colonel, Commanding First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

    #46

    July 4, 1862

    June 30 were drawn up in line of battle on the left of the Quaker road. McCall, who was in front, became engaged about 3 o'clock. The engagement was progressing with considerable vigor, and McCall seemed to be holding his own, when suddenly he gave way, and the attack fell upon our own lines. Owing to the nature of the ground I could bring the fire of but one company to bear upon the enemy, who struck our lines some rods to the right of my position. This company delivered a rapid and telling fire, which was returned, but the return fire all went over. The enemy was soon beaten back from that point, and the battle raged farther along the right.

    I was then ordered by General Hooker to take my regiment out of line and clear the open space between the wood held by the enemy and that held by us. I did so, charging through for about a quarter of a mile, and covering and holding the entire open space, clearing it of the enemy so far as I could see. The men charged with great cheering and shouting and the enemy fled, leaving us from 20 to 30 prisoners, who were extracted from ditches and other places of concealment. The smoke of battle and the coming night making it very dark, and my left flank extending toward and nearly reaching the enemy's wood, I filed my men into the front edge of our wood in such position as to cover the entire open space on our front. From this point I was withdrawn and posted to support a portion of Sumner's corps. The next morning we went to Malvern Hill, and were posted on the right directly before one of our batteries, which was firing over us most of the day. The next day reached Harrison's Landing.

    GEO. D. WELLS, Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Vols.

    #47

    On the morning of the 30th I was directed by the brigadier-general commanding the division to reconnoiter the country in front of the Quaker road toward James River, and especially with reference to intersecting roads leading from the front. Accompanied by Colonel Carr, commanding Third Brigade, and Captain Chester, of my staff, I made a careful examination of the line as far as Malvern Hill. While returning heavy cannonading on the right admonished me that an engagement had begun in the vicinity of the Charles City road. Hastening to my command, I found it moving under Colonel Taylor to a position covering the Quaker road, along which our train was passing. General McCall was in front and to the right. The brigadier-general commanding the division assigned me the left of the line of battle, embracing my own and the Third Brigade, which was formed on the outskirts of a belt of woods covering the Quaker road and commanding an opening extending to a small stream in front. On the left the woods encircled the opening, and through this timber, as well as in front to another belt of timber, flankers and skirmishers were thrown out. My left requiring support, I directed the Second New York to form on Colonel Taylor's left, and later in the day the Eleventh Massachusetts reported to me with orders to cover the left flank. It was not long after these dispositions were made before General McCall became engaged. A considerable body of his troops falling back on my line, and mistaking us for the enemy, poured several volleys into us Our colors were promptly displayed along the line, and through the exertions of Major Holt (First Regiment) and Major Stevens (Third), with a company of Berdan's Sharpshooters, which were in front, these fugitives were driven back to their line. From a lookout which I established in a tall tree, in charge of Corporal Bowen, Company D, and Private Patrick Connor, Company E, Third Regiment, and also from the reports of my skirmishers, confirmed by my own observations, I ascertained that the enemy's reserves were moving against our right in a line of battle almost perpendicular with my front. This I caused to be reported to the brigadier-general commanding the division, with the suggestion that a battery of artillery, supported by my left, might be advantageously thrown forward, so as to assail the enemy in the rear and on his right flank.

    At this moment my second regiment was ordered to report to General Sumner, and learning that the First and Sixteenth Massachusetts, of this division, were also sent to support our position on the right, I reluctantly relinquished the design of moving my left forward, even without artillery. Each regiment as it was successively posted on my left flank (Third Excelsior, Second New York, and Eleventh Massachusetts), by throwing forward skirmishers and flankers, captured numbers of prisoners--at least 150 in all--and among these the field and some of the line officers, together with the colors of --------- Regiment.

    These prisoners were sent to the rear in charge of Captain Chester, of my staff, with directions to report with them to the division or corps commander, and in their absence to turn them over to the nearest provost-marshal. My loss during the day was limited to a small number wounded, which is embraced in the list of casualties heretofore reported. I regret exceedingly that Private Patrick Connor, Company E,Third Regiment, was seriously injured by falling from the tree in which he was rendering important service as a look-out. Corporal Bowen, Company D, Third Regiment, was exceedingly active and useful in discharging the same duties.

    During the night we rested on our arms. The enemy was in motion all night. Rations for two days were issued to his men. Parties were constantly sent out for wounded. All commands given were distinctly heard along my line, and especially by my pickets. These commands embraced at least forty regiments, from various States. Just before dawn--indeed, twice during the night--the enemy formed a line of battle in front and extending far beyond my left. These movements were promptly reported to the brigadier-general commanding the division. At daybreak, in pursuance of orders, I called in my pickets and flankers and withdrew my command, moving by the right flank through the woods to the Quaker road, where I joined the division column and marched with it to Malvern Hill, whither the main body of the army had preceded us.

    After remaining in column of battalions for several hours, exposed to the enemy's artillery, fortunately without loss, I was ordered about 2 p.m. to support the First Brigade in front. Covering my men in a ravine on the right, I threw out Captain Bliss' company, Third Regiment, as scouts, and the First and Fourth Regiments (forming one battalion), under Major Holt, as pickets along the interval between the right of the Third Corps and Sumner's left.

    Two prisoners taken by Captain Bliss, who were sent to division headquarters, reported a movement of the enemy in force toward our front. This was corroborated by other information and some demonstrations of the enemy, who was then attacking General Porter on our extreme left, so that it appeared- evident that a general engagement along the whole line was imminent. Soon afterward, say about 5 p.m., I was ordered to move at once to support General Porter, which order was welcomed and obeyed with admirable spirit by my command. For my operations in that part of the field I have the honor to refer you to the special report made to the assistant adjutant-general of the Fifth Provisional Corps, a duplicate of which is herewith transmitted.

    This is an imperfect and barren narrative of the movements of my command during two eventful days and nights. Desiring to confine my report within the appropriate limits sanctioned by usage, yet I cannot close this communication without putting on record my heartfelt testimony to the fortitude and constancy--traits rarer than courage--. which signalized alike my officers and men in all the critical positions, the anxious vigils, the arduous marches, and the severe privations which they shared in common with this army in its successful movement to a new and distant base of operations.

    D. E. SICKLES, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

    July 9, 1862.

    I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from the brigadier-general commanding the division, on the afternoon of the 1st instant I left my position on the right and moved rapidly with my command to report to General Fitz John Porter, who was then engaged with the enemy at Malvern Hill, on the extreme left of the position occupied by the army on that day.

    On arriving at General Porter's headquarters, the general being in front, I reported to General Kearny, who was present. General Kearny told me the enemy were then moving in force toward the center and right, and advised me to return and resume my position. The action on the left appearing still to be very animated, I requested the signal officer at General Porter's headquarters to inform me of the state of affairs in General Porter's front. In a few moments it was reported to me that General Porter's right was weak, several regiments being out of ammunition. General Kearny then said, "I have no further advice to give; decide for yourself." I immediately led my column at a brisk pace to that part of the field where the firing was most vigorous and sustained. Not meeting an officer from whom I could receive orders I halted my men in a ravine partially under cover, and, accompanied by Major Stevens, Third Regiment, rode over the field from right to left, which was nearly a mile in extent, to find General Porter. Meeting an officer of his staff, I reported to him, and informing him of the position of the head of my column, returned to my command and awaited orders.

    In a few moments General Porter arrived in person and directed me to support two batteries near a large farm-house on the right of the main road, and for this purpose to form my line en échelon, left in front. At the same time General Porter directed me not to pursue in case the enemy retired, but to hold my position at all hazards. The column was promptly deployed, every regiment springing into line with enthusiastic cheers--indeed, the same dashing spirit animated all their movements throughout the day.

    I directed my left-flank regiment (Colonel Taylor, Third Excelsior) to be formed in line to the left and rear of the left battery. The Fifth, Col. Charles K. Graham, the First and Fourth (forming one battalion), under Maj. Thomas Holt, and the Second, Col. George B. Hall, were formed in line en échelon at 20 paces, so that the right-flank regiment (Colonel Hall's Second) was within supporting distance of the battery on the right.

    A few moments after this formation was completed I was directed by an officer of General Porter's staff to report to General Couch, to relieve such of his regiments in front as would be indicated. I endeavored to find General Couch, but could not. However, it was not long before several staff officers came to me with messages from Generals Couch, Howe, and Abercrombie, requesting me to relieve a number of regiments in front which were out of ammunition. As soon as precise orders could be obtained from General Couch Colonel Taylor's Third was sent forward, moving by the right flank, to relieve the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, which was in position in an open field in front of a belt of woods, behind which the right battery was posted. The Sixty-first New York was on the left, and both these regiments were engaging the enemy. Colonel Taylor promptly relieved the Thirty-first Pennsylvania and was soon warmly engaged, the enemy being in force on the other aide of the edge of the woods in front and on his right. Giving his line an oblique direction on the right, Colonel Taylor delivered a sustained and most effective fire for an hour. Twice the enemy, suffering from the rapidity and precision of our fire, attempted to advance across the open field, but each time was gallantly driven back with great loss, when he withdrew, leaving some parties to carry off his wounded.

    In the mean time Colonel Graham's Fifth Excelsior was posted on the left of the road to the rear and left of Colonel Taylor, about 100 yards in advance of one of our batteries, and far enough to the left to unmask its fire. Colonel Graham was immediately engaged with the enemy, who was covered by some woods on the left. Opening with great spirit an oblique fire to the left, which being promptly followed by grape and canister from the battery, the enemy was driven from his ground with fearful loss. Colonel Graham was then withdrawn from the front to the support of the battery on his right. Later, when the firing of the enemy had ceased on the right, he was again advanced and pickets thrown out to the woods in front.

    Leaving Major Holt within supporting distance of a battery farther on the right, I moved Colonel Hall's Second Excelsior to the front, where he relieved the First U.S. Chasseurs, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler commanding. The fire from the battery effectually cleared the woods in his front. After lying on his arms about two hours Colonel Hall moved forward in line with the Third Excelsior, and remained in that position until my regiments were withdrawn. The battery on the right having retired, I sent for Major Holt's battalion, First and Fourth Excelsior, as a reserve support for my line in front, but it seems that an aide-de-camp of Brigadier-General Howe had in my name ordered the regiment to the front, to relieve, as he understood, the Eighty-first Pennsylvania. Some time afterward I found Major Holt in position on the left, he having relieved one of the regiments of General Howe's brigade.

    Observing that there was no reserve supply of ammunition on the right in General Couch's division, I brought up from the rear 20,000 rounds, caliber .58, having previously supplied Colonel Taylor with 15 rounds a man from Major Holt's boxes while he was in reserve. As soon as the ammunition arrived Colonel Taylor and Major Holt obtained 60 rounds a man, and the remainder was placed at the disposal of the regiments of other commands.

    Colonel Taylor lost several men from the fire of one of our batteries in the rear. There was no hospital and no surgeon in my part of the field. There were many of our wounded who languished and died from the lack of medical attendance.

    Early in the morning I was informed by General Couch that he was ordered to withdraw all his troops and move to the rear. No orders were communicated to me, but General Couch intimated to me that I should follow the movement of his command.

    About 2 a.m. I withdrew my regiments, commencing with the Third (Colonel Taylor), and having formed in line of battle about 600 yards in the rear, covered the movement of several isolated regiments, called in my pickets, and with a section of a battery moved off in column, following a portion of Kearny's division, which I overtook on the route toward Harrison's Landing. Colonel Hall remained on the large field in the rear of General Couch's headquarters, when he reported to Colonel Averell, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, who was in command of the rear guard, and continued under his orders until about 9 a.m., when he was relieved and proceeded to join this brigade.

    I have to regret the severe loss sustained by Colonel Taylor. Besides Capt. Stephen M. Doyle, an officer conspicuous for courage and zeal, who was killed early in the action, this regiment lost 14 killed and 47 wounded out of a force of about 300 engaged.

    Colonel Graham (Fifth) lost 8 wounded. Commendation is pre-eminently due to Colonel Taylor, Major Stevens, and the officers and men of the Third Regiment for gallantry and distinguished conduct in this action. Colonel Graham (Fifth), during the brief period his regiment was under fire, handled his men with judgment and tact, displaying his characteristic intrepidity in action.

    The loss inflicted upon the enemy in my immediate front was very great. Without estimating the destructive fire of the Third and Fifth Regiments, which was at short range and delivered with coolness and precision, the artillery swept the woods with grape and canister, followed by shell as the enemy fled through the undergrowth. During the night the air was laden with the cries of their wounded, which were audible all along my lines, and as I advanced my pickets it was difficult for them to avoid the enemy's dead and wounded lying in their paths. Many of my own wounded were left behind. They were brought to the rear and placed beside others of our men in some farm buildings near General Couch's headquarters. Every possible attention was given to them. I sent Lieutenant Tremain, aide-de-camp, as well for ambulances as for ammunition, but with all his efforts he was only able to procure three, and these could not be brought to the depot for the wounded until morning, when we had commenced our flank movement. A few only were brought away, with the body of Captain Doyle. It was painful beyond expression to abandon so many brave men. If a surgeon could have been left with them my solicitude for their fate would have found some alleviation. All the medical officers of my command were on duty at the general hospital, nearly a mile in the rear.

    D. E. SICKLES, Brigadier-General, Commanding

    #53

    At 5 o'clock a.m., June 29, I was relieved by the First Brigade, in order that I might prepare my brigade to move, which was done in a very brief space of time. At 6 o'clock I commenced the movement, and formed line of battle on the left of the Williamsburg road about a mile to the rear of the rifle pits. I was then ordered by General Hooker to move and form my brigade on the right of the road in the rear of the second line of defenses. There we remained until 4 o'clock p.m. when I was ordered to move and take the rear of the division, which covered the whole column. This position we retained without molestation from the enemy until we arrived at White Oak Swamp, where we bivouacked for the night.

    At 12 m. on the following morning (30th) I was ordered to form line of battle in the edge of the woods in the rear of the Quaker Meeting-House, to support Generals McCall and Kearny, who anticipated an attack from the enemy. I posted four regiments on the left of the First Brigade and one on the left of the Second Brigade (the Second New York), directing them to throw out one company as flankers. While the enemy was hotly engaged with the first line they advanced on to our left and engaged the flankers from the Second New York, under command of Capt. Sidney W. Park, who stood their ground nobly, and captured one battle flag (bearing the inscriptions "Williamsburg" and "Seven Pines") 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and from 30 to 40 enlisted men---all belonging to the Seventeenth Virginia. As the enemy did not advance by the first line the remainder of the brigade did not become engaged. I retained the position until 3 o'clock the next morning, July 1, when ordered to move to the rear of the First Brigade, which order I endeavored to carry out, but was prevented by the Second Brigade, which broke through my line and passed me, as I believe, contrary to orders. At about 6 o'clock I arrived at Kemp's farm, on the James River. After remaining here for two hours was ordered to form line of battle on the left of the road, which was done under a heavy fire from the enemy's battery, but the position was chosen by General Hooker, and it was a splendid one, for we could resist an attack against three times our number, as every man was under cover.

    I remained here until 3 o'clock the following morning, July 2, when I received orders from General Heintzelman's aide to move my brigade immediately, and also notify General Grover to do the same. I sent word to General Grover, and at the same time moved my own brigade. It commenced raining, and rained incessantly until after my arrival at Harrison's Landing, which rendered the march excessively severe, especially on the convalescents. After reaching Harrison's Landing we immediately went into camp and remained until the following morning, July 3, when we were ordered to march, without camp equipage or knapsacks. After marching about 2 miles and halting as many hours we were ordered to another camp, where we remained until the following morning, when General Patterson took command of the brigade.

    In closing, it affords me no ordinary pleasure to compliment nearly all the officers of the brigade, especially Colonel Mott, of the Sixth New Jersey, for his coolness and excellent judgment, and Capt. Sidney W Park of the Second Infantry, New York Volunteers, who commanded his company while acting as flankers during the engagement of the 30th ultimo, and captured so many officers and men, as well as a battle flag, without losing a man; also Lieut. C. K. Hall for his very efficient and able services as aide during the whole movements and engagements which the brigade took part in.

    JOS. B. CARR, Colonel, Commanding Brigade

    #64

    July 11, 1862.

    On the morning of the 30th I moved my battery from the vicinity of the bridge up to General Kearny's headquarters and reported. The caissons of my battery came by another road, and having been sent forward at a rapid gait by General Kearny's orders, one complete caisson and one body were upset and lost.

    The battery was then ordered into position near the New Market road on the right. The fences in front were leveled, the brush cut down, and the field cleared. Soon after General Meade came with General Seymour and desired me to change my battery from front to right, so that instead of bearing on the New Market road it should bear toward the débouché from the Charles City, &c., roads. I pointed out to them the position of General Kearny's division, and said I was on his left flank, and, as I believed, in proper position as regarded his division. They retired, and soon after an apparent change of line of battle in General McCall's division was observed, and the battery they proposed to deploy perpendicularly was deployed nearly in prolongation of it, slightly advanced. General Kearny soon rode up and I commenced to tell him of this. He ordered me to change my position so as to fire to the right, which placed me nearly perpendicularly behind Randol's battery, and soon after General Kearny left I deployed forward in echelon of pieces, and came into action left, so as to cover the ground I did at first, and in this position the battery fought over three hours. Had I remained in the other position my battery would have been swept away with Randol's, without doubt, before I could have changed front forward.

    The enemy appeared by the New Market road, and as soon as they began to show themselves in front the battery opened on them with spherical case-shot just in the edge of the woods about 400 yards. They advanced in line, stooping down and firing, and we continued firing spherical case-shot until they reached the torn-down fence, brush, &c., about 150 yards in front, where they appeared to falter. They soon, however, rallied for a charge, and canister was poured upon them, and as they advanced double canister was used and served without sponging, which with the terrible infantry volley poured into them by Colonel Hays' Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, gallantly supporting the battery, drove them back. They retired to about 150 yards at the fence, when spherical case was again used with half-second fuses. Three successive charges were made by overwhelmingly large forces, but they were each time hurled back with terrible slaughter. The battle continued in this manner when, at about 7.30 o'clock p.m., the canister and spherical case-shot having become exhausted, and after firing round shot, it became apparent that the battery was being risked without doing the enemy injury, and it was therefore retire.

    Lieut. J. H. Butler is deserving of great credit for bravery and efficiency. I am under great obligations to him for the condition of my battery.

    The battery went into action with six pieces, four caissons, and one caisson limber; came out with five guns, one caisson, and two limbers. The horses of one piece were shot, and the piece lost after getting partly off the field.

    One man killed, 13 wounded, 2 missing. Medical-Cadet Frank Le Moyne was on the field of battle or near the battery during the entire day, and worked until late at night dressing wounded until all were attended to. His conduct deserves great commendation.

    JAMES THOMPSON, Captain, Second Artillery, U.S. Army.
    .
    [Indorsements.]

    * This statement as to Twentieth Indiana is not correct.

    P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

    No excuse for this. I remained on the field as long as the enemy continued to advance--at least half an hour after retiring of battery. It was never reported to me, nor General Robinson, nor Colonel Hays.

    P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General.

    July 7, 1862

    I have the honor to report the operations of my battery (G, Second U.S. Artillery) on Monday, the 30th June:

    In compliance with instructions from the general commanding the division the battery was posted on the right of the New Market road, supported by Berry's and Robinson's brigades, in order to be in position to open fire on the enemy advancing either upon the New Market road or upon the Central road. I deployed my battery facing the open field on the right of New Market road, the left piece near and a little in rear of the right piece of Randol's battery, First U.S. Artillery, McCall's division, the right retired in echelon.

    About 400 yards in front was a dense wood, which approached within 100 yards on our right behind a small house. About 4 o'clock the enemy came upon us in line from this wood. I opened fire upon them with spherical case-shot, but they advanced to the débris of two fences I had caused to be thrown down in the earlier part of the day and about 100 yards in front. Canister was now used, and our supports opened fire on them with musketry, and they were stopped. The wood on the right was densely crowded with them in large force, and three successive charges to capture the battery were repulsed by the prompt and gallant supports deployed between the guns and by the murderous double canister from our guns, loaded without sponging.

    The battery was enabled to hold this position until about 8 p.m., after the capture of the battery on our left, and until our supply of canister was exhausted, some guns having fired double spherical case-shot, cut to explode on leaving the gun.
    By great exertion we were enabled to bring all our guns from the field except one. When leaving with this a trace broke, and in replacing it (although there was one under the limber) the horses were shot, and we were compelled to spike the gun and have it. Efforts were made during the night to bring it away, but without success. The battery was saved, first, by its double canister, served without sponging, and the admirable support rendered by Generals Berry and Robinson; secondly, by its retired echelon position.

    Our loss was small--1 man killed, 13 wounded, and 2 missing. As the infantry deployed through the battery they mingled with the cannoneers, and in some instances served the guns with great zeal and efficiency.

    After Randol's battery was taken one of his lieutenants worked one of my guns for some time with 3 men only. The conduct of the officers and men of the battery was excellent. Lieut. J. H. Butler, Second Artillery, was very cool, brave, and active, and I am greatly indebted to him for the efficient condition of the battery before the battle. Lieut. J. S. Dudley, Second Artillery, and Lieut. J. C. Schuetz, Second Michigan, had charge of sections, and behaved admirably.

    JAMES THOMPSON, Captain, U.S. Army.

    [Indorsements.]

    * I should rather say that the time was 7.30 p.m.

    P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

    I have to complain that Captain Thompson made no report to me of this accident to his piece at the time, though immediately in front of where the pieces had been firing. A small detail of men---even his own artillerists--should have taken it off. I was ignorant of his loss for twenty-four hours and only learned it by rumor.

    P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

    Respectfully forwarded.

    The court of inquiry asked for at my suggestion should examine this loss of piece, never reported and most easy to be saved. Our line never once broke, but held their ground. I was with Colonel Hays for more than half an hour after retiring of Thompson's pieces. Captain Thompson was brave in action, negligent afterward.

    P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General

    #65

    July 4, 1862

    On the morning of the 30th ultimo my brigade left the edge of White Oak Swamp and took the position assigned it at Nelson's farm, on the right of the New Market road, McCall's division being on the left. About 2.30 o'clock p.m. the enemy commenced a furious attack upon McCall's position. While he was there engaged I employed a portion of my brigade in constructing a slight barricade of rails on the right of my line. Before this was completed the enemy relinquished his attack on McCall, and at 4 o'clock turned his whole force against my front. I had two companies of the Twentieth Indiana deployed as skirmishers in the woods in front of the clearing, who held their position as long as possible and fought their way back to the brigade. The remainder of the Indiana regiment was in line behind the barricade. In the center was the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania, and on the left the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, while the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania was formed in column and held in reserve. Against this line the enemy brought his whole force, constantly sending in fresh regiments to relieve those already engaged.

    For five hours my brigade sustained these assaults under a terrific fire, and frequently repulsed the enemy and drove him to seek shelter in the woods. I was supported during the afternoon and evening by regiments from Birney's, Berry's, and Caldwell's brigades, but many of the regimental commanders having failed to report to me, I leave it for those brigade commanders to report their operations. The enemy was twice driven back by our troops charging upon him.

    The Sixty-third Pennsylvania, in addition to guarding the left of our line, was charged with protecting Thompson's battery, which duty was most gallantly performed. The regiment, although few in numbers, made a brilliant charge upon the enemy, contended with him hand to hand, and drove him from the field.

    I beg to call your special attention to the report of Colonel Hays, who mentions First Lieutenants Gray and Fulton and Adjutant Corts as particularly distinguished in this action.

    Considering the disparity of the forces engaged, the enemy outnumbering us at least 4 to 1, the result of the battle was all that could be desired and more than we had reason to expect. The Eighty-seventh New York, one of the regiments of my brigade, was that morning detached and sent to destroy Brackett's Ford, across White Oak Swamp, which duty was well performed in face of the enemy.

    JNO. C. ROBINSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

    #68

    July 4, 1862

    I have the honor to report the operations of the Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers during the battle of the 30th of June, near Richmond, Va.

    Early in the day the regiment, of 300, men was detailed to protect the battery commanded by Captain Thompson, Second U.S. Artillery

    About 3 o'clock p.m. the enemy opened fire upon one advanced section, in command of Lieutenant Butler, which was soon withdrawn, and with the regiment retired to the rear to join the battery. The battery was placed in position to sweep an extended field, over which it was necessary that the enemy should advance to the attack.

    In about an hour's time the enemy opened upon us with shot, shell, and other missiles, to which Captain Thompson replied most gallantly. For the space of an hour the firing was unremitting. In the obscurity of the smoke it was communicated to me that the battery was endangered. I at once gave the order to charge, which was responded to by my men leaping the fence and moving forward at double-quick in better order than at an ordinary drill. The alarm was false, and I withdrew to my original position.

    Very soon afterward General Kearny, as also Captain Thompson, announced danger to the battery. Again the order was given to charge, and again the regiment moved forward, passing the battery, and were halted 50 feet in front, the enemy retiring to the woods and houses beyond. The order was given to lie down and open spaces for the artillery. Within good range of our "Austrians" and the continued fire of the artillery we hurled into the enemy a perfect storm of shot. The enemy, however, replied vigorously and presented an obstinate resistance. The contest was thus carried on for an hour, when Captain Thompson announced to me that his ammunition was exhausted and the necessity of withdrawing his battery. To cover his withdrawal, as the enemy had been made emboldened by heavy reenforcements, I ordered again a charge. At once the men sprang to their feet, and with leveled bayonets dashed upon the enemy. The conflict was short, but most desperate, especially around the buildings. It was muzzle to muzzle, and the powder actually burned the faces of the opposing men as they contended through the paling fences. The enemy fled, and I withdrew my force back to the position occupied by the battery--one piece of which still remained upon the field. I was here informed that another force was relieving us, and retired to our original position at the fence. Night was coming on. We had been under fire for five hours, in action half the time, and our loss very heavy.

    We are indebted to a detachment from the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers for assistance during our last charge, and I would be pleased if I could name the officers in command. At the same time I regret to state that our charge was much impeded by a fire on us from our friends.

    ALEX. HAYS, Colonel Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

    #78

    July 20, 1862

    On the morning of June 29 a large portion of a regiment of rebel cavalry, approaching on the New Market road, charged upon a part of the line of Couch's division with extraordinary audacity. Averell's cavalry sentinels in front gave way judiciously, leading the enemy forward to within 50 yards of our line, when a section of Captain McCarthy's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Munk, First Pennsylvania Artillery, opened with canister and case-shot, which being followed up by Averell's cavalry and assisted by Lieutenant Dougherty, of Flood's battery, First Pennsylvania Artillery, who commanded a section on the right, damaged the assailants to the amount of about 80 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our side lost not a man. This little affair produced an excellent effect in clearing the roads, as the contrabands informed me that all the cavalry we did not kill had run away to Richmond. I desire to call particular attention to the fact that Lieutenants Munk and Dougherty were ready with their guns to fire when the enemy appeared. Lieutenant Munk had measured the ground in front of his guns, and was thus able to cut his fuses to the proper length.

    On the afternoon of June 29 I was ordered by General McClellan to move my whole force to the James River, where I was to communicate with the gunboats, guard Turkey Bridge, the mill-pond, and stream leading to the river. Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's corps was ordered to support me in case of attack.

    By the assistance of scouting parties from the Eighth Illinois and Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry and persons belonging to the country I had learned all the roads and paths to the James River. I directed Colonel Farnsworth, with his (Eighth)Regiment of Illinois Cavalry, with all the baggage and mule trains, to march after dark by a road to the left. The whole of the infantry, artillery, and Colonel Gregg's Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry I directed along an obscure road through the woods which had been brought to my knowledge by Captain Keenan, of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, an excellent officer, and as skillful as an Indian in woodcraft. A portion of that road had not been used for wheels in many years, and old trees were lying across it. The cavalry and artillery were divided through the column, the infantry of Couch's division in advance and that of Peck's division in the rear. In this way the Fourth Corps moved all night silently 6 miles through the woods, and early in the morning of June 30 it encamped, with all its artillery and baggage in good order, on the banks of James River, below Turkey Bridge, which was strongly guarded, without delay.

    After the arrival of the commanding general and other portions of the army the line of defense on the down river side of the new position was assigned to the Fourth Corps. The enemy having attacked above Turkey Bridge, I was ordered successively to detach the brigades of infantry of Couch's division to strengthen our forces in that direction. By a reference to the reports of Brigadier-General Couch and his subordinates, and of Major West, chief of artillery, and other artillery commanders, it will be found that at Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Bet-tom's Bridge, Jones' Bridge, and elsewhere the troops of the Fourth Corps fought with the same gallantry with which they have uniformly met the enemy in this campaign. That corps has won many advantages over the enemy and has never given an inch of ground to equal numbers.

    With the balance of my command, embracing Peek's division of infantry, thirty-five pieces of artillery, and two regiments of cavalry, I was charged on the night of July 1 to form the rear guard of the army in its movement down the river to Harrison's Bar, 7 miles below Turkey Bridge.

    The road along which the army was to move, running at an average distance of 2½ miles from the river, was bordered throughout on the left with forest and on the right by open fields, here and there checkered with woods. From the left the enemy might approach by many roads and paths through the woods, and might follow on the main road over Turkey Bridge unless we could succeed in destroying it.

    To insure the destruction of the bridge I requested Colonel Farnsworth, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, to send me an officer and a detachment of men from his regiment, on whom I could rely, for that purpose. He sent Captain Clark, with a party of 25 axmen, who proceeded to make, in advance, the examinations and preparations necessary to secure the prompt demolition of the bridge the moment the last of our troops should have crossed. To provide against a hot pursuit, I directed Major West to select an able officer of artillery to blow up the bridge if it should become absolutely necessary to destroy it in that way. Lieut. M. Reichenbacher, First Pennsylvania Artillery, was the artillery officer selected. Lieutenants Gibson and Jackson, of my staff (the former an officer of General McClellan's staff and a volunteer with me for the night), were directed to go with the parties to the bridge and to make sure of its destruction, and bring me information. While our troops were passing, many large trees were chopped nearly through, and in fifteen minutes after the taft of the column had crossed the bridge had disappeared without the use of powder, and the road through the jungle was blocked against the possible passage of wheels or cavalry for twenty-four hours and made hazardous for infantry.

    Beside the main road, upon which the army was to retire to Harrison's Bar, a road for the accommodation of neighbors starts from Haxall's immense field, below Turkey Bridge, on which vast numbers of our wagons were parked, and joins the main road about 4 miles below the bridge. Near my headquarters on the lower edge of the field this road crosses a stream, wooded on both sides, which extends from the main road to the river. To prevent the enemy passing that way to attack our right flank I had given permission to General Naglee, who came to ask it, to fell trees across the road after he had passed over with his brigade and several batteries of the rear guard.

    As the day began to dawn it became evident that all the artillery and wagons could not pass along one road. Immense trains were standing still, and others were turning off the main road, which had become blocked, and were moving down toward my headquarters. At this time the rain began to fall briskly, and though I was not yet certain of the destruction of Turkey Bridge, I knew the roads would be seriously injured by the rain; so, weighing all the chances and dangers, I concluded to save the trains if possible. Accordingly I ordered as many axmen as could work to clear away the felled trees and open the road which Naglee had obstructed. Over the road thus cleared not less than 1,000 vehicles, nearly all drawn by six cattle, passed, and were saved from the enemy, who might otherwise have seized them all.
    The troops composing the rear guard were arranged as follows: Wessells' brigade, with Miller's and one section of McCarthy's batteries, all under immediate command of Brigadier-General Peck, commanding division, were formed in line of battle, faced to the rear, on the hill overlooking Haxall's vast farm and in the woods across the roads coming in from the direction of White Oak Swamp. Upon all these roads cavalry scouts were kept in constant motion. Half a mile below Peck's position Colonel Farnsworth's regiment, the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, was drawn up in line of battle, faced also to the rear, and still a mile farther on Naglee's brigade and several batteries under Major West were formed in line of battle on the brow of a ridge. All these arrangements were made before daylight, and the extremities of the lines of battle concealed in the woods or by the inequalities of the ground, so as to confuse the enemy in regard to our numbers. The Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Gregg, was ordered to accompany me, to act as circumstances might dictate. The columns of infantry moved in the fields parallel to the double line of wagons in the main road. The men were kept in the ranks and the ranks and teams closed up, so that the army never presented a more formidable appearance nor had it before been so much massed and in so good a situation to repel an attack, which was threatened, but not made, during the march of our columns.

    As the last of our wagons passed the rear guard withdrew to new positions. Every straggler who could be seen was sent forward, and nothing was left behind except a small number of wagons which broke down. No doubt some stragglers concealed in the woods fell into the hands of the enemy.

    As the day advanced the continuous deluging rains rendered it next to impossible to get forward the trains over Kimminger's Creek, which is the boundary of our present camp. It was found necessary to park some 1,200 as they came up on the other side of the creek, and it was not till after dark of the 3d instant that by extraordinary exertions the last of the wagons was brought over.

    Brigadier-General Wessells, with his brigade, assisted by Miller's battery and a party of Gregg's cavalry, remained to guard the wagons and to defend them against the enemy, approaching with cavalry and artillery. After firing a few shells the enemy left upon being saluted with a few 100-pounders from the gunboats.

    I do not think more vehicles or more public property was abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left in the same state of the roads if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him; and when it is understood that all the carriages and teams belonging to the army stretched out in one line would extend not far from 40 miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated.

    Accompanying this report are reports of Brigadier-Generals Couch and Peck, commanding divisions, and of Major West, chief of the Reserve Artillery of the Fourth Corps, and of their subordinates. To these officers, especially to my staff, and to many others I owe my acknowledgments for their efficient co-operation with me in the late movements. In other communications many gallant officers have been recommended for advancement.

    In the battles, labors, and exposures to which this army has been subject the Fourth Corps has had its full share. Many in that corps have fallen while nobly and bravely fighting for our cause. Their names will be held in honorable remembrance. A few, I regret to say, have sought to evade the stern duties which this crisis imposes upon every man who loves his country.

    E. D. KEYES, Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

    #93


    July 8, 1862.

    On the 29th of June, the major-general commanding having decided to move on the following day the whole of the material of the army to a position on the James River near Turkey Island, I was directed, with Morell's and Sykes' divisions and a portion of the reserve artillery, to proceed to the vicinity of Turkey Bridge, and there select and hold a position behind which the army could be withdrawn in safety. I moved the command at sundown that evening on New Market road from White Oak Swamp, but, ignorant of the country, having but one guide, we were misled that night and did not succeed in reaching our destination until the following morning at 9 o'clock, where I had two hours earlier selected a position on Malvern Hill west of Turkey Bridge. This hill commanded all the roads leading from Richmond and Chickahominy Swamp to James River which converge at Turkey Bridge. Here as soon as possible were posted the two divisions, thoroughly covering the River road and the débouchés from the New Market, Charles City, and Williamsburg roads. Warren's brigade, of Sykes' division, was posted in the valley of the creek, across the River road, to prevent the left flank from being turned by an advance from Richmond along the road. Through the command thus posted passed in safety the supply trains of many of the divisions and the reserve artillery of the army, the current only ceasing to flow at about 4 o'clock p.m. 30th of June.

    At about this hour the enemy began to appear and to feel our front, and about 5 o'clock showed themselves in large force, advancing upon our left flank. Under the cover of the woods skirting the River road the enemy planted his artillery to engage our main force on Malvern Hill, while his infantry, with some artillery, moved direct upon Colonel Warren, with whom he was soon engaged.

    The enemy's demonstration soon brought upon him the concentrated fire of some thirty guns, together with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's troops. Under these influences the force which had advanced against that part of our line incontinently retreated, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren and numerous evidences of the destructiveness of the artillery which crowned the crest of Malvern Hill.

    In this connection should be mentioned with due acknowledgment the help of the gunboats, whose well-directed fire of heavy shells gave the very greatest support, moral and physical, to the efforts by which this determined onslaught was repulsed. The assaulting column is understood to have consisted of 15,000 men, under General Henry A. Wise, being part or the whole of the division commanded by General Holmes. This is known as the battle of Turkey Bridge.

    While the battle was taking place, McCall's division, posted on the New Market road to cover the withdrawal of our trains, was attacked by the enemy in immense force. He maintained his place till night-fall, when the surviving portion of his command rejoined the corps, coming in under the command of Brigadier-General Seymour, the only remaining general officer on duty. I have here to regret the loss of Brigadier-General McCall, commanding division, taken prisoner, and of the services of Brigadier-General Meade, severely wounded, and of many other valuable field and line officers, as well as many brave men.

    This action (the battle of New Market road) lasted from about 4 p.m. till after dark, during which period the remainder of the trains of the whole army had successfully passed the contested point and reached a place of safety within the interior lines of the army. To Generals McCall's, Meade's, and Seymour's reports, to be made and forwarded hereafter, I must refer for the details of the battle of New Market road, and to Generals Couch and Warren for those of Turkey Bridge.

    F. J. PORTER, Brigadier-General, Commanding

    The fate of McCall's Penna. Reserves Division on 30 June 1862 reminds me of another, far more modern, Penna. Division that was sent to a "quiet spot" in the lines after a severe beating during the Schlacht im Hürtgenwald in 1944.

    More to come.
    [B]Charles Heath[/B]
    [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]heath9999@aol.com[/EMAIL]

    [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Spanglers_Spring_Living_History/"]12 - 14 Jun 09 Hoosiers at Gettysburg[/URL]

    [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]17-19 Jul 09 Mumford/GCV Carpe Eventum [/EMAIL]

    [EMAIL="beatlefans1@verizon.net"]31 Jul - 2 Aug 09 Texans at Gettysburg [/EMAIL]

    [EMAIL="JDO@npmhu.org"] 11-13 Sep 09 Fortress Monroe [/EMAIL]

    [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Elmira_Death_March/?yguid=25647636"]2-4 Oct 09 Death March XI - Corduroy[/URL]

    [EMAIL="oldsoldier51@yahoo.com"] G'burg Memorial March [/EMAIL]

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: The Federal point of view

      And a little more.....

      July 8, 1862

      While the battle of Turkey Bridge was taking place the necessary arrangements were being made to resist the enemy coming from the direction of New Market and Charles City, who, as a natural consequence of previous operations, might be expected to launch on the following day his whole power against this force, with the hope of annihilating it and destroying the Army of the Potomac. The corps felt the responsibility and accepted it.

      The position in which we were thrown had certain elements of great strength, and was the best adapted for a battle-field of any with which we have so far been favored. All elevated plateau covered the converging roads and was fronted to a certain extent with defensible ravines and low grounds, over which our artillery had excellent play. On the night of the battle of Turkey Bridge the division of General Morell was placed on the right of the line, with a portion of his division artillery and of Hunt's reserve artillery; the division of General Sykes on the left, with the same support, and the reserve artillery, under Colonel Hunt, advantageously posted for general efficiency, crowning the crest of Malvern Hill. In this position the corps lay on its arms during the night and waited the attack, which took place at about 4 in the afternoon of the 1st of July.

      Couch's division, which had been sent on the night of the 30th of June to General Sumner, remained in support of our immediate right, and, like our own force, lay on its arms through the intermediate time.

      On the following morning, July 1, the lines were visited and rectified by the major-general commanding, and Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, who had retired from White Oak Swamp within our lines during the night, took position on the right of Couch, prepared to resist attack or give support to the left and center, as circumstances should require. Our position was strengthened by the arrival of heavy artillery under Colonel Tyler, whose ten siege guns were posted so as to control the River road and sweep our left flank, and by firing over the heads of our own men to reach the enemy, advancing on the Charles City road.

      At about 1 o'clock p.m. the enemy commenced with his artillery and skirmishers, feeling along our whole front, and kept up a desultory firing till about 4 with but little effect. During this firing General Sumner, having withdrawn under the crest of the hill behind Malvern house a portion of his corps, directed me to do the same with mine. I could not at once refer to the major-general commanding then on the right of the line, and protested against such a movement as disastrous to us, adding that as the major-general commanding had seen and approved my disposition, and also General Couch's, I could not change without his order, which could soon be obtained if desirable. He desisted, and the enemy was soon upon us, compelling him to recall his own corps.

      The same ominous silence which had preceded the attack in force at Gaines' Mill now intervened, lasting till about 6 o'clock, at which time the enemy (General John B. Magruder's corps) opened upon as suddenly with the full force of his artillery, and at once began to push forward his columns of infantry to the attack of our positions. Regiment after regiment, and sometimes whole brigades, were thrown against our batteries, but our infantry withheld their fire till they were within short distance (artillery mowing them down with canister), dispersed the columns in every case, and in some instances followed the retiring mass, driving them with the bayonet, capturing prisoners, and also flags and other trophies, some of which have been forwarded to your headquarters.

      This contest was maintained by Morell's and Couch's divisions, the former supported by Sykes, who had thrown some of his regiments to the front and dispersed a large column attempting to take us in flank. A portion of the reserve artillery was also here in action. While the battle was proceeding, seeing that the enemy was pressing our men and accumulating his masses to pour fresh troops upon them, I called for aid from General Sumner, which call was promptly responded to by the arrival of General Meagher, with his brigade, followed by that of Sickles, which General Heintzelman voluntarily and generously sent to complete the contest. These brigades I posted--Sickles on the right of Couch and Meagher on the left of Morell and in their sup-port-with instructions to push their regiments forward in echelon of about 100 paces, extending to the rear from the right or left of Couch's division, to relieve those in advance whose ammunition had been expended and to drive the enemy. These directions were promptly and successfully executed. McCall's (now Seymour's) division was held in reserve.

      In the mean time Colonel Hunt hastened and brought up artillery to relieve the batteries whose ammunition had been exhausted and who had successfully borne the brunt of the engagement throughout the day. Long after the enemy's infantry was driven in disorder from the field and our own troops withheld from the desired pursuit these fresh batteries (one of them of 32-pounder howitzers) sent their missiles in destructive search after the rear of his column, silencing the guns he placed in position to cover his retreat. The lateness of the hour (9 p.m.) did not permit us to pursue the enemy farther, maintaining due regard to the security of the army, of which we were simply a rear guard, even had we had ammunition and provisions, in both of which particulars our men were sadly deficient.

      For this brilliant action of my corps, inflicting on the enemy a blow which under other circumstances might have been followed up to a decisive victory, we can only claim that the success obtained secured for the army the following days of peaceful and undisturbed retirement to Harrison's Landing, so essential to rest, recruit, and security.

      I have to acknowledge the excellent dispositions of the reserve artillery made by Colonel Hunt and the promptness with which batteries under the immediate directions of Maj. William Hays and Capt. George W. Getty were always at hand when wanted to relieve others or to open fire in new positions, and also for valuable services, both by advice and action, received of him and of his assistants.

      Colonel Averell, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, rendered me valuable service as volunteer aide during the action, and to him was confided the command of the rear guard, which held the position keeping the enemy in check by the boldest demonstrations during the march which ensued on the following day from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing. His dispositions were in every respect brilliant in conception and satisfactory in result. Under the protection of his regiment and Buchanan's brigade of regulars and Tidball's battery all the troops and all the trains were safely and in proper order and time brought to this depot.

      Reports of the commanders of divisions will soon be presented, when I shall take occasion to bring to the special notice of the major-general commanding many officers to whose services are due the successes of the day and who merit reward. Among the many noble spirits taken from us in this battle I have to mourn the loss of the brave, gallant, and beloved Colonel Woodbury, Fourth Michigan Volunteers, and Colonel Cuss, Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, who had escaped the dangers of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, and who were about to see their noble efforts and those of their comrades crowned with success and themselves with honor.
      In presenting this my hasty and preliminary report of the services of this corps and of those commands which accidentally or by order served with it, I cannot close it without a tribute in general terms to the gallant officers and men who have day after day contended successfully against immense odds in severe battles, made long marches, endured exposure, fatigue, and hunger without a murmur, and patiently awaited attack of the immense forces of the enemy pouring upon us with a confidence of success. Cheered by the example of their officers; held together by mutual confidence, arising from strict discipline; relying under Providence in the justice of their cause, this gallant band has on three occasions withstood the brunt of attack of the main force of the enemy, and finally driven him from the field when expecting success to crown his efforts--that success the capture or destruction of this army. I am gratified to be able to add that in this movement of the army to its new base, hard pressed as it has been at times, the corps has maintained its discipline and unity, and with its accustomed cheerfulness and confidence has ever been and is now ready for any duty required of it.

      F. J. PORTER, Brigadier-General, Commanding

      July 8, 1862.

      I have the honor to forward to you for the Government at Washington four rebel flags taken in battle by different commands of this corps. Two were captured by the Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Reserve Corps at the battle on the New Market Road, June 30, 1862; another at the same time and place by the Ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Reserve Corps, and the fourth by the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Butterfield's brigade, Morell's division, at the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, 1862.

      I desire to state that another flag was taken by a regiment of Couch's division at the battle of Malvern Hill from a rebel regiment which had been already cut to pieces by the destructive fire of Kingsbury's battery. This flag is properly a trophy of this battery, although it is held and claimed by the above-named regiment of Couch's division.

      An account of the capture of these flags is attached to each, with the names of the regiments to which they belonged, as well as the names of the captors.

      F. J. PORTER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

      #96

      July 7, 1862

      It will be perceived by reference to Major Arndt's report that Diederichs' and Knieriem's batteries of 20-pounders, stationed near Golding's house, were used with effect in cannonading the enemy's right at Gaines' Hill. On the 27th Elder's and Ames' light 12-pounder batteries, of Getty's brigade; Grimm's 32-pounder howitzers, and Diederichs' and Knieriem's 20-pounder Parrotts, under Major Arndt---in all thirty-two guns-under the general charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Getty, reported to Brigadier-General Smith, and took post in front of Gelding's, where they were hotly engaged with the enemy's batteries of position and field batteries on Garnett's farm repeatedly during the day. After silencing them they took part in the defense of the position when it was assaulted in the evening. During the afternoon Diederichs' and Knieriem's 20-pounders were also usefully employed in cannonading the enemy's right on Gaines' Hill, on the opposite side of the Chickanominy.

      On the evening of the 28th the reserve took the road for James River passing through White Oak Swamp. It passed the bridge, and went to camp at General Keyes' headquarters, near the junction of the New Market and Charles City roads during the morning of the 29th. On the afternoon of that day Benson's battery of horse artillery was assigned to service with Averell's Horse to make a reconnaissance toward New Market. Diederichs' and Knieriem's batteries of 20-pounder Parrotts and Randol's of light 12-pounder guns were assigned to McCall's division, and Elder's to Keyes' corps for special service.

      Diederichs', Knieriem's, and Randol's batteries were engaged in the battle of New Market road June 30. From the report of Lieutenant Randol it would appear that they were badly posted and badly supported. All that men could do under the circumstances seems to have been done by him and his officers to redeem the errors of others, but it was at the sacrifice on the part of Lieutenant Randol of all his guns and of two of Knieriem's. Randol might have saved his, but was not permitted to do so, as the effort would have brought on another attack. For the particulars of the action reference may be had to Major Arndt's report and Lieutenant Randol's, inclosed herewith.

      The loss of Randol's guns and the success of the enemy's charge upon them might have been prevented but for an error, so common and so deeply rooted as to require special instructions from headquarters to correct it. It appears that the column of attack on the battery consisted of three regiments in line. The two first were repulsed. The second repulse was followed up by a charge from the supports of the battery. Immediately on meeting the third regiment of the assaulting column the support broke and sought shelter in the battery, closely pursued by the enemy, who entered it with them. Had they returned, as urged and warned beforehand to do, by the flanks of the battery, thus leaving its field of fire clear, the third assault might have been repulsed and the guns saved; but, as is usual, the supports had in the first place taken up their positions in the rear of the guns, amongst the carriages, where they could by no possibility be of use except to repel an attack with the bayonet, and from which position they are almost always sure to fire through the battery. When in this case the supports were repulsed in their sortie they rushed through the battery for their former positions, depriving the artillery of the power of self-defense.

      I have always found it difficult to get infantry troops ordered to support batteries to take positions on the flanks. They insist upon being either in front or rear of the batteries. Generally the commanders of these supports rank battery commanders, and the latter are unable to correct the evil. It is desirable that artillery officers should always be consulted as to the positions to be occupied by their supports. If this is not done, it would be better in most cases to give them no special support, but leave them to the chance assistance of troops in their neighborhood. Lieutenant Randol's guns were well defended by the gunners, and their loss reflects no discredit on either men or officers.

      On the 30th that part of the reserve still at headquarters marched to Malvern Hill, and were posted on the height, on the west of the plateau and in front of the brick house. On the extreme left of the plateau, overlooking the valley, was stationed Smead's battery of light 12 pounders; then Voegelee's and Carlisle's 20-pounders; then Edwards' and Weed's, between whom and the house on the heights were two New York batteries not belonging to the reserve. About 4 p.m. the enemy commenced shelling the plateau from a point of wood at Turkey Creek across the valley. He was immediately answered, his fire silenced, his horses killed and men driven off, leaving two guns in our possession.

      On the 1st of July the positions were held by these batteries very much as on the day before, the line on the left being strengthened by the siege guns under Colonel Tyler. On the right of the plateau were stationed Wolcott's and Snow's batteries of the reserve, and Frank's battery of New York artillery, temporarily serving with it. Facing the wood which stretches along the Valley road dividing the plateau was placed Grimm's 32-pounder howitzers. The horse artillery, the remaining Napoleon guns, Diederichs' and Knieriem's 20-pounder Parrotts were held in reserve near the brick house used as a hospital. Ames' and Livingston's were stationed on the left front of the line of battle, near the road and in front of Griffin's brigade. During the conflict of the afternoon such changes were made as exigencies required. Wolcott's, Diederichs', and Knieriem's batteries re-enforced General Sumner on the right. Snow's and Frank's were posted to support Couch's division. Edwards' was sent to the front to strengthen the position occupied by Ames. Weed's. Carlisle's, and Smead's were posted upon the road by which the enemy, should he succeed in forcing our left, would debouch upon the plateau.

      Toward night his efforts to accomplish this were fierce and persistent, and the whole of the reserve was called into action. By direction of General Porter I brought up all the horse artillery under Colonel Hays and Grimm's 32-pounder howitzers, and pushed forward to the front of Malvern Heights, where they were immediately brought into action at the point of the enemy's main attack, and took a decisive part in the final struggle for the mastery of the position, following up the enemy until darkness and the nature of the ground stopped further pursuit.

      It will be perceived from this and the accompanying reports that the Reserve Artillery had its full share in all these operations; that it was represented at the advanced position at Mechanicsville by a battery of Napoleon guns and one of 10-pounder Parrotts; in the battle of the Chickahominy by six batteries of various descriptions, besides the aid afforded by the flank fire on the enemy's right from two batteries stationed near Golding's; that on the same day it contributed five batteries to our forces at the battle of Garnett's Farm, and furnished the horse artillery to Stoneman's command; that it furnished the batteries for the position of Sumner's Lower and Bottom's Bridges, and covered the passage of the army by those points; that it furnished three batteries for the battle at the advanced position on the New Market road; that it provided all the artillery which silenced the enemy's cannonade at Turkey Bridge; that in the battle of July it re-enforced strongly the whole line, and sent forward its full quota to repel the attacks on our front and left, and finally brought up to the decisive point at the close of the day the howitzers and the three horse batteries, thus bringing every gun of this large artillery force into the most active and decisive use.Not a gun remained unemployed and not one could have been safely spared.

      I trust that I may be pardoned for stating here that when we consider, in addition to all this, the service of its heavy batteries at Yorktown; that rendered by furnishing the large force of draught horses required for moving the siege train; the labors of officers and men in fabricating gabions and fascines and making and laying platforms; the details of its officers for engineer duty in constructing redoubts and batteries; the service of the horse artillery at Williamsburg and in all the operations of Stoneman's and other cavalry commands down to the time of our establishment on the Chickahominy and the part it took in the battle of Hanover Court-House and in minor operations; the great and indispensable service rendered by its complete ammunition train, in not only keeping up fully its own supplies but making good the deficiencies of others--it may be justly claimed that its artillery reserve has contributed its full share to the services rendered by the Army of the Potomac, and vindicated in the most complete manner the wisdom and forecast of the general commanding in organizing so completely and thoroughly a special artillery force of such magnitude, and which events have proved was no larger than necessity required.

      Lieutenants Randol and Olcott, First Artillery, volunteered their services to me as additional aides-de-camp on the evening of July at Malvern, and as such were engaged in the hottest of the fight, besides assisting in the service of the 32-pounder howitzer battery in the last struggle on the hill.

      HENRY J. HUNT, Colonel, Commanding

      [Indorsement. ]

      September 26, 1862

      Respectfully forwarded to the headquarters Army of the Potomac. In my official report of the actions before Richmond I referred to the services of this command, but now take pleasure in again calling attention to the distinguished services of the Reserve Artillery and the importance of such resources, as well for the moment when suddenly large reserves are thrown into action as to replace that artillery of divisions which has been disabled in action or otherwise not available.

      The Reserve Artillery, under command of Colonel Hunt and lately under Colonel Hays, has been ever judiciously employed, and always was within reach of and employed when it was required. In every case (and this has been in every action, not only in the Army of the Potomac, but in all in which this army was associated with the Army of Virginia) its services have been marked and valuable, its officers serving with distinguished ability, and doing their full part to gain the battle by their individual efforts and their cordial co-operation and labors with other troops.

      I also here especially commend the services of that portion of the reserve which has served as mounted or light artillery or horse artillery, whose labors have been severe and losses in some cases irreparable. The officers of the artillery have received but little if any reward for their services, and while their companions of the same date are elevated in rank and command they receive not the reward a soldier seeks and they and the army are conscious that they merit, and the fact tends to discourage them. Their duty to the country which educated them and their patriotism alone keeps them in the service so long as they benefit her. Some have been offered promotion in volunteer regiments, but appreciating the value of their services in the artillery and that they could not be spared from an arm which has been among the most prominent in earning victory they have declined the advancement, while others have avoided seeking what they know they could obtain. Such self-sacrifice deserves reward, and taken in connection with their services, I would respectfully ask of the Government promotion by brevet or in volunteer service.

      F. J. PORTER, Major-General, Commanding.

      #102

      July 6, 1862

      I have the honor to report that my battery, E, First Artillery, arrived in camp near New Bridge May 27. On June 1 I was ordered with my whole battery to a position near one of the bridges on the Chickahominy, and remained there until about sunset, when I was relieved by part of the Maryland Artillery. The whole battery was again on picket at New Bridge June 5, remaining in position twenty-four hours. On the 9th of June the right and left sections were again on picket--the right at New Bridge and the left at the bridge immediately below it. On the 11th of June I crossed the Chickahominy to Camp Lincoln. On the 27th of June, while the battle was in progress beyond the Chickahominy, my battery was hitched up and in readiness, but did not leave camp until the morning of the 28th, when it took a position to command the bridge--Lieutenant Hill and the right section on the road near the bridge, Lieutenant Olcott and the left section at the bridge immediately below, the center section movable. As soon as the bridge was destroyed Lieutenant Hill moved his section back some 200 yards, and took up a position to command the bridge.
      At about 11 o'clock p.m. the order was given to retreat, and I marched all night and part of the next day, crossing White Oak Swamp, and coming into the temporary camp of the Artillery Reserve about 11 a.m. on the 29th. Toward evening, in compliance with your orders, I reported with my battery to General McCall on the New Market road, and was placed by him on picket during the night. On the 30th of June my whole battery was engaged in action with the enemy until about 4.30 p.m., when my supports became panic-struck and ran. My cannoneers were driven from their posts with the bayonet and my guns were taken. I rallied a few companies of the supporting regiment and retook my guns, but was unable to hold them or remove them from the field. I then joined the remnant of my battery, and reported with them at City Point same night.

      A.M. RANDOL, First Lieutenant, First Artillery, Commanding Battery E.
      -----

      July 7, 1862.

      I have the honor to report that in compliance with your orders I left the temporary camp of the Artillery Reserve, near White Oak Swamp, on the evening of the 28th of June, in company with Benson's battery, and reported to General McCall on the New Market road, near the junction of the road leading to Malvern Hill.

      At dusk we proceeded about a mile and a half along the New Market road, when I was ordered by General McCall to place the battery in position in a field on the right of the road and await further orders. The position designated by the general was at the foot of a hill covered with small trees and underbush, the soil swampy. Supposing that the field was selected merely for an encampment for the night, and not for a position of defense, I made no objection to entering it. Fortunately the enemy did not make his appearance, and nothing of importance occurred during the night except three disgraceful stampedes by the infantry of McCall's division. About an hour before daybreak an aide of General McCall's informed me that the division was on the wrong road, having moved too far to the west, and ordered me to hitch in and follow them to the junction of the two roads above mentioned. I did so, and on applying to General McCall for further orders was told to remain where I was.

      About 2 p.m. our advance pickets on the New Market road were driven in and measures immediately taken for forming our line of battle. I was ordered by Brigadier-General Meade to place my battery on a field on the right of the New Market road and on the left of Captain Thompson's battery (G, of the Second Artillery). Not having room for the whole battery,! placed four pieces in position, leaving the left section (Lieutenant Olcott) movable. Soon after General Kearny appeared on the field and changed the front of Captain Thompson's battery to right angles with mine. I then placed one piece of Lieutenant Olcott's section in position in the road on my left, near the woods, to command it.

      Shortly after the enemy appeared in some force on oar left and drove a regiment of our skirmishers, who ran without firing a shot. Immediately after the enemy opened fire on the batteries on my left, which was at once replied to, and a fierce cannonading ensued, which lasted about thirty minutes. As the enemy was beyond the range of my guns and their movements hidden by the woods I did not open on them, lest I should unnecessarily expose the battery to a fire which we could not return with any effect. After the firing of the enemy had ceased, and while they were supposed to be forming for a charge, at the suggestion of General Meade I fired four rounds of spherical case into the woods in front of me, but receiving no reply, a regiment of Pennsylvania Reserves was sent into the woods on my left to ascertain their position. They met them, fired one volley, broke and ran, closely pursued by the enemy. As soon as our flying troops had unmasked Lieutenant Olcott's gun he opened on the enemy with canister, making a terrible slaughter in their ranks. After this first attack of the enemy on the batteries on my left having been repulsed, I ordered Lieutenant Olcott to limber up and come in battery with his section on my right. Soon the enemy made a second attack on the batteries on my left, when I changed front forward on my left piece, so as to take them in flank. Again they were forced to retire, but not until they had driven the cannoneers away from all of the batteries on the left and killed many of their horses. They next appeared on my present right flank (my former front), when I immediately changed front to the rear on my left piece. Captain Thompson also changed front to a line parallel to mine, his pieces being in line with my caissons. The rebels approached under cover to within 300 yards, when I opened on them with canister. They came boldly on, notwithstanding the frightful havoc made among them, to within 100 yards of the battery, when they broke and ran, but were rallied behind a second regiment, advancing to the attack, who approached to about 50 yards, but they too were driven back in confusion with great slaughter. My infantry supports, who during the attack were lying down between the lines of my limbers and caissons firing at the enemy, arising for a charge on the disordered mass, I ceased firing.

      Early in the engagement I had cautioned both officers and men of my supports that if they charged in front of the battery and were obliged to fall back, they should at once unmask my fire by returning by the flanks of the battery. They rushed boldly to the charge, confident of an easy victory, but being met by a fresh regiment, the third of the column of attack, they fired once, were seized by unaccountable panic and fled, threw away their arms, and rushed directly for the battery. I in vain endeavored to make them unmask my fire. On they came, the foe close behind them, till when within 30 yards I gave the command to fire; but it was too late. They rushed through the battery, followed by nearly 50 of the enemy. When our troops broke I ordered the pieces to be limbered to the rear, but 38 of my horses lay dead on the field and many were badly wounded. Captain Thompson's battery had opened fire also, and being on the same line with our caissons it was impossible to-move up the limbers of the caissons, so I ordered them to leave the field.

      When the enemy entered the battery they drove the cannoneers (who had up to this time kept up the fire) from their posts at the point of the bayonet, and took Lieutenant Hill, who was badly wounded, a prisoner. It was impossible to stop all our frightened, flying supports, but I rallied a few companies, and with them charged the battery and retook it, one of their officers recapturing Lieutenant Hill: but we could not hold our advantage. The enemy were within 50 yards, charging again, and I was obliged to leave the field.

      I found two caissons and four limbers and the bulk of the men of my battery on the road about half a mile from the battle-field, and proceeded with them to the hospital, where the wounded of my battery had been carried. Soon afterward I moved the remnant of the battery, carrying all my wounded except 2 to City Point, where I reported in person to the colonel. My loss during the action was 2 killed and 8 wounded. Thirty-eight horses were killed and 8 wounded. I also lost six light 12-pounder guns, four caissons partially packed, and two limbers.

      The regiment that pretended to support the battery was the Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves. They acted very badly, rushing forward as if to charge the enemy, receiving one volley, breaking and running, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts of General Meade and his staff to rally them.

      I would particularly call your attention to the conduct of my officers and men during the engagement. It was gallant and meritorious in the extreme, although almost completely worn-out by frequent picket duty and long and tedious marches night and day; yet they performed their duty willingly and cheerfully, and manfully stood by their guns till (being unarmed) they were driven from them at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant Hill, who was badly wounded, taken prisoner, but retaken, acted with commendable bravery and coolness, and was one of the last to leave the field. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the conduct of Lieut. E. W. Olcott during the whole engagement; constantly active, ever foremost in the fray, endeavoring to rally our panic-stricken supports by voice and action, it was a miracle he was not killed. After we had been driven from the battery he joined Captain Thompson, and did noble duty as cannoneer to one of his guns. He left the field with me, but after we had assembled the remnants of the battery he returned and acted as volunteer aide to one of our generals. All my non-commissioned officers performed their duty with great gallantry, and where all did so nobly it would seem invidious to make any distinction among them; but I would particularly recommend for promotion my first sergeant, James Chester, who commanded the center section of the battery, and exhibited qualities which eminently fit him for a higher position than the one he now fills. The greater part of my command were in the attacks on Forts Sumter and Pickens, and they did not belie the almost world-wide reputation they there obtained for bravery, skill, and endurance.

      A.M. RANDEL, First Lieutenant, First Artillery, Comdg. Battery E.

      July 25, 1862

      In my official report of the battle of New Market I stated it was the Fourth Pennsylvania Reserves that rushed toward the enemy, received one volley, broke and ran, charging through my battery. Since then I have been led to believe, from testimony given in court of inquiry and statement made to me by Colonel Magilton, that I was mistaken about the number of the regiment. My mistake arose from the fact that Colonel Magilton's regiment was early in the engagement posted between my limbers and caissons, and I was not then aware he had changed his position and another regiment taken his place. In justice to Colonel Magilton I would therefore respectfully request that so much of my report as designates the number of the regiment be corrected, the rest of the report remaining unaltered.

      A.M. RANDOL, First Lieutenant, First Artillery.

      #107

      July 7, 1862.

      I have the honor to report respectfully about the position and activity of the batteries under my command during the time from the 27th of June to the 1st of July:

      On the 27th day of June, at 5 o'clock a.m., I was ordered, with three batteries (Captains Diederichs', Knieriem's, and Grimm's), in front of General Smith's division, where I took position in the following order: Grimm's was placed on the left of the redoubt and close to the siege pieces, in order to shell the enemy's redoubt. After a few shots he was stopped firing by order of Colonel Getty. Knieriem's was posted just in front of our redoubt, and began about 11 o'clock p.m. firing at the enemy, who came down Gaines' Hill in great force. Diederichs' was placed, by order of General Smith, to the right of the redoubt, close to the ravine, with the object to sweep the ground in front and to shell the wood to his left, but after a few shots he had to cease firing because some of his shells wounded our own men. After this battery had been nearly an hour inactive, and while the enemy continued marching down Gaines' Hill, I met General Barry, and asked his permission to bring Diederichs' battery in the same position as Knieriem's, in order to increase the fire on Gaines' Hill. My request was granted, and I did in consequence, and according to the acknowledgment of General Porter and my own observation, terrible damage to the rebels. I ceased firing about 7 o'clock p.m., when the rebel batteries opened their firing into our rear, which was silenced by Diederichs' battery in less than half an hour.

      Captain Voegelee was during this day in battle on the other side of the Chickahominy, under command of General Sykes. About noon he was placed near the bridge leading over the Chickahominy below Gaines' Mill, and was soon brought into action by a rebel battery 2,000 yards in front. He kept up a brisk fire at the enemy till late in the evening, but could not tell with what effect, as the enemy's batteries had been hidden in the woods. He lost during the engagement 2 men killed, 6 severely wounded, 16 horses, mostly by rifle-balls, and the battery wagon.

      On the 28th, at 3 o'clock a.m., I was ordered to return with my batteries to Camp Lincoln, where I was rejoined by Captain Voegelee. About 11 o'clock a.m. I received orders to march to Savage Station, and from there soon to White Oak Swamp. I arrived at 12 o'clock p.m. near the bridge, which I crossed at 4 o'clock on the 29th, and I went into park 1½ miles farther on. In the evening, about 5 o'clock, I received orders to send 8 pieces (Captains Diederichs' and Knieriem's) to the disposal of General McCall.

      On the 30th, at 4 o'clock p.m., they were put in position by General McCall himself on a field about 600 or 700 yards square, and surrounded on all sides by woods. On the left wing they commenced shelling the woods. At 4.30 o'clock Knieriem, whose position was about 100 yards in advance of Diederichs', was attacked by infantry on his left flank at a distance of no more than 60 yards, wounding 4 men and killing 22 horses. Two men were missing. In consequence of the loss of horses he had to abandon two caissons. He lost in this action also two pieces, but saved the limbers.

      The moment Knieriem had left his position Diederichs fired at the attacking infantry as long as he had canister and shrapnel, used with very short fuses. Then he also was obliged to withdraw. When entering the road the traces of the wheel horses of a caisson broke, and caused the loss of the hind part of that caisson. Diederichs lost in this action 1 man killed, 1 wounded, 1 missing, and 12 horses killed.

      With Voegelee's and Grimm's batteries I arrived about noon at the heights of the James River, and went into battery on the right of the road. Toward evening the enemy opened fire with a heavy battery from the woods, which was, however, soon silenced by Captain Voegelee, in conjunction with several other batteries. I sustained no loss whatever.

      On the 1st of July Voegelee's battery remained in the same position as the day before. Diederichs and Knieriem I brought in position to the right of our center, where they silenced a rebel battery about 7 o'clock p.m. Grimm's battery was all the day in position in front of the hospital without firing. Toward evening he was brought up in pursuit of the enemy, whence he returned about 10 o'clock.

      ALBERT ARNDT, Major.

      #112

      Early next morning, the 29th (Sunday), firing was heard in the direction of James River and Richmond, and a message from General Keyes directed me to move up so as to be in a position to support him if necessary. The firing, however, soon ceased. While my division was getting in motion General McClellan and staff arrived, followed soon after by General Porter, under whose direction I proceeded up the Long Bridge, or New Market, road a short distance beyond its junction with the Charles City and Quaker roads, and formed partial line of battle, facing toward Richmond. The day passed quietly, and at daylight on the 30th (Monday) I started for Turkey Bridge and James River via the Quaker road and Malvern Hill, and bivouacked about 10 a.m. on the bank of the river below the bridge, but was soon recalled to Malvern Hill, as the enemy was approaching.

      Near a mile north from Malvern house is a large cultivated field, stretching about three-fourths of a mile from south to north and one-fourth from east to west. It lies on the west side of the Quaker road and north side of one known to us as the Richmond road, which, beginning at a point where the Quaker road turns sharply to the east, descends along a depression of the grounds and runs first westerly then across a valley southwesterly till it intersects the River road to Richmond. On the west is a valley some 800 or 1,000 yards wide, which, sweeping around the westerly base of Malvern Hill, extends to the river. For 100 yards from the Richmond road the ground rises gradually to the height of about 40 feet, and then gently descends to the woods, which bound the field on the north and for some distance on the east. These woods extend also westerly across the valley and along its west side. On the west edge of the field, not far from the Richmond road and overlooking the field and valley, is a large white house, Dr. J. H. Mellert's, at which were my headquarters. My division occupied the extreme left of the line, and in this field bore its part in the battle of Malvern.

      The Second Brigade, General Griffin, was ordered to the front. The artillery advanced toward the woods, and was supported on the left by the Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Captain Hull, and on the right by part of Couch's division. While getting into position a few casualties were caused by shot thrown from a battery on our left and rear and on the opposite side of the valley, which, however, was soon silenced by guns near Malvern house. At evening the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Campbell, Third Brigade, was sent forward to the left of the batteries, and in this position we passed the night on our arms. Early in the morning of July 1 (Tuesday) the Eighty-third was relieved by the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury, Second Brigade, and retired to its brigade. The Fourteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel McQuade, Second Brigade, with a section of Weeden's battery, was placed in the edge of the field, between the Richmond road and Dr. J. H. Mellert's house, facing to the west, to watch the road and valley and protect our left. The First and Third Brigades were under cover of a narrow strip of woods which skirts the Quaker road after it turns to the east. The artillery in front was placed under command of General Griffin. Berdan's Sharpshooters were thrown forward as skirmishers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley. Shells were thrown into the woods where the enemy were supposed to be approaching and forming, to which they replied on my right front, but on my left front and left maintained an ominous silence.

      About 10 o'clock an attack was made upon General Couch's right by a moderate force, which was repelled by his batteries and those in my front. Satisfied that a heavy attack was impending, and my First and Third Brigades being too far to the right and rear to render prompt assistance, about 11 a.m. I moved the First, General Martindale, into Mellert's field, immediately north of the Richmond road, and the Third, General Butterfield, in its rear on the south side, both in close order, making the men lie down, in which position, while sheltered by the rise of the ground in front from all except vertical fire, they were near at hand to support Griffin's brigade, directly in front, Couch's division on the right, or to meet an attack on the left. Further, to guard against accident, I directed Generals Martindale and Butterfield to support General Griffin, if he called for assistance, and each other, without waiting for further orders, if the emergency required it. Sykes' division and the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, under General Seymour, were in reserve. General Couch was on my right, on the east side of the Quaker road.

      The batteries first in position were Captains Edwards' and Livingston's, Third U.S. Artillery; Lieutenant Kingsbury's (D) and Lieutenant Ames' (A), Fifth U.S. Artillery; part of Captain Weeden's (C), First Rhode Island; part of Captain Allen's (E), Massachusetts, Lieutenant Hyde commanding, and Captain Bramhall's New York, which were relieved by others whose designation I am unable to give.

      About 12 o'clock the enemy advanced against my left front and some two hours later against my right, but were driven off by the fire of the artillery, the infantry not being engaged. Neither of these attacks was vigorously pressed, and I considered them demonstrations made to feel our position prior to the commencement of more serious work. There was now a cessation of firing till near 5.30 o'clock p.m., when they made their most determined attack. It was begun by a heavy fire of artillery from the front of my division and of Couch's, producing a serious cross-fire over my two rear brigades, which were concealed and partially covered by the undulation of the ground. While this was in progress I received notice from Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley, of the Sharpshooters, that a considerable body of the enemy were stealthily making their way along the valley to attack my left and rear. I had been on the lookout for such a movement, but a growth of bushes and a light mist floating a few feet above the ground completely concealed it. I cautioned Colonel McQuade, Fourteenth New York Volunteers, to be prepared; ordered General Martindale, the left of whose brigade was immediately in his rear, to wheel the Thirteenth New York, Major Schoeffel, to the left to his support; directed General Butterfield to be ready, and dispatched a note to General Porter apprising him of my situation. I had barely completed these arrangements before the enemy appeared ascending the hill near Mellert's house, and opened fire upon the Fourteenth New York Regiment, which promptly advanced to meet them, and after a sharp engagement, in which three attacks were repulsed, drove them away. The attempt in that quarter was not renewed.

      Simultaneously with the attack on the left of my rear a most determined and powerful one was made on my left front. The enemy in great force emerged from the woods, and, notwithstanding the severe fire from the batteries, advanced steadily until they arrived near them, when the supporting regiments--the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury; Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Cass, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania, Captain Hull--gallantly moved forward and repulsed them; but being re-enforced by fresh troops, who extended their line on the right and left, these regiments were compelled to fall back to their former position, where they maintained their ground until their ammunition was exhausted, and they were regularly relieved by the Twelfth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson; Forty-fourth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, and Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Campbell, and these, supported by the First Michigan, Col. H. S. Roberts; Twenty-second Massachusetts, Captain Sampson; Second Maine, Col. C. W. Roberts; Twenty-fifth New York, Captain Gleason, and Sixteenth Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Ruehle, continued the fight against unequal numbers until they were in turn relieved by part of Sykes' division and the Irish Brigade, General Meagher, which, having been sent to our aid, was led into action by its own commander and General Porter.

      It was now after 7 o'clock. The enemy, constantly re-enforced, fought with great obstinacy, but made no impression on our line; yet they continued the struggle tin after dark, and only relinquished it when their strength was exhausted. They were finally driven from the field, which remained in our possession, and was picketed from my division by the First Brigade, the Sixteenth Michigan, of the Third, and the Fourteenth New York Volunteers, of the Second Brigade, this last regiment retaining the position it held in the morning. The Second Brigade, with the exception of the Fourteenth New York, when relieved retired to the vicinity of Malvern House, and the Third a little to the rear of their position before going into action. Having received orders about 11 p.m. to go down the James River to Harrison's Bar, I put my division in motion as soon as practicable, and arrived there near sunrise the morning of Wednesday, July 2.

      I cannot speak too highly of the endurance and courage displayed by officers and men during the period embraced in this report. From the moment we were summoned to Mechanicsville till we arrived at Harrison's they were constantly on the alert, and though without shelter and at times almost without food, they responded with the utmost alacrity to every call to duty. At Gaines' Mill the flag of the First Tennessee Regiment was taken by the Thirteenth New York, and that of the Fifth Alabama, which was stricken down by the fire of Buckley's section of artillery, was secured by the Second Maine. At Malvern a flag was captured in a charge made by the Forty-fourth New York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which fell into the hands of the last regiment. At Malvern the flag of the Sixty-second Pennsylvania was five times cut down, but quickly raised again and carried, displayed by the regiment from the field. The Fourth Michigan nobly held its ground after its colonel (Woodbury)was killed until its ammunition was exhausted and it was relieved by the Fourteenth New York, when it retired in perfect order.

      I regret to add that our loss, as appears by the returns already forwarded, has been extremely severe. Forty-seven officers of this corps are reported killed in action, 28 of whom fell in my division, viz: 2 in the First, 19 in the Second, and 7 in the Third Brigade. At Gaines' Mill, Colonel Black, Sixty-second Pennsylvania, was killed in the early part of the action leading his regiment in a charge, and soon after Lieutenant-Colonel Skillen, Fourteenth New York Volunteers, met a similar fate. At a later hour Colonel Gore, Twenty-second Massachusetts, was killed, and as the line gave way Colonel McLane and Major Naghel, Eighty-third Pennsylvania, fell while changing the position of the regiment. Col• H. S. Roberts, First Michigan; Colonel Childs, Fourth Michigan, and Major Gilbert, Twenty-fifth New York, were wounded. And Colonel Stockton, Sixteenth Michigan; Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer, Sixty-second Pennsylvania; Lieutenant-Colonel Varney, Second Maine; Major Tilton, Twenty-second Massachusetts, and Major Gilbert, Twenty-fifth New York, were made prisoners. At Malvern, Colonel Woodbury, Fourth Michigan, was killed late in the afternoon. Colonel Cass and Major Hanley, Ninth Massachusetts; Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley, First Sharpshooters, and Major Barnum, Twelfth New York, were wounded. Colonel Cass' wound was mortal. He died a few days after reaching home.

      I am under obligations to the brigade and regimental commanders for their able discharge of the arduous duties which devolved upon them, particularly after the great loss of officers at Gaines' Mill, and I desire especially to recognize the services of General Griffin, who held the front at Malvern, and in addition to his brigade had the immediate command of the batteries, which his knowledge and experience as an officer of artillery enabled him to use with a skill and judgment that contributed materially to our success. His horse was killed under him.

      I make my acknowledgments to Captain Grannis, division quartermaster, and to Captain Batchelder, Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, division ordnance officer, for their care and attention in getting their trains to the James River; and I am particularly indebted to Captain Auchmuty, assistant adjutant-general, and to Lieutenant Willares, Thirteenth New York Volunteers, one of my aides, and the only members of my staff with me, for communicating orders, and for doing promptly and cheerfully whatever was required of them, though they were far from being well. Captain Auchmuty's horse was shot at Gaines' Mill and Lieutenant Williams' at Malvern. Also to Captain Weeden, of the First Rhode Island Battery, and chief of the division artillery, who, besides performing his peculiar duties, joined me whenever he could do so, and acted as one of my staff.

      I forward reports from the commanders of brigades of the regiments of the First and Third Brigades (I have received none from those of the Second), of the batteries of Captain Weeden, chief of division artillery, of Colonel Berdan's First U.S. Sharpshooters, and of Colonel Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, of the services of his regiment while detached with General Stoneman, to all of which I beg leave to refer for further details and for the names of officers and men who have particularly distinguished themselves, concurring in their recommendations and asking for them a favorable consideration; and in addition I recommend Col. James McQuade, Fourteenth New York Volunteers, the only surviving colonel of the Second Brigade, for promotion.

      GEO. W. MORELL, Brigadier-General Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

      #119

      March 27, 1863

      It was now Monday afternoon, June 30. Back we marched up the hill. This march was about three-quarters of a mile, and through a narrow path, most of the way covered by a dense wood. The springs ran down the road, and it had only been made passable by placing rails thickly across it. As we returned some of the baggage wagons obstructed the passage, and we had to pick our way along in single files. At length my brigade was on the elevated plateau above, where we could overlook the country for miles. The battle was coming nearer and nearer. Transportation wagons were teeming in on the trot. Clouds of dust and smoke filled the air. I received orders to move my brigade still farther to the front about a mile to support a battery. These orders were communicated to me by Captain Auchmuty, assistant adjutant-general of General Morell, and he showed me the position which the orders indicated. General Griffin was already there with part of his brigade. I passed Butterfield's brigade on the road. My lines were all formed and I had sent out pickets. I knew that there was a force of our troops still in our front, and soon Couch's division went forward to relieve it.

      At about 10 o'clock at night I received information from General Porter that he did not expect me to go so far to the front and not farther than the position held by Butterfield's brigade, but he sent me no orders. I then withdrew my command about half a mile, but still in advance of Butterfield's brigade. We had parted from our transportation, tents, and food back at White Oak Swamp on Sunday morning. This night the men had to forage for food, and although firing had ceased, pigs were squealing wherever they could be found in our vicinity. The Thirteenth New York Regiment had a full day's ration of hard bread on hand, and they generously divided with the First Michigan, which regiment had been twenty-four hours without rations.

      Morning came, July 1. We got intelligence from our wagons, and had sent around to us a quantity of sugar, coffee, and hard bread. This was a great relief. It was quite along in the forenoon, when the rear guard of the day before retired, and Porter's corps and Couch's division were left to cover the front. I think it was full noon when the battle opened. The firing was in a northeast direction from us, toward Couch's division, which was on our right. Under orders from General Morell I moved my brigade forward and formed in line of battle by battalions at half distance. They were slightly covered by ground rising in front. The Second Maine Regiment was on the right; the Thirteenth New York was on the left. I directed them to lie down. Griffin's brigade was in front, still farther on the left, where we had a couple of batteries. Butterfield's brigade was immediately in my rear.

      The battle was now an affair of artillery, and none of Porter's corps had yet engaged the infantry. Couch, however, was pressed severely on the right, but held his ground. I had encountered artillery before, but now it opened as I had never yet seen it. It was obvious that the whole Army of the Potomac was resting there for safety on the steadiness of the portion of it which was then confronting the enemy. I went along the line of my regiments and told them my dispositions for battle, and reminded them that a retreat would be annihilation. It would be better to face the enemy to the last than to retire--that there was no Washington to fall back upon, as at Bull Run; no Chickahominy to cross, as at Gaines' Mill. We must be victorious or perish. That statement of the case was true, and the men knew it and appreciated it.

      During the progress of the cannonading my men were held inactive. I saw repeatedly the wounded rise from their places and retire to the shelter of a bank to our left and rear (which place was selected for a hospital), and those that could not go without aid borne by comrades, who deposited them with the surgeon, and promptly and quietly returned to their places. In this position a number of men were killed and were borne away in like manner, and the places thus made vacant were immediately closed again. Without contrasting the quiet, steady, resolute courage of my brigade with any other engaged that day, I am sure that no other furnished finer exhibitions of fortitude and heroism than my men displayed. At length the enemy ceased their cannonading. There was a calm, but the storm burst again speedily. I had directed the Second Maine to the right, to be in readiness to support Couch. I formed the Twenty-second Massachusetts with the Twenty-fifth New York (which was reduced to a fragment) and advanced it to the support of Griffin's brigade. I reformed the Second Maine in rear of the Twenty-second Massachusetts and ordered it forward.

      At this time the enemy was attempting to move around under cover of a bank and turn our left flank. Griffin had one regiment, the Fourteenth New York, in that direction. I received orders from General Morell to use my own judgment in repelling that attack. Deeming the emergency imminent, I went in person to form and lead the Thirteenth New York in that direction. Major Schoeffel, who was in command (Colonel Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Stephan both being absent sick), under my direction formed line to the left and moved to the support of the Fourteenth New York. I returned to the First Michigan Regiment, and deploying it, ordered it forward. At nearly the same time Butterfield's brigade came forward and one of the regiments (the Twelfth New York) reported to me. Other re-enforcements appeared on the ground not belonging to Morell's division. There was danger of confusion. I placed the Twelfth New York in position to protect the extreme left, and I think also another of the regiments which moved up from the rear. As I made these dispositions General Porter himself appeared on the ground, and I explained to him how the commands were situated.

      JOHN H. MARTINDALE, Brig. Gen., lately Comdg. First Brig., Morell's Div., Fifth P. A. C

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      • #4
        Re: The Federal point of view

        From Hooker to McCall through Seymour and beyond, the controversy raged.

        #154

        "August 12, 1862.

        I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of my division in the battles before Richmond on the 26th, 27th, and 30th June last, my capture by the enemy at the close of the battle of the 30th and subsequent detention in prison at Richmond having necessarily deferred my report until the present day.

        On the afternoon of the 19th June I received your orders requiring the "greater part" of my division to move forward from Gaines' farm, where I was then encamped, about 2½ miles from Mechanicsville, and relieve Taylor's brigade, of Franklin's division, at the above-named village, then the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac. In accordance with this order I directed the First and Third Brigades, commanded respectively by Brig. Gens. J. F. Reynolds and T. Seymour, to proceed to Beaver Dam Creek, 1 mile this side of Mechanicsville, and occupy a strong position on its left bank near its junction with the Chickahominy, and thence to throw forward to the heights in front of Mechanicsville one regiment and a battery to relieve Taylor, and to post a strong line of pickets from the Mechanicsville Bridge to the Meadow Bridge. The position selected on the Beaver Dam Creek was naturally a strong one, the left resting on the Chickahominy and the right extending to thick woods beyond the upper Mechanicsville road, which were occupied. The passage of the Beaver Dam Creek was difficult throughout the greater part of my front, and, with the exception of the roads crossing at Ellison's Mill and that above mentioned, impracticable for artillery. On the right of the last-named road an epaulement calculated for four pieces of field artillery was thrown up and rifle pits for a regiment each were constructed in advance of each brigade. Cooper's battery of six 10-pounder Parrott guns on the right of the upper road and Smead's battery (regular) of four 12-pounder guns on the left commanded that approach. De Hart's battery (regular) of six 12-pounder guns was near the front-center, commanding a more distant view of the same road and also the lower road direct to Mechanicsville. I held in reserve the Second Brigade (Meade's) in front of Gaines' farm, ready to act either in support of Reynolds and Seymour or to oppose the crossing at New Bridge should the enemy attempt it.

        In this position I awaited any movements the enemy might initiate. Cobb's Legion, of the Confederates, was encamped within view on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and A. P. Hill's division about a cannon-shot to the rear, detachments from both of which held two redoubts and an extensive line of rifle pits along the crest of the highlands overlooking the river.
        At about noon on the 26th the enemy was discovered to be in motion, and at 12.30 p.m. our pickets at Meadow Bridge were driven in by the advancing column of the enemy, and those along the road were ordered to fall back. Soon afterward, when the head of his column approached, my infantry and artillery in front of Mechanicsville were recalled. I now ordered forward Meade's brigade, and directed them to occupy ground in rear of the line, where they would be out of the range of musketry and at a practicable distance for support of any part of the field.

        My line of battle was formed in the following order from right to left: On the extreme right were seven companies of the Second Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless; then six companies of the First Rifles, Major Stone; next the Fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Simmons; then the Eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Hays; then the Tenth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Kirk; then the Ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Jackson, and the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves on the extreme left. Meade's brigade, in reserve, consisted of the Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Sickel; the Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Magilton, and the Seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Harvey. Easton's battery of four 12-pounder guns and Kerns' battery of six 12-pounder howitzers were also held in reserve.

        The Sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieutenant-Colonel McKean, had been detached some days before, and was at Tunstall's railroad station, while the Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Gallagher, was on picket along the Lower Chickahominy. These two regiments were consequently thrown out of the engagement, except that the Eleventh was brought forward on the morning of the 27th, and was under fire for a short time before being withdrawn.

        At about 3 p.m. the enemy's lines were formed in my front and the skirmishers rapidly advanced, delivering their fire as they approached our lines. They were answered by my artillery and a rather general discharge of musketry.

        At this moment I rode along the front of several of the regiments, and I remarked in the animated and cheerful countenances of the men the promise of that brilliant success which they so nobly achieved in the sequel. In a few moments afterward the enemy, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, boldly advanced in force under a heavy artillery fire and attacked my position from right to left. I, however, was not long in discovering that his principal effort was directed on my extreme right, whereupon I ordered. Kerns' battery to that point, and at the same time moved forward Sickel's regiment (Third) to support it. Here for a long time the battle raged with great fury. The Georgians rushed with headlong energy against the Second Regiment, only to be mowed down by the steady fire of that gallant regiment, whose commander soon sent to the rear some 7 or 8 prisoners taken in the encounter.

        The enemy now for a time retired from close contest on the right, but he kept up during the whole day a heavy general fire of artillery and infantry, which, with the rapid reply of the Reserves, was at times one unbroken roar of a stunning depth. After a time, however, a heavy column was launched down the road to Ellison's Mill, where a determined attack was made. I had already sent Easton's battery to General Seymour, and I now moved the Seventh Regiment down to the extreme left, apprehending that the enemy might attempt to turn that flank by crossing the stream below the mill. Here, however, the Reserves maintained their position and sustained their character for steadiness in splendid style, never losing a foot of ground during a severe struggle with some of the best troops of the enemy, fighting under the direction of their most distinguished general. For hour after hour the battle was hotly contested, and the rapid fire of our artillery, dealing death to an awful extent, was unintermitted, while the greatly superior force of the enemy enabled him to precipitate column after column of fresh troops upon my nearly exhausted lines.

        About sunset Griffin's brigade, with Edwards' (regular) battery, arrived. The former I requested its gallant leader to move to the extreme right, that being the weakest point in my position. Some time elapsed before these troops could reach their ground, and as the enemy had advanced, only a portion of this force could be brought into action. Then, a short time before the close of the engagement, the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury, relieved the Fifth Pennsylvania Reserves, whose ammunition was exhausted, and two companies of the Fourteenth New York joined the Rifles and the detachment of Berdan's Sharpshooters.

        Edwards' battery had been left by Griffin in reserve, and late in the evening I turned it over to General Seymour, to be placed on his left. About 9 o'clock this well-contested action closed by the withdrawal of the enemy, with very heavy loss.

        My attention was now directed to the cleaning of the arms and issuing of ammunition, to be in readiness for the resumption of the combat in the morning. This consumed the time till 1 a.m. of the 27th, and shortly before day I received General McClellan's order through you to withdraw my division and fall back to the rear of Gaines' Mill. This order, I confess, gave me some concern. Had it reached me at midnight the movement might have been accomplished without difficulty and without loss, but now it would be daylight before the movement---under fire, one of the most delicate and difficult in war, and now in presence of a superior force---could be commenced. I, however, went to work without a moment's delay. Meade's brigade was the first withdrawn, but before this was completed the enemy opened his fire upon us. His fire was promptly returned, and again soon became general along the line.

        Now great caution became necessary to screen the movement from the enemy, but this was successfully done. Griffin's brigade and Edwards' battery were the next to be withdrawn. This was done coolly and successfully. Reynolds' brigade was next ordered to retire, keeping up a scattering fire with musketry and from a single piece of artillery. Thus the fire was kept up until all the artillery was brought out of action. Lastly, Seymour's brigade was brought out in the handsomest style. In fine, our killed had been buried, the wounded had been sent off, and not a man, nor a gun, nor a musket, nor a knapsack was left upon the field. The different regiments filed past as steadily as if marching from the parade ground, and it must have been some time before the enemy were aware that we were gone, as no attempt was made to follow immediately.

        My loss in this action was, as nearly as I have been able to ascertain, 33 killed and 150 wounded. The loss of the enemy was heavy beyond precedent in this war for the numbers engaged. I learned from excellent authority while a prisoner in Richmond that General Lee's loss in killed and wounded did not fall short of 2,000. In the published returns it appears that the First North Carolina lost nearly one-half of its effective force and the Forty-fourth Georgia nearly two-thirds. Stonewall Jackson's artillery was in the battle, although his infantry was several miles to the right.

        Where all so gallantly supported the honor of the flag it would seem almost invidious to particularize, but my thanks are particularly due to Generals Reynolds and Seymour, and to Colonels Simmons, of the Fifth, and Taggart, of the Twelfth, and Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, of the Second, Major Stone, of the Rifles, who were all closely engaged. General Meade is entitled to the credit of great zeal and promptness in carrying out all the orders conveyed to him, though not immediately engaged.

        It is with much gratification that I acknowledge my obligation to General Griffin, who promptly brought his fine brigade to my support at a time it was supposed to be much needed. Also to General Morell, whose division was within supporting distance had aid been required. My personal staff, Capt. H. J. Biddle, assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenants and Aides-de-Camp Scheetz and Mcconkey, deserve special notice for their gallantry in carrying orders and the other duties incident to their offices.

        Battle of Gaines' Mill on the 27th June, 1862.

        My division having been successfully withdrawn from its position after the repulse of the enemy at Mechanicsville on the morning of the 27th June, moved leisurely and steadily to the ground designated, in rear of Gaines' Mill, where it arrived at 10 o'clock a.m. Here I was notified by General Porter that my division, having been deprived of much sleep during the previous night and having been engaged for three hours that morning with the enemy, would be held in reserve to-day. As the troops arrived on the ground they were formed on the edge of the wood and constituted the first line, while the Reserves were on the plain some 600 yards in rear of the woods.

        At 3.30 p.m. the enemy advanced, and very soon after the action commenced. You ordered me to move forward the Second and Third Brigades of my division to support the first line. This was immediately done, and in a style that called forth an expression of admiration from the commanding general. These two brigades soon were under fire, in some instances the regiments going immediately into line, while in others they halted directly in rear of the line already formed.

        In a short time after this the First Brigade of my division also was ordered forward and soon became engaged. In the mean time the batteries of my division, Cooper's on the right, and De Hart's, Easton's, and Kerns' in the center and on the left, also advanced, and shelled the enemy over the heads of the men in line.

        The action soon became general, and the fire in front of my division, which was near the center of the battle line, increased to a deafening roar of musketry, above which the artillery fire at times could scarcely be distinguished. The enemy was apparently drawn up in five lines, and one after another was thrown forward on my front as fast as the preceding one recoiled before the well-directed fire of the Reserves, or with such short intervals that the thoroughly-heated muskets had not time to cool. In this way for upward of three hours my brave fellows were under fire, either relieving each other or some regiment of another division, when the men became exhausted. About this time, seeing some commotion on the left of my division, I rode rapidly to the ground, and found that the Fourth had been driven in and was being rallied by General Meade. The line, however, was soon reformed, and I rode in front of the regiment, addressed the men briefly, and they soon resumed their place in line of battle.

        Everything now on the left of the division was in successful and satisfactory operation. I therefore rode along the line, halting for short time in the center, and then proceeded to the right. Here I found General Reynolds coming from the woods with the First and Eighth Regiments of his brigade, he having relieved them and brought them out of action in consequence of their ammunition being exhausted. He reported to me that the Fifth Regiment had also nearly expended all its ammunition and ought to be relieved. I directed my assistant adjutant-general, Captain Biddle, to ride down the line and, if possible, bring up a regiment (of Morell's division, I think) that I had seen in reserve as I rode along the line. I now discovered a battery in rear of my extreme right which I thought might be advantageously brought into action, and I rode back to the spot and recommended a position in front to the officer in command, Captain Weed, of the Fifth Regular Artillery. He cheerfully assented, and at once moved off' to occupy the position. He had not proceeded far before I discovered a large number of men toward the left retiring. It soon became apparent that we had met with a reverse. I rode out in the direction of the retreating men and strove vigorously to rally them, placing a squadron of Indiana cavalry I happened to find on the ground in line, with orders to cut down any man who attempted to pass their line. My endeavor was partially successful, and I also stopped two batteries that were in retreat and brought them into battery against the enemy, who just then appeared on the opposite hill-side. This checked their advance on this point.

        About this time French's brigade and Meagher's brigade arrived on the ground where I was, and I stopped the fire of the two batteries just brought into action while they passed down the hill in front. At the foot of the hill, however, they were met by General Fitz John Porter, who halted the column of these generous friends, as the sun was then about down and the enemy had retired from view, so that these gallant troops had not the pleasure of encountering the enemy that day. My division now deliberately retired, and in obedience to orders destroyed the bridge opposite Trent's Hill, upon which they had crossed. Here they did bivouac near the ground occupied previously by the general headquarters.

        The only occurrence of this day's battle that I have cause to regret (except the loss of many brave and valuable officers and men, whose fall I sincerely mourn) is the capture by the enemy of a large portion of the Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Gallagher. This regiment, of Meade's brigade, had in the course of the afternoon relieved the Fourth New Jersey Regiment, Colonel Simpson (major U.S. Topographical Engineers), the latter promising to support the former in case of being hard pressed. In the heat of the action the Eleventh Regiment, becoming enveloped in the smoke of battle, continued the fight after the rest of the line had retired, being closely engaged with a rebel regiment in front, and before the colonel was aware that he had been left alone on the field he found himself under fire of two regiments on either flank besides the one in front. Notwithstanding the peril of his position he gallantly kept up a galling fire on the advancing foe as he retired in order upon the Fourth New Jersey. Here, to crown his ill-fortune, he found that he, as well as Colonel Simpson, was completely surrounded, a strong force having already taken position in his immediate rear.

        The situation of these two brave regiments, which had so nobly maintained their ground (not having been recalled) after all had retired, was now hopeless, their retreat being entirely cut off by the increasing force of the enemy, who were still advancing, and they were compelled to surrender. No censure can possibly attach to either Colonel Gallagher or Colonel Simpson or the brave men of their respective regiments on account of this ill-turn of fortune, but, on the contrary, they are entitled to the credit of having held their ground until it was tenable no longer.

        I have only further to add that throughout this day the Reserves supported the character they had gained in the battle of Mechanicsville on the afternoon of the 26th and the morning of this day.

        My thanks are due to Brig. Gen. J. F. Reynolds, who, I regret to report, was captured, together with his assistant adjutant-general, Charles Kingsbury, by the enemy on the morning of the 28th, the general finding on the previous evening that the enemy was already in his rear, and having retired to the woods, where he passed the night. Generals Meade and Seymour, as usual, led the brigades with the skill and effect to be expected of officers of their distinction. To the officers of my personal staff, particularly to Capt. H. J. Biddle, assistant adjutant-general, and to Maj. Alfred E. Lewis, First Pennsylvania Artillery, acting aide-de-camp, my thanks are due for efficient services.

        The loss of my division to-day was heavy, and is embraced in the total loss at the foot of this report.

        Battle of New Market Cross-Roads on the 30th June, 1862.

        On Friday evening, June 27, after the battle of Gaines' Mill, my division crossed the Chickahominy to Trent's Hill, where it remained till 8 p.m. on the 28th, when I was ordered to move in the direction of White Oak Creek, and take with me Hunt's reserve artillery, consisting of thirteen batteries. Owing to unavoidable detention on the route my division was all night on the march, and did not reach White Oak Creek till near noon on the 29th. Having crossed the creek, I was ordered by the general-in-chief to put my division in position to repel any attack of the enemy from the direction of Richmond. This I did, and remained in position till 5 o'clock p.m., when the march was resumed, and continued by my command till I reached the Quaker-road crossing of the New Market road, where I arrived at midnight and took up a position on the cross-road, sending out a regiment and a battery in front and a strong picket in advance of them. Here I remained in readiness to repel any advance of the enemy till about daylight, when I was ordered to retire. This I did, left in front, and reached the point where the Turkey Bridge road turns off from the New Market road at about 7 a.m. on the 30th. I here turned into Turkey Bridge road, and was ordered to halt on this ground till the whole of our immense train, which had safely crossed White Oak Creek, had passed on toward James River, and to repel any attack that the enemy might make on it.

        At 9 o'clock had commenced the heavy cannonade caused by the enemy attempting to force the passage of the creek in order to fall upon the train, and it continued with little interruption till noon. It was a determined artillery duel, but as I did not apprehend their ability to effect a passage, I was not long in coming to the conclusion that any attack on myself must come from the direction of Richmond on my right flank. I had thrown out a cavalry picket in that direction, and afterward discovering indications of an advance of the enemy, moved out a regiment in the same direction on picket duty.

        I now examined the character of the country around me, and made my disposition of the troops facing to the right flank--Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds', now commanded by Col. S. G. Simmons, of the Fifth, in reserve ; Randol's (regular) battery, six 12-pounder Napoleon or light 12-pounder guns, on the right, in front of the Fourth Regiment ;Kerns' and Cooper's batteries opposite the center, and two German batteries, belonging to Morell's division, of 20-pounder Parrott's, of four guns each, commanded by Captains Diederichs and Knieriem, on the left, all in front of the infantry line. The country on my new front was open, embracing a large farm, intersected toward the right by the New Market road, and a small strip of timber parallel to it. The open front was about 800 yards; its depth about 1,000 yards. It was a beautiful battle ground, but too large for my force to find cover or protection on both flanks.

        My disposition having been made I calmly awaited the approach of the enemy. About 2.30 o'clock my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part. At 3 o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left center and another on the right center, to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shell and boldly advanced, but were both driven back on the left by the Twelfth Regiment and on the right by the Seventh Regiment. After this, in order to strengthen the left, I rode forward with the Rifles and put them in a narrow strip of timber on the left and front. Soon after this the left was threatened by a very heavy column, which had passed through the woods beyond the farm. I at once changed front on that flank by sending Colonel Simmons with two regiments to re-enforce Seymour. This movement was promptly made, but not a moment too soon, for a furious attack with artillery and infantry was almost immediately made on that flank. I at the same time directed Captain Biddle, assistant adjutant-general, to ride to the left and change the direction of the fire of the two German batteries against the enemy on the flank. This order was gallantly executed, but I regret to state that just at the moment the enemy's fire happened to be poured in with terrible effect, and this brave and valuable officer fell mortally wounded, being pierced by two Minie balls and slightly wounded by a third.

        For near two hours the battle raged hotly here, and under a perfect storm of shot and shell the gallant and much-to-be-lamented Col. Seneca G. Simmons fell also mortally wounded. At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry fire of the Reserves. The German batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers.

        It must not be supposed that the enemy were inactive along the center and on the right of my line during all this time. The batteries in front of the center were boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced back, when I re-enforced this part of the line with the two regiments of the reserve still remaining on the ground. The contest was severe, and put the steadiness of these regiments to the test. They both suffered much, but particularly the First Regiment, whose lieutenant-colonel, H. M. McIntire, lost his left leg below the knee.

        In the course of this struggle I had the pleasure of having presented to me a regimental color borne off from the attacking regiment.

        Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randol's battery by a full brigade advancing in wedge-shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, as I have stated been previously made on Cooper's and Kerns' batteries by single regiments without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the Fourth Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were indeed successfully limbered had their horses killed and wounded and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy dashing past drove the greater part of the Fourth Regiment before them. The left company (B) nevertheless stood its ground with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, in front of it, as did likewise certain men of other companies.

        I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success. It was here my fortune to witness one of the fiercest bayonet fights that perhaps aver occurred on this continent. Bayonet wounds, mortal or slight, were given and received. I saw skulls crushed by the butts of muskets, and every effort made by either party in this life-or-death struggle, proving indeed that here Greek had met Greek. The Seventh Regiment was at this time on the right of the Fourth, and was too closely engaged with a force, also of great superiority in numbers, to lend any assistance to the gallant few of the Fourth who were struggling at their side. In fine, these few men, some 70 or 80, were borne bodily off amongst the rebels, and when they reached a gap in the fence walked through it, while the enemy, intent on pursuing those in front of them, passed on without noticing them.

        It was at this moment, on witnessing this scene, I keenly felt the want of re-enforcement. I had not a single regiment left to send to the support of these so overpowered. There was no running; but my division, reduced by the previous battles to less than 6,000. had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill (considered two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men), and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them. My right was, as I say, literally forced off the ground by the weight simply of the enemy's column.

        The center and left were still at times engaged, and the only staff officer left with me was Lieut. E. Beatty, who was now wounded at my side and forced to leave me, after maintaining his position for some time. My orderly, a most faithful man, Sergt. Simeon Hertz, was also mortally wounded at my side, and I was left with but two men of my cavalry escort, Corporal King and one private. I now rode to the rear to endeavor to rally a force, and on the road-side 200 yards in rear of my right I found two regiments of Berry's brigade, Kearny's division. I requested these regiments to move forward and support my men, but their orders, I was informed, would not admit of their leaving their ground. After some time General Kearny came up. He at once formed two lines in the woods on the right of the road and moved forward, saying to me as he rode on, "If you can bring on another line in a few minutes I think we can stop them."

        By this time the sun had set, and the firing, now confined entirely to the right of my division, was becoming slack and interrupted. In a little while Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, Pennsylvania Reserves, came up and reported to me that he had collected about 500 men, with whom he was then advancing. I rode on with him up the road so as to bring this little command upon the left of Kearny. On arriving at the point where my original line crossed the road I halted the men, and having no staff officer with me I rode forward to ascertain whether some men of the Fourth whom I had left a little in advance were still on the ground--they had, as I afterward learned, joined Kearny--and I had not proceeded more than 100 yards before I rode right into the Forty-seventh Virginia Regiment, which, being drawn up under some trees, was not seen by me in the obscurity of the evening until I had ridden in among them, and thus became a prisoner.

        The desultory firing on the right continued at intervals for some time, but the battle was in fact over, and my division, as I have since learned, slept in part on the ground and the remainder within a few hundred yards of the enemy, and at 2 o'clock a.m. of the 1st of July moved forward toward James River, under command of General Seymour.

        The conduct of the division in this hard-fought field is worthy of all praise. Besides the officers already named, I have to thank Brig. Gen. George G. Meade, who was severely wounded, Colonel Sickel, of the Third Pennsylvania Reserves, and a number of others, who contributed largely to the result desired, namely, to defend the position until after the heavy supply train had placed itself in safety. Among these I must mention Acting Division Surg. A. E. Stocker, who accompanied me during a considerable part of the day and assisted in bringing the laggards into line until he was slightly wounded in the wrist by a fragment of a shell. My thanks are also due to Brigadier-General Sedgwick, whose brigade came to my support near the close of the day. Great credit is likewise due to Capt. George A. Woodward, of the Second Reserves, who was severely wounded while gallantly leading his company against fearful odds.

        GEO. A. McCALL, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

        [Indorsements.]

        September 25, 1862

        Respectfully forwarded to Headquarters Army of the Potomac. I have heretofore in several communications referred to the services of numerous officers, some of whom are commended herein, and asked for them rewards.

        I present now the name of Brigadier-General Meade, commanding brigade, whom I accidentally omitted, and request that in the promotions for brevets his name may receive the attention his high merits deserve.

        ! commend to the consideration of the Government the names of the other officers specially highly spoken of in this report. Many of the officers of volunteers have been recommended to Governor of Pennsylvania for promotion.

        F. J. PORTER, Major-General, Commanding.
        -----

        October 22, 1862.

        I respectfully call the attention of the commanding general to the report of these actions. General McCall was in immediate command of the division at Mechanicsville, was detached at New Market roads, and the absence of his reports, those of Generals Reynolds and Morell and Meade, prevented me in my preliminary report referring more specially to the services of the division, which are now made known through the commander: The reports are of exceeding interest, and put before the commanding general the services of the division, which were distinguished, and only required this report to be made part of the history of the memorable events of the war on the Peninsula, which has reflected high honor upon our arms.

        F. J. PORTER, Major-General, Commanding.
        -----
        December 10, 1862

        I have the honor to submit the following statement and accompanying documents supplemental to my official report of the battle of New Market Cross-Roads, June 30, 1862, and to request that these papers may be appended to that report. My reasons for so doing are the following, viz: My attention has been called to General Hooke's report of the battle of Glendale, published in Wilkes' Spirit of the Times and copied into other papers, in which the conduct of the Pennsylvania Reserves is severely and unjustly reflected upon. As these troops fought with great gallantry on that day and sustained heavy loss in officers and men in a desperate conflict with thrice their numbers, holding the enemy in check till night, it is due to them and their State that their record be fairly set before the country. With that single purpose the events of that day will be here briefly recapitulated.

        Whilst the Army of the Potomac was retiring upon James River one of the severest attacks made upon its right flank was that of Monday, June 30. Of the four divisions that day engaged, each maneuvered and fought independently. My own was formed in line of battle in front of the Turkey Bridge (or Quaker) road, and crossing the New Market road nearly at right angles. Hooke's division was some distance on my left, his right resting on the first-named road. The part which his division took in this engagement he calls the battle of Glendale; but as the Confederate- Army advanced from Richmond down the New Market road, and as General Lee, who commanded in person, made the most determined effort to cut the Union Army in twain at this point, I have thought it proper to designate the fierce conflict which there took place the battle of New Market Cross-Roads. To the Reserves it was a desperate affair, as will be seen in some of the accompanying documents. They were barely 6,000 strong on the field, having suffered severely in the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, and one entire regiment being detached. Yet here they had to contend with A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions, from the troops composing which the Reserves captured during the day about 200 prisoners and three stands of colors--- one of the standards as late in the day as just before sunset, in my presence, by Private William J. Gallagher, of Company F, Ninth Regiment,-who killed the rebel color-bearer in a bayonet charge and brought off the trophy, which he presented to me on the spot.

        There was but one injudicious or unfortunate movement made during the day. Before the action commenced I placed the Twelfth Regiment in position on the left of my line, and after I had moved to the right General Seymour divided this regiment, posting the colonel with six companies in advance and to the left, thus detaching them from the line. Soon afterward the enemy advanced a battery here, and the Third and Tenth Regiments were ordered to charge it. They drove it in, routing the infantry support, and sent in about 100 prisoners. They were ordered to reform, and the Rifles were ordered to support them. But suddenly a heavy column advanced rapidly, and they were compelled to retire, which they did without precipitation, and reformed in rear of their own ground. The six companies of the Twelfth, however, were cut off from the line, and retired to the road in front of which the division was formed. At the same time a section of a Dutch battery belonging to Porter was abandoned by its cannoneers, who fled with their horses, broke through the ranks of my cavalry, and also several detachments of the Third and Tenth Regiments, which were carrying to the rear the prisoners just spoken of.

        This melange of horses, men, and prisoners, numbering perhaps 400 in all, were hurried down the road between Sumner and Hooker, and partly on Hooker's right. Colonel Taggart, it will be seen by his report, soon reformed his men on Hooker's right and reported himself to that General, who availed himself of the colonel's services to carry a message to General Sumner.

        With the exception of this temporary and very partial confusion, produced as I have endeavored frankly to describe it, and the failure of the Fourth Regiment to support and protect Randol's battery on the extreme right, it will be seen that the division maintained its position throughout the day against thrice its numbers of the best troops of the Confederate generals, whose encomiums were passed upon it the next day, as testified by Surgeon Marsh, of my division, in his report herewith.

        The following testimony by officers of high character will, I think, substantiate what I have here stated, for it is apparent, from General Longstreet's remark to Surgeon Marsh, that Lee's object in moving down the New Market road was to break through the Union Army at that point, and taking possession of the Turkey Bridge (or Quaker) road, move on and seize another road a mile or more In my rear, which two roads were the only avenues in that neighborhood leading to James River. Had he succeeded in routing my division he would have accomplished his object, viz, to cut off Heintzelman, Franklin, and Kearny from the main body of the army. And if the Confederate force on the ground was, as stated to me by Longstreet that night at Lee's headquarters, 70,000 strong, the position of those divisions would indeed have been perilous.

        I will here remark that the following reports, with the exception of those of Generals Meade and Seymour, are from officers whom I casually met in this city; they all belonged to the Reserves; and were more required, any amount of testimony could be obtained from others of unimpeachable veracity from the same corps.
        [Extract from report of Brig. Gen. George G. Merle, commanding Second Brigade, McCall's division.]

        November 7, 1862.

        General GEORGE A. McCALL:

        DEAR GENERAL: * * * I had seen Hooker's report before you sent a copy, and, as you well remark, was greatly surprised at his account of our doings. * * * It was only the stubborn resistance offered by our division, prolonging the contest till after dark and checking till that time the advance of the enemy, that enabled the concentration during the night of the whole army on the banks of the James River, which saved it. I will show your letter and the report to General Seymour.

        GEO. G. MEADE, Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

        [Extract from a note by Brig. Gen. T. Seymour, commanding Third Brigade, McCall's division.]

        * * * I entirely agree with General Meade. Any explanation should come from General McCall as to the battle of New Market. Its' credit and its failures are well known to him, and are mostly, if not entirely, the result of General McCall's arrangements; and whatever General Hooker may have written, in error or otherwise, may now, after the three battles, be considered as incapable of affecting the honor of the Reserves.

        T. SEYMOUR, Brigadier-General.

        [Extract from a note by Maj. Gen, Fits John Porter, commanding Fifth Provisional Corps.]

        * * * Had-not McCall maintained his position on New Market read, June 30, the enemy would have cut that line of march of the army.

        F. J. PORTER, Major-General.

        [Extract from report of Capt. J. C. Clark, assistant adjutant-general, Seymour's brigade.]

        November 1, 1869.

        General GEORGE A. MCCALL:

        GENERAL: * * * My attention having been called by you to General Hooker's report of the battle of Glendale, I have the honor to make the following report: * * With the exception of a portion of one regiment on the left, the officers and men of the brigade behaved well and fought bravely, and stood their ground for three hours against superior numbers and one of the most vigorous attacks made by the enemy in any of the engagements in front of Richmond. Part of the Twelfth Regiment was posted in advance by General Seymour. The attack in the early part of the engagement on this point was in force and impetuous--not to be withstood--and these men were routed and fell back hastily, and may have continued the retreat to Hooker's command. All the other regiments, as far as I know, behaved nobly; those of the left, under General Seymour, I know did. Had the whole division been routed, &s stated by General Hooker, the fight could not have been continued as it was or the field have been hold until sundown by you.

        I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

        JAMES C. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General

        [Extract from the report of Col. Roy Stone, One hundred and forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers late major First Rifles]

        November 3, 1862.

        General GEORGE A. McCALL:

        GENERAL: * * * My regiment (First Rifles) was not actively engaged June 30 until after the brilliant and successful charge made by several regiments on the left, driving back the enemy's advanced battery, routing its infantry supports, and capturing a large number of prisoners. These regiments, whose ranks were necessarily somewhat broken by the very impetuosity of their charge, but especially by the detachments required to bring in their prisoners, were ordered to reform in front of the farm-house, and I was sent to the left by you to support this formation. The enemy, however, pushed a solid column of overwhelming numbers out of the woods to the left and front, compelling our men in turn to retire.

        The advance of the enemy might have been checked by the Dutch battery belonging to General Porter, but it was deserted by its gunners at the first appearance of its enemy some men on the extreme left of the line were cut off from their companions by the enemy's rapid advance and were obliged to retreat to the left. These were probably the men who reached Hooker's line. Meantime the enemy, turning to the left (their left) were repulsed by your center (not by Kearny, as General Hooker states).

        About sunset I was ordered to the right, and I can bear testimony that the ground held by the center of your division when the battle opened was held by your troops in the face of a large force of the enemy long after dark.

        ROY STONE, Colonel One hundred and forty-ninth Regt. Pa. Vols.,late Major First Rifles.

        [Extract from the report of Capt. J. Cuthbertson, commanding Ninth Pennsylvania Reserves (temporarily).]

        November 4, 1862.

        General GEORGE A. McCALL:

        GENERAL: * * * This regiment was at the commencement of the action of June 30 placed in support of Cooper's battery. The enemy consumed a couple of hours in a number of ineffectual attempts to take this battery, several times charging up within a £ew yards of the guns, but each time driven back with great slaughter.

        About 6 o'clock this regiment was ordered to the left, the enemy apparently making headway there, leaving other troops to support the battery. When the enemy on the left was repulsed we were moved to the rear of Cooper's battery, which had just been taken by the enemy.

        The regiment was ordered to retake the battery, and the men advanced, cheering lustily, to the attack, although it was in possession of a superior force and was defended with great vigor. A hand-to-hand struggle ensued; muskets were clubbed and bayonets were used; the enemy was driven from the guns, fleeing in great confusion, our men after them to the road. Here our men were with difficulty halted, I having to catch hold of the color-bearer to stop him.

        The regiment then fell back. Soon afterward a body of the enemy several times our number came up and were at once engaged, our men behaving with a valor and heroism that could not be surpassed. Though not over 50 yards separated us and officers and men fell rapidly under the terrible fire, not a man faltered. In a few minutes a musket-ball passed through both my thighs. It was then nearly dark, and as I was carried off I could see my gallant comrades were still maintaining the unequal contest with a recklessness of life that astonishes me when I now calmly reflect upon it.

        As near as I can estimate it was about fifteen minutes before 8 o'clock when I was wounded. I was the senior captain, and temporarily in command of the regiment at the time. This regiment during this battle was not at any time in rear of the line of battle adopted by you.

        JOHN CUTHBERTSON, Senior Captain, Ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves.

        [From Col. R. Biddle Roberts, commanding First Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves.]
        General GEORGE A. MCCALL:

        DEAR GENERAL: * * * The brigade to which my regiment was attached June 30 was under command of the late lamented and gallant Col. Seneca G. Simmons and held a position near the center of your line, and you will remember that soon after the action commenced I received a personal order from you to advance the regiment to the support of Kerns' battery, which was at once done. From this position I had a view of portions of the three brigades of the division. We received two distinct charges from the enemy, which were repulsed successfully. We suffered severely, but fought on to the close of the day. * * *

        R. BIDDLE ROBERTS, Commanding First Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves.

        [Extract from report of Col. John H. Taggart, commanding Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves]

        November 18, 1862

        General GEORGE A. McCaLL:

        GENERAL: * * * My regiment on the 30th June was assigned a position by yourself on the left of your division. Shortly afterward General Seymour made a change, posting six companies in a breastwork of logs hastily constructed and fear companies as a support to two 20-pounder guns of the Dutch battery. At 5 p.m. a sudden and vigorous attack was made on my left and front. My men opened fire on the advancing foe, but the charge was so impetuous that after a short hand-to-hand struggle, in which many men were killed and wounded, the six companies fell back to the hill, where a new line was formed, and a number of the men fought side by side with a Massachusetts regiment, belonging, as I understood, to General Hooker's division. Afterward, seeing General Hooker in the road alone, I reported to him the men under my command for duty. General Hooker replied that he did not want any more troops, and directed me to ride over to General Sumner and tell him to send no more troops to his (Hooker's)support, as he did not want them. I delivered this message and returned to General Hooker, who directed me to remain with my command and report to my brigade commander. I then advanced my men to the front again under fire. I did not at any period of the battle see any disorganized masses of the Reserves break through General Hooker's lines nor did I see any of our men kill or wound any of his troops. A number of our men, perhaps 150 or 200, passed down the road between Sumner's and Hooker's lines. These men were carrying off a number of prisoners taken by them in front.

        JOHN H. TAGGART, Late Colonel Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves
        P. S.--General McCall has shown me the foregoing reports of Capt. J. C. Clark, assistant adjutant-general, and Col. Roy Stone, and I concur with them in the statements they make concerning the battle.

        [Extract from report of Surg. N. F. Marsh, Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, McCall's division.]

        November 25, 1862

        General MCCALL:

        After the battle of the 30th June I remained at Willis' Church with a large number of our wounded. The next morning I was directed by General Jackson (Stonewall) to report to General Lee. I found General Lee in company with Generals Longstreet, Magruder, and Hill, on the New Market road. I addressed General Lee, and informed him that I was a Federal surgeon, and had remained to care for our wounded, and wished protection and supplies for our men. He promised supplies, and directed General Longstreet to write the necessary permit.

        At the time I approached they were discussing the battle of the previous day, being then on the ground. General Longstreet asked me if I was present. I replied I was. He asked what troops were engaged. I replied, I only knew the division I was connected with (McCall's), which fought just where we then were. General Longstreet said, "Well, McCall is safe in Richmond; but if his division had not offered the stubborn resistance it did on this road we would have captured your whole army. Never mind; we will do it yet."

        On Thursday, July 3, General Roger A. Pryor came into the church (hospital), and we had a long conversation. He repeated, in substance, what Longstreet had said, and spoke in the highest terms of the "pluck displayed by McCall's Pennsylvania troops."

        The interest I felt in the Reserve Corps made me careful to remember these acknowledgments of the rebel generals.

        I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

        N. F. MARSH, Surgeon, Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

        [Extracts from report of Col. Everard Blerer, One hundred and seventy first Pennsylvania Volunteerrs.]

        General GEORGE A-MCCALL:

        DEAR SIR: * * * About the middle of July last, while I was a captain of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserves and a prisoner in Richmond, I was called on by Maj. David M. Whaley, Fifth Texas Regiment. He was born in Fayette County, Pennsylvania, where I reside. We were companions in boyhood and school-mates. He was also known by Major Johns, of my regiment. About eleven years ago he went to Texas. He told me he had been in all the battles of Richmond, and that he never saw better fighting than that of the Pennsylvania Reserves. He stated that at the battle of Mechanicsville the Confederate forces were repulsed at every point, and that their loss was very heavy--about 2,000 in killed and wounded. He was astonished when I told him our 1oss was only about 200.

        Though in the rebel army, Major Whaley is a gentleman of high integrity, and perfectly reliable, as I believe.

        EVERARD BIERER, Colonel One hundred and seventy-first Pennsylvania Militia.

        The original letters from which the foregoing extracts were made are now in my possession.

        GEO. A. Mecca, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.


        #155

        SEYMOUR'S (LATE McCall’s) DIVISION,

        Harrison's Landing, July 15, 1862.

        Being the only general officer left with this division, it devolves upon me to report its history during the recent battles, those of June 26 and 27 at the Beaver Dam Creek, near Mechanicsville; at Gaines' Mill on the afternoon of the 27th; at Charles City road near New Market on June 30, and at Malvern on July 1:

        Early in June the division had been transferred from the Rappahannock to the Army of the Potomac, and by the 15th instant had reached Dispatch Station, near the Chickahominy. On the 18th, having been assigned to Porter's corps, it moved to the right of the line, near Mechanicsville. The First Brigade, Brigadier-General Reynolds, consisted of the First, Colonel Roberts; Fifth, Colonel Simmons; Second, Colonel McCandless, and Eighth, Colonel Hays, with a battalion composed of the First Rifles and of two companies of Berdan Sharpshooters, under Major Stone. The Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Meade, consisted of the Third, Colonel Sickel; Fourth, Colonel Magilton; Seventh, Colonel Harvey, and Eleventh, Colonel Gallagher. The Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Seymour, consisted of the Ninth, Colonel Jackson: Tenth, Colonel Kirk, and Twelfth, Colonel Taggart, the Sixth, Colonel Sinclair, having been left at Tunstall's Station. Four squadrons of the Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Childs, belonged to the command. The artillery force, under Captain De Hart, chief of artillery, consisted of his battery, C, Fifth Artillery, six light 12-pounders; of Easton's battery, A, four Light 12-pounders; Cooper's battery, B, six 12-pounder Parrotts, and Kerns' battery, G, six 10-pounder howitzers, these three batteries all of the Pennsylvania Artillery.

        On the 19th the First and Third Brigades, with De Hart's and Cooper's batteries, were ordered to occupy the line of the Beaver Dam, the Second Brigade being held in reserve near Gaines', about 2 miles to the rear. The position can best be understood by reference to the diagrams that accompany this report.The Beaver Dam is a stream of small size, and would everywhere be passable but for its marshy edges, and, in its lower course, for a mill-race and deep ditches. The banks, which are abrupt, are covered with thick brush and woods, behind which extend broad fields. On the Mechanicsville side the crest of the slope somewhat commands, with artillery especially, the eastern side, occupied by our troops. From the village, which is on the main route from Richmond northward, roads diverge to Meadow Bridge, Hanover CourtHouse, to Cold Harbor, and along the Chickahominy, these two last intersecting the position on the Beaver Dam.

        The approach of the rebel forces was announced on the morning of the 26th. Mechanicsville was then occupied by the Fifth, Colonel Simmons. A few companies of the First Rifles, Major Stone, were on picket duty near Meadow Bridge, and the Eighth Illinois Cavalry. Colonel Farnsworth, patrolled the roads toward Hanover Court-House for several miles. It was by this last route that the enemy first came down, but soon after heavy columns crossed at Meadow Bridge and above. The Bucktails made resistance, and one company, Captain Irvin, holding ground too eagerly, was surrounded and fell into the enemy's hands.

        From the Chickahominy northward the line of battle was as follows: Twelfth, Tenth, Eighth, Fifth, Bucktails and Sharpshooters, Second and First. The Ninth was in reserve on the left; the Fourth on the right. The immediate crossing at Ellison'd Mill was held by the Twelfth, Colonel Taggatt, supported by a section of Cooper's battery, under Lieutenant Fullerton, and still farther on a section of Smead's battery, Fifth Artillery, under Lieutenant Van Reed, and Easton's battery (all light 12-pounders) swept the road in advance of the point. The center was occupied by Captain De Hart's battery and by a section of Kerns' battery, while the right road was held by the Fifth and Bucktails with the right section of Smead's battery and the remaining four guns of Cooper. The remaining four guns of Kerns' were on the extreme right. Martindale's and Grifiln's brigades came up after the engagement commenced and deployed upon our right toward Shady Grove, where the ground was open and our position might have been turned.

        As the rebels came down in great force and commenced crossing the plateau in front of our line the artillery opened upon them with excellent practice. Lieutenant Van Reed smote the head of one column so sharply with shot and shell that it broke and fled. The ground immediately in front was soon occupied by skirmishers. Artillery came up rapidly, and about 4 o'clock the engagement became general along the line. The brunt of the action was borne by those regiments that were nighest the crossings. From rifle pits and parapets [previously prepared at these points)a close fire was kept up, under which column after column, advancing by the two roads, and endeavoring to force a passage, melted away or retired. On our right the Second, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, held a ford against superior numbers, experiencing considerable loss, but gallantly repulsing every attempt of the enemy, and here the Fourth Michigan and four companies of the Fourteenth New York (Griffin's brigade)were engaged and rendered important service.

        About sunset the left of our line, being threatened, was re-enforced by a portion of the Second Brigade and by Edwards' battery, Third U.S. Artillery, of six 3-inch rifles. As night fell the fire slackened, but not until after dark did it cease entirely, and both sides laid upon their arms. Through the night the cries of wounded and suffering rebels came plainly to our ears and attested the vigor of our defense.

        Soon after midnight orders, in pursuance with the commands of the general-in-chief, were received to withdraw. This difficult movement was executed on the right by General Reynolds, the Bucktails, under Major Stone, being the rear guard, and on the left, under my supervision, by the Ninth, Colonel Jackson. In the early morning, as soon as objects were visible, a sharp fire recommenced on both sides, under which the Ninth relieved the Twelfth from their rifle pits. The withdrawal was effected without loss. So stern and apparently unexpected had been the resistance made that the enemy did not attempt to follow for some time. The entire division fell back to Gaines' Mill, some 4 miles distant, where it was formed as a reserve to the line of battle, composed of the remainder of the corps.

        But slight loss was experienced in this engagement. The shelter that had been prepared and the clearing of the ground in front gave our inferior forces advantages that were fully improved and that cost the enemy very dearly.

        In the absence of General Reynolds I may say that much of the credit of this day belongs justly to him; his study of the ground and ample preparations, even to the smallest detail, justify his high reputation as a soldier, and his conduct of the right wing is worthy of all praise. General Meade came up with his brigade, and by his advice, as well as by the presence and aid of his command, was of most valuable service.

        Major Stone, with rare intelligence, prepared his position, and fought it like a true soldier to the end; and to Colonel Simmons, since dead, the same praise is due. Colonel Taggart, of the Twelfth, deserves praise for the good service rendered by his regiment, which held on the left the crossing at Ellison's Mill with the greatest tenacity, repelling several assaults. Colonel Jackson, of the Ninth, deserves good mention for the skill with which he relieved the Twelfth, withdrew himself from battle, and covered the movement to Gaines' Mill. Col. Biddle R. Roberts, on the right, rendered excellent service, as did Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, preventing that part of the line from being forced.

        To the artillery arm belongs also much credit. Captain Easton, since dead, repeated his glorious conduct of Dranesville, directing his guns with great effect. Lieutenant Van Reed, of Captain Smead's battery, conducted the fire of his section admirably. Lieutenant Fullerton, on the left, with the Twelfth did excellent service. I hear the highest praises of Captain De Hart and his battery of Captain Smead, of Cooper, and of Kerns. Their batteries were well handled, and their close and rapid fire must have inflicted severe loss upon the masses of the enemy's troops as they crossed the gentle slopes before our line.

        Men never behaved better; to their constancy and courage, after all, the good stand made against a greatly superior force is due, and Pennsylvania may forever be proud of the memories connected with the deeds of her sons at Mechanicsville.
        BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY [GAINES' MILL].
        The several brigades of the division arriving successively upon the ground selected for the next point of resistance near Gaines' Mill were formed as a reserve to Morell's and Sykes' divisions, already posted in battle order. The contest here may be described briefly as a struggle for the mastery of a body of woods on our front and left, the possession of which gave control of the open ground in our rear, over which passed the roads to the bridges of the Chickahominy by which we must be supported or retire. Morell's division occupied these woods; Sykes' ground comparatively open to the right. This division was in rear of the woods in reserve, Reynolds brigade on the right, Meade's on the left, Seymour's as a reserve to the division in rear of it. Cooper's battery was on the right, overlooking open ground toward Cold Harbor, and the batteries of De Hart, Easton, and Kerns on the left, sweeping from commanding ridges the space between the woods and the Chickahominy. The cavalry covered the main bridge still farther to the rear.

        The engagement commenced fiercely about 3 o'clock, and such overpowering numbers were brought into action by the enemy that it was soon necessary to send forward this division in support of the line already engaged. Regiment after regiment advanced, relieved regiments in front, in turn withstood, checked, repelled, or drove the enemy, and retired, their ammunition being exhausted, to breathe a few moments, to fill their cartridge boxes, again to return to the contested woods. Some of these regiments stood for four hours, scarcely changing position, yielding to no odds, and to no diminution of their own numbers. At times parts of the line would be driven from its ground, but only to receive aid and to drive the enemy in his turn. The woods were strewn with the heroic dead of both sides, and multitudes of wounded and dying painfully sought every hollow affording even momentary shelter from the incessant and pitiless fire.

        Through such scenes, upon such ground, the Reserve Corps principally enacted its part. Several regiments were detached from their brigades to the support of distant points. No brigade went into action entire, and it is difficult to describe connectedly the movements of any one command. Of the First Brigade the Second Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, was detached to the left, in support of General Morell's line. The Bucktails, First, Fifth, and Eighth, went in to relieve the left of Sykes' division and the right of Morell's. They held their ground well and stood fast, even after four hours' work had exhausted their ammunition. The First only was relieved, retired, and after some rest subsequently advanced a second time. The Eighth, posted in support of two batteries of Sykes' division, was advanced to relieve the Second U.S. Infantry, where it gallantly repulsed an advance of the enemy in force.

        In the Second Brigade the Fourth and Third Regiments were also ordered forward to support the main line of battle, and the Fourth relieved Warren's Zouaves, the Third the Fourth Michigan. These both did manly service. The Fourth held the enemy in check for some time, but was compelled to fall back. The ninth, of Seymour's brigade, came to its relief. It reformed and again returned to support the Third, still farther to the left, was finally overpowered, and fell back in good order. The Third, Colonel Sickel, was engaged for two hours, losing many men. The Eleventh had been ordered to relieve an exhausted regiment in front, and moved into line through the woods by a flank upon the right of the Fourth New Jersey at the moment when the left of Sykes' division was being relieved. The enemy, pressing strongly, fell upon the Eleventh, and finding it at disadvantage surrounded it and compelled it to yield..

        The Third Brigade early in the day was ordered to the extreme right to support batteries, but the attack being developed more to the left, the Twelfth was left in support, and the ninth and Tenth moved to the rear of the woods, into which they were soon ordered. The ninth, Colonel Jackson, relieved the Fourth on the right of the woods at a moment when the enemy endeavored to advance. Joined by parts of the ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania it drove him back across a field in front, thereby exposing itself to a severe fire, under which it fell back. Reforming in the wood it returned, but could not force the enemy, whose forces rapidly increased. Again it fell to the rear and again advanced with no better success. The enemy's weight was overpowering, but the ninth took one of his colors from him. Adjutant Swearingen, doing his duty like a brave soldier, was here severely wounded. The Tenth, more employed in support, was not so seriously engaged.

        Toward evening both the right and left of the line were forced. The enemy came through in great numbers, and from the edge of the woods poured a fire upon the artillery. The batteries had already played an important part. They now endeavored to drive the enemy, and opened with rapidity and precision, but could not contend successfully against the bullets of the infantry at this short range. Captain Easton, nobly encouraging and cheering his men, shouted that they should never have his guns except over his body. This gallant gentleman fell, and his battery was lost with him. First Lieut. William Stitt, of this battery, was severely wounded here. The horse of Lieut. J. L. Detrich was shot under him. Both behaved with courage and coolness. Capt. Mark Kerns was wounded early in the battle, but in spite of the injury kept the field, and when the enemy came down thickly upon his battery loaded and fired the last shots himself and brought four of the guns off the field.

        Captain De Hart's battery did its best service, keeping its ground and delivering its fire steadily against the advancing enemy. Captain De Hart was wounded here. Officers and men all displayed the greatest gallantry, but no efforts could repel the rush of a now successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down and guns lay immovable upon the field.

        Sometime here, during the confusion incident to relieving regiments, &c., General Reynolds was taken, with Captain Kingsbury, his assistant adjutant-general. No greater loss befell the division on this or any subsequent day.

        Supports came up about this time. The cavalry came forward, and the division fell back a few hundred yards to reform and to pass the night. Still later, in conformity to original plans, it withdrew with the rest of the army across the Chickahominy.

        BATTLE OF NEW MARKET CROSS-ROADS [GLENDALE, NELSON'S FARM, OR FRAZIER'S FARM].

        On the morning of June 30 McCall's division halted on the New Market road just in advance of where a by-road turns off toward Quaker Church. The remainder of the corps (Morell's and Sykes') had already passed on toward the James River. Exhausted by the fatigues of the previous three days of fighting and nights of marching, men and officers courted this short rest with delight and reposed in fancied security. The order to follow the mass of the corps was momentarily expected by the men, and no dispositions were made to meet an attack, until General Meade and myself, riding to the front, found only a squadron of cavalry, unsupported by a single infantry soldier, interposing between the division and the enemy, whose pickets were close at hand. Reporting this to General McCall, the First Regiment, Colonel Roberts, and the Third, Colonel Sickel, were immediately ordered to the front on outpost duty, and the division was soon after posted in order of battle. The line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, two batteries, Randol's First and Thompson's Second U.S. Artillery, to the right of the road, and on the left Amsden, with four of Kerns' guns, Cooper's battery, and Captains Diederichs and Knieriem with two four-gun batteries of 20-pounder Parrotts. They were supported by a line of infantry in rear, and this line was strengthened by reserves deployed in the edge of the woods along the by-road alluded to above.

        The Second Brigade was on the right of the main road, the Third on the left, the First in reserve. The Fourth Cavalry was close in rear of the left of the line. The division was scarcely formed before the attack commenced by a distant fire of shot and shell upon the ground occupied by the left, and attracted, doubtless, by a few discharges from the 20 pounder Parrotts. It was borne with perfect coolness and steadiness The advanced pickets of the First and Third were rapidly driven back by a force of skirmishers upon the main body, which at short range delivered a deliberate fire upon the advancing foe, cutting to pieces a regiment supposed to be the ninth Virginia, and taking from it a number of prisoners. The position of the Third interfering with the range of our artillery, which now began to open, it fell back, and being unfortunately fired upon by our own men, retired in some confusion, and reformed only late in the day.

        On the extreme left a small log farm-house (Whitlock's) had hastily been prepared for defense by piling rails and logs so as to shelter a part of the Twelfth Regiment, and from which, supported as it was by other troops, it should never have been driven. A fire from skirmishers, added to that of the distant artillery, drove these men, however, early in the action, and with very weak resistance, from their posts, and lost to us a very important point. The Fifth and a part of the Tenth and the small remnant of the First Rifles gallantly and successfully for a time stemmed the overwhelming tide. The Tenth, driving the enemy back by a brilliant charge, took some 60 prisoners from the Alabama and Georgia Regiments; but the success was only momentary. The force thrown upon us was too great to be long withstood.

        Many a noble soldier laid down his life in holding this ground. Here fell Colonel Simmons, of the Fifth, commanding the First Brigade, closing a long line of honorable service by a glorious act of devotion to duty. Here Captain Biddle, assistant adjutant-general to General McCall, gave his life to his country, and no man more brave nor more esteemed fell this day. Capt. Philip Holland, of the First Rifles, an excellent and noble-minded young man; Adjutant Gaither, of the Tenth, of high promise as a man and a soldier, and not a few other officers and many men, in endeavoring to stay the rush of the enemy, yielded up their lives.

        Immediately upon the enemy presenting himself the batteries opened along the entire line, but at a great disadvantage, so close could the enemy advance under cover. On the left, no sooner were the Parrott guns subjected to the fire of musketry than they were limbered up and withdrawn, causing much confusion. The cavalry, crowded into a narrow ravine and shaken by the disorder, soon followed• It formed farther to the rear, but found no good opportunity to be of service on the field. Cooper's guns were finally taken from him after many of his officers and men had been disabled. Lieutenants Danforth and Cadwallader both died at their posts. Veterans could have done no more. The ninth, Colonel Jackson, retook these pieces by a successful charge, and drove the enemy well back, but in so doing drew a heavy fire from his right that compelled his return. Amsden stood fast, doing excellent service until his ammunition was exhausted, then withdrew.

        On the right of the road General Meade met a severe attack, but the capacity of Randol's and Thompson's batteries (all light 12-pounders) for canister gave another aspect to the fight. The enemy was repeatedly driven back with great loss, yet from the woods in front of Randol a fire was sustained that first weakened, then destroyed his effect. A force came down to take his guns, but Colonel Magilton (Fourth), keeping his men well to the ground until close at hand, met It with perfect success; followed with the bayonet; gave and received many wounds recaptured Lieut. E. B. Hill, of the battery, who, after much gallantry, was already a prisoner, wounded, and returned gloriously to his position with three secession flags in proof of the obstinate courage of both parties. The Seventh, by similar conduct, added to the success of the resistance. It also charged gallantly with the bayonet. All its color guard being killed or wounded, Capt. R. M. Henderson seized the standard and bore it off the field, when by main strength the enemy compelled the regiment to withdraw. The chief credit of the stand here made may, however, be ascribed to the tenacious skill with which Captain Thompson handled his pieces.

        About this time General Meade was severely wounded and compelled to retire, and the services of an able officer were lost to the command. But along the line generally the sturdiest efforts of officers and men could not have resisted unaided the impulse and force of this attack, and although but little ground was lost, it was evident that the enemy was gaining. Happily a part of Richardson's division came to our relief, and when night fell and the battle ceased but trifling, if any, advantage had been conquered.

        The parts of regiments that had most suffered and had fallen to the rear were reformed successfully by the exertions of several field and staff officers (Lieutenant Collamer, Maj. Roy Stone, Capt. Chandler Hall, Captain Henderson, and Lieutenant Lainborn, with others) and moved to the front in support of those still on the field. While passing forward by the main road, led by General McCall in person and somewhat in advance and in company of Major Stone, they came suddenly upon the head of a body of rebels who demanded their surrender. Major Stone escaped with a slight hurt from a volley fired upon him, but General McCall fell into their hands. The presence of our men staid the enemy's farther advance.

        The object of the enemy was doubtless to divide our forces by a strong attack upon the center of our line and to seize the roads by which the army was changing its base. Several divisions, so prisoners state, fell upon the Reserve Corps. The enemy did not gain his object, and in the night the division continued its march to Malvern.

        In the battle of July 1 the command was held in reserve and so completely successful was our main body that no occasion offered for it to take a direct part in the engagement.

        It remains only to name some of the many eminently worthy of mention. Of the staff officers of Generals McCall, Reynolds, and Meade all cannot be named, though all deserve noble prominence, for some were killed and some were wounded in the discharge of their important and perilous duties. Among these was Lieut. J. H. Kuhn, a young man of many friends and of great promise. Lieut. W. N. Watmough (wounded) was one of this class. Capt. Chandler Hal and Lieut. E. Beatty (wounded) were noted by many for their active and energetic conduct on the field. Lieut. C. B. Lamborn, in rallying men and in many other ways, behaved gallantly and efficiently in all these engagements, and after General Reynolds was taken attached him to General Meade for further duty.

        My own staff, Capt. J. C. Clark, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieuts. G. H. Bemus and C. n. Jackson, aides, rendered me laborious and faithful service through the battles, as did my quartermaster, Capt. C. E. Russ. My commissary, Capt. J. M. Tillepaugh, left his wagons and rendered at the hospital the greatest service to our wounded.

        Of the surgeons I cannot speak with sufficient praise. Drs. A. E. Stocker, E. D. Dailey, and J. King, the brigade surgeons, were untiring and unremitting in their care and attention to the wounded, as were also the regimental surgeons, with scarcely an exception. Drs. J. Collins (Third), J. De Benneville (Eleventh), n. F. Marsh (Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry), and E. Donnelly (Second) voluntarily remained with the wounded on the field, and submitted to the distress of capture and imprisonment in order to devote themselves to the relief of the suffering.

        The chaplains devoted themselves to the wounded, and deserve every encomium for the services they performed.

        Many of the deserving field officers have been mentioned in the course of my report. Capt. L. Wister and Quartermaster H. W. Patton, of the First Rifles (Bucktails), are highly praised for efficient and gallant service. Maj. Roy Stone deserves the highest praise on all occasions. He relates that John Doyle, a private of Easton's battery, after the guns were lost, went to his command and, among the foremost, performed manly duty. Col. R. B. Roberts and Lieut. Col. H. M. McIntire, of the First, both gave proof of being brave and accomplished officers. The latter was severely wounded on the 30th and left in the hands of the enemy. Maj. G. A. Woodward, of the Second, is praised for general good conduct; also Capt. H. Neide— both wounded severely. Col. H. G. Sickel and Lieut. Col. W. S. Thompson, of the Third, are among the most deserving for continued good conduct. Maj. R. H. Woolworth and Capt. T. F. B. Tapper, of the Fourth, showed especial bravery. Adjt A. G. Mason, of the Fifth, was wounded by a piece of shell, stunned, and compelled to withdraw; returned to the front and remained with his regiment. Lieut. W. Riddle, of the Fifth, was severely wounded on the 26th in the head and arm, but refused to leave his regiment; went into the following engagements, and was again wounded and a prisoner on the 30th. Lieut. H. P. Petrikin deserves honorable notice. Lieut. Col. H. C. Bolinger, of the Seventh, behaved with great courage and judgment. Capt. R. M. Henderson has already been mentioned. Maj. S. M. Bally, of the Eighth,Capts. R. E. Johnson, A. Wishart, and G. S. Gallupe are much praised by their colonel. To the cool and gallant conduct of Col. C. F. Jackson, of the ninth, I was often witness, as well as that of Adjt. T. B. Swearingen, who deserves high praise. In the Tenth, besides Col. J. T. Kirk, Lieut. Col. A. J. Warner was distinguished for intelligence and courage under all circumstances. Private E. E. Douglass, of Company A, recaptured a stand of American colors on the 30th and brought them off the field. Maj. P. Baldy, of the Twelfth, behaved excellently. Adjt. T. McMurtrie was noted for special coolness and good conduct under fire.

        The artillery, to which so much is due in these battles, behaved with great spirit and courage at all times. All the battery commanders on the Beaver Dam field on the 26th (J. R. Smead, H. V. De Hart, J. H. Cooper, H. Easton, and M. Kerns) played their part gallantly and with skill, as they did also on the 27th, and for their excellent conduct subsequently the previous pages of this report must be consulted.

        To the commander of the cavalry of the division, Col. S. H. Childs, Fourth Pennsylvania, much is due for the faithfulness and promptitude with which the duties were performed that fell to his arm of the service.

        Many officers and men are deserving of great honor and of the widest mention whose names have not yet been submitted officially. Instances of heroic courage and devotion, modestly hidden, are daily being ascertained, that must form the substance of another and more detailed report.

        Very respectfully, captain, your obedient servant,

        T. SEYMOUR, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division"

        For those who register for the 4th Penna. Reserves, a little background information may be useful. I hope this helps fill that need.
        [B]Charles Heath[/B]
        [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]heath9999@aol.com[/EMAIL]

        [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Spanglers_Spring_Living_History/"]12 - 14 Jun 09 Hoosiers at Gettysburg[/URL]

        [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]17-19 Jul 09 Mumford/GCV Carpe Eventum [/EMAIL]

        [EMAIL="beatlefans1@verizon.net"]31 Jul - 2 Aug 09 Texans at Gettysburg [/EMAIL]

        [EMAIL="JDO@npmhu.org"] 11-13 Sep 09 Fortress Monroe [/EMAIL]

        [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Elmira_Death_March/?yguid=25647636"]2-4 Oct 09 Death March XI - Corduroy[/URL]

        [EMAIL="oldsoldier51@yahoo.com"] G'burg Memorial March [/EMAIL]

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: The Federal point of view

          It's nice to add a little history. I find it ironic Cooper's Battery (US) and Chapman's Battery (CS) were nearly facing each other across an intermittent tributary. Maybe Doug and Dusty will get a chuckle from that, and there is one commander's name in this for the Trekkies out there.

          #156

          HEADQUARTERS FOURTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
          July 6, 1862

          Monday, June 30, at 10 o'clock p.m., by order of Captain Biddle) assistant adjutant-general to General McCall, I formed two squadrons of my regiment in a small ravine in rear of the Twelfth Infantry Reserve Corps and a battery of four guns and one squadron in the woods adjoining My orders, as far as I had orders, were to remain in the position in which I was placed until a favorable opportunity occurred and then charge.

          The position I held was a very bad one. The men were but partially sheltered, with no avenue of retreat until I bridged the swamp in the rear with rails, and so close upon the infantry that the field officers in the rear of the regiment were on a line with my company officers in front of their platoons.

          We remained in this position some time, exposed only to an occasional shell, when suddenly a very heavy fire of infantry opened upon us. The battery limbered up to leave and the infantry began to show signs of disorder. My men were dismounted and lying on the ground, by my order to escape the musketry which was pouring over us apparently from two directions. I immediately ordered them to mount, but before many of them could get into the saddle the Twelfth Regiment broke in a most disorderly manner, without firing a shot at the enemy, and falling back upon the ranks of my men frightened the horses and compelled them to join in their disgraceful flight. I readily rallied the men a few hundred yards in the rear of our former position and reformed them on a neighboring field.

          I endeavored fruitlessly for some time to find an officer from whom I could obtain instructions or orders, then being utterly unacquainted with the locality and in entire ignorance as to the disposition of our troops. I made my men as useful as possible, stopping stragglers, reforming parts of regiments, and guarding prisoners— not a very glorious but possibly a useful service.

          JAS. H. CHILDS, Colonel, Commanding Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

          #158

          Being on picket duty near Mechanicsville, I was ordered at noon on Thursday, June 26, to place my battery in position by General Seymour. The right and center sections, commanded by Lieutenants Dan-forth and Cadwallader respectively, were placed behind a half-finished earthwork on the right of the village, and the left section, commanded by Lieutenant Fullerton, in rear of the village near the church. By a subsequent order from General Reynolds, the right and center sections were placed behind an earthwork in camp of the Bucktails, and the left section in the rear of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps rifle pits.

          At 3 p.m. the enemy, consisting of a regiment of infantry, attempted to cross the field in our front, when we opened fire on them, and caused them to retire in confusion and disorder, when a battery of rifled guns opened upon us from a concealed position on the right. We returned the fire with marked effect, forcing them to change their position to the left of the field in our front. At this juncture of affairs they opened fire with a battery of smooth-bore guns from the woods directly in our front, which did but little injury, their shots all failing short.

          At intervals during the engagement we fired canister into the woods on our right and left, assisting the First Regiment on our right and the Fifth on our left in repelling the enemy, who were engaging these regiments at short musketry-range.

          The rifled battery continued to engage us until 8 o'clock p.m., when we ceased firing, having fired 800 or 900 rounds of shot, shell, and canister.

          Lieutenant Fullerton, in command of the left section, reports having engaged the enemy at the same time, repulsing them with case-shot and canister. Four desperate efforts were made to cross the bridge near the mill, but as often were they repulsed and forced to fall back.

          J. H. COOPER, Captain, Pennsylvania Artillery, Comdg. Battery B.

          The battery having been ordered by General McCall to take position in line of battle near the above-named place at 2 o'clock p.m., where we remained until 4.30 p.m., when one of the enemy's batteries, concealed in the woods to our front, opened fire upon us, to which we replied with marked effect, as soon but one gun replied to us. During the engagement parties of infantry attempted to cross the field in our front, but with the assistance of Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery, we compelled them to retire in disorder and confusion. This continued about one and a half hours, when Battery G was compelled to retire for want of ammunition, and our infantry support, with the exception of three companies, retired. The enemy, availing themselves of this opportunity, advanced a regiment from a point of woods in our front, which our canister failed to check, although it did marked execution.
          The remaining infantry falling back, we were compelled to retire from our guns. The charge being so sudden and overpowerinng; it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed by the enemy's fire.

          J. H. COOPER, Captain, Pennsylvania Artillery, Comdg. Battery B,

          #159

          July 3, 1862.

          In the absence of Captain Kerns (wounded) it devolves upon me to make the following report:

          Orders were received Friday, 27th ultimo, about 4 a.m., by Captain Kerns, to fall back and take position on Gaines' Hill. The right section followed soon after. Battery came into position in the course of the morning. About 5 p.m., the enemy appearing in force in front. Fire was opened upon them. They charged the battery and were repulsed three times, but finally drove it from the field. The charge is said by prisoners and members of the Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps to have been led by General Stonewall Jackson in person, carrying the colors. The man carrying the colors was killed by a charge of canister within 80 yards of the battery fired from the left piece of the right section. Guns nos. 1 and 4 were left on the field, owing to lack of horses and men to get them off. While the battery was being limbered the enemy were within less than 20 yards of the pieces. Captain Kerns was shot in the calf of the leg almost in the commencement of the fire, but remained with the battery, taking especial command of the center section, loading and firing the last two shots himself, and bringing the battery off the field. In this affair 7 men were killed. 11 wounded, including Captain Kerns; 10 horses were killed, 2 guns, carriages, and implements were lost. One hundred and thirty-eight spherical case, 36 shell, and 75 canister were fired. Battery crossed the Chickahominy and encamped with the division near General McClellan's headquarters. Here the command of the battery devolved upon me, Captain Kerns being taken to the hospital.

          From what remained to us after the previous day's battle I immediately prepared for service a four-gun battery and reported same, with a synopsis of losses, &c, to General Meade.

          On Saturday, the 28th ultimo, about 6 p.m., received orders from headquarters to start all loaded wagons on the road through White Oak Swamp and prepare the battery to march upon order. This was done. Orders to march came about 10 p.m.

          Line of march in rear of First Brigade was taken up about 12 p.m. on Sunday, the 29th ultimo. About 2 p.m. we encamped in a field on a hill just beyond the White Oak Swamp. About 4.30 p.m. line of march was again taken up, and the road followed till beyond New Market Cross-Roads. Here we bivouacked until almost daylight. The column was then reversed and proceeded back to the cross-roads, where we encamped. On Monday, the 30th ultimo, about 12 m., orders received to prepare for battle. About 3 p.m. we opened fire upon the enemy. Before the firing commenced my caissons had been ordered to the rear by General Seymour. When I found I should need ammunition I sent for them. They could not be found, having been moved by order. Lieutenant Fitzki and my two buglers were sent three different times, but failed to communicate with them.

          When the ammunition in my limbers was expended I reported to General McCall, who ordered me to take the road to the rear with my guns and halt outside of the fire. This was done, the guns halting near a hospital. After hunting near an hour for my caissons I again prepared to move my guns, by advice of General Meade, who passed by wounded. I took up line of march for James River, and reached Harrison's Landing Tuesday, the 1st instant, about 9 a.m. My caissons reached here all safe about 4 p.m. Quartermaster-Sergeant Buffum, who had them in charge from the time they left me on the field, deserves especial mention for the manner in which he brought them from the field and conducted them in safety to the battery. I immediately made a report of my condition and where I was, directed to yourself, and sent same to Major Clendenin, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, then commanding post, with request that he would forward.

          F. P. AMSDEN, First Lieutenant, Comdg. Battery G, First Pa.

          July 5, 1862.

          I have the honor to report that in obedience to order on the 26th day of June I placed six companies of my regiment in rifle pits in front of Easton's Pennsylvania battery, four companies being directed to deploy as skirmishers, for the purpose of receiving the enemy, who were reported to be advancing in great force upon us near Beaver Dam. We were not in position more than twenty minutes when the batteries opened fire. About 4 o'clock p.m. the enemy's line appeared sufficiently close for our infantry to have effect, when the battle raged fiercely until night closed the contest.

          At early dawn the battle was renewed until I received an order to fall back upon a New line at Gaines' Mill. I called in the skirmishers and flanked the regiment onto the Gaines' Hill road, marching slowly and in good order to our New base of operations, where I received an order from General McCall to support two regular batteries that were then engaged. I occupied my position as directed and remained there about one hour, when Colonel Warren, of a Massachusetts regiment, reported to me that his command was being divided and wished me to go to his support. I told him if he would get an order from General McCall I would assist him. He did so, and reported the enemy in force, concealed in some woods about a quarter of a mile in front. I marched in line of battle toward the enemy, and when within a distance of perhaps 100 yards charged them with the bayonet and drove them back, when some desperate fighting took place. Colonel Warren, in the mean time, taking advantage of the enemy's being engaged, escaped from his position (or that portion of his command that he wished to have relieved). I flanked the regiment, marched in good order to our original position, stacked arms, and remained there until I received orders to bivouack for the night.

          About midnight we were ordered to cross the Chickahominy toward James River, and marched in that direction until the 30th, near Willis' Church, where we were again called into action, and had a severe fight, lasting until late at night.

          My officers and men in all these engagements behaved with great gallantry except in a few isolated cases. When relieving Colonel Warren I had three valuable line officers, to wit: Captains Gallupe, Johnson, and Wishart, severely wounded, as was my major, S. M. Baily, also several non-commissioned officers and privates that I highly valued.

          We are now encamped on the banks of the James River, and my total loss in killed, wounded, and missing, from the 26th to the night of the 30th (in battle), proved to be 230, the particulars of which I hereby append.

          GEO. S. HAYS, Colonel, Commanding Eighth Regiment, P. V. R.

          #161

          July 1, 1862.

          On the night of the 28th we marched through White Oak Swamp, marched nearly all the next day, and did picket duty on the Richmond road during the night of the 29th. Many of our stragglers and slightly wounded had come in, and we entered the action on the 30th with 5 officers and 150 men and 5 officers and 84 men of the U.S. Sharpshooters. My first position was in the rear of the batteries on the right of the First Brigade. When the brigade made its charge I remained to support the batteries, moving to the left of the Parrott guns. The charge was brilliant and successful, but the enemy, giving our troops no time to reform, hurled itself in masses upon the left of our line, where you were endeavoring to reorganize those regiments which had become broken in the charge and encouraging them to meet the attack. I had been ordered to take position still farther on your left, but had only reached a point in rear of nelson's house and behind a crowded but confused force of our own troops when the attack commenced. I soon saw our troops giving way, and, halting, faced my men by the rear rank to the then front. We lay down upon the ground, while all our own troops ran over us. I begged their officers in passing to reform behind us, and when our front was unmasked rose and gave the enemy a volley and continued firing for some minutes; but finding that we were the center of a murderous fire of an overwhelming force at very short range; that my men were falling fast and I should soon have none left, I gave the order to retire just in time to escape being surrounded. Here was lost one of the most gallant officers of the regiment: Senior Capt. Philip Holland was shot dead while steadying his own men and attempting to rally others.

          The enemy did not pursue us far, but turned to the left to attack the batteries. My regiment halted about 400 yards to the rear, where I made it the nucleus for rallying all the fragments of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps which came that way. The men rallied nobly, though still under heavy fire. They only wanted a point to gather and the order to fail in. We soon had the colors of six regiments in the line and a respectable brigade of troops properly officered and in fighting condition.

          At dusk I moved the whole battalion, which seemed to put itself under my command, forward in excellent line of battle toward the front, where the fight was raging in the dense woods. I should hare been utterly at a loss as to where advantageously to place my command but for the superior judgment and accurate knowledge of the progress of the battle possessed by Mr. Lainborn, who had posted the other divisions of the fresh troops as they had come up, and knew from his own observation the position of every corps upon the field. Upon his advice I moved by flank up the Richmond road, and advancing steadily to the extreme front under sharp fire, halted to reconnoiter upon finding myself among the wreck of our own batteries where the action commenced. General McCall had come out of the woods wounded and alone, and taken his place at the head of the column.

          After the halt the general took me forward a few paces with him, and suddenly in the darkness we found ourselves close upon the leveled muskets of a column of the enemy, which filled the road in front of us. We were ordered to "Halt; dismount;" but I turned and escaped only slightly hurt, though drawing two volleys from the enemy. General McCall was not so fortunate, and is in the enemy's hands. My men at the same time had captured the colonel of a rebel regiment with a small party who were scouting in our direction. I formed my first company across the road, and went to the rear in search of a cannon to sweep the road in front. I soon, however, became so faint and dizzy from the effects of my hurt that I was taken to the hospital and took no further part in the action, which soon terminated. The presence of my force, which still remained half an hour on the ground and then retired in good order, no doubt checked an advance of the enemy which would have cut our lines in the very center— its weakest point. They were already feeling their way down the road and had a powerful column ready to make the dash.

          The loss of my command in this action was much greater in proportion than in any of the preceding. I have this morning but 3 officers and 60 men of my own regiment and 3 officers and 28 men of the U.S. Sharpshooters for duty. We were under fire for a while this morning at the battle of Malvern Hill, but soon retired, according to your order, under the bluff.

          I am pained to mention the loss of Capt. Charles Drew, Wisconsin company (G), U.S. Sharpshooters, a brave, skillful, and much-beloved commander. He was shot dead early in the action.

          ROY STONE, Major, Commanding First Rifles.

          #162

          July 4, 1862.

          In accordance with division order, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, of July 3, 1862, I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report:

          June 30, at 11 o'clock a.m., the Third Regiment was posted on picket duty in front of the camp of McCall's division, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, the right resting on the Long Bridge road, extending southward about one mile. It was soon reported to me by the outpost pickets and by me to the rear that the enemy was rapidly covering our front with heavy columns of infantry. Their advance soon drove in our outposts, when we received orders to retire on our camp, which was done in good order to the skirt of the woods, when we again took up position in line of battle. Here we remained until the enemy approached to within 50 paces, when the entire line delivered a well-directed fire upon the enemy's front, utterly cutting to pieces the ninth Virginia Regiment. Their column was momentarily checked, when we delivered the second fire with the same good results.

          At this time our artillery had opened fire upon them, and we were obliged to retire to get out of range of our own guns. Immediately after a regiment in our rear commenced to fire upon my men, which caused them to break and run in great confusion, and it was not until very late in the day that I could rally them together in any great force, but they were all fighting somewhere in the line. I would here state that in our retirement we captured and took in with us 7 prisoners— one a Lieutenant- In this part of the engagement our loss was very considerable, including several officers.

          There are a number of officers and men who distinguished themselves by daring acts of bravery during the three days' battle which I shall at some future time take great pleasure in noticing. First of these, however, is Lieut. Col. William S. Thompson, who rendered me the greatest services during the severe trials through which we have just passed. Also Adjutant Jameson and Sergt. Maj. H. S. Jones, the latter of whom was always at his post, encouraging on the men to their duty. I will hereafter make a full report of the officers of the line.

          H. G. SICKEL, Colonel Third Infantry, P. R. V. C.

          #163

          HEADQUARTERS FOURTH REGIMENT P. R. V. C.,
          Harrison's Landing, Va., July 4, 1862.

          In accordance with division orders, P. R. C., July 3, 1862, I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of June 26, 1862, the Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps marched toward Mechanicsville and was placed near to and in the rear of Captain Easton's Pennsylvania Reserve Artillery, as a support to the battery; that we remained in this position all night until early next morning, when we were withdrawn to Gaines' house, and although we were in full range of the enemy's battery and shells exploding constantly around us, we had not a casualty.

          June 27 we were again stationed in rear of Easton's battery, and remained until we were ordered into the woods as a support to the troops engaged. We soon came up to them, and found them to be the Duryea Zouaves. Here we were engaged in skirmishing, and drove the enemy well to the rear; but the enemy, being strongly re-enforced, pressed us closely, and we were obliged to retire, which was done in good order. We were soon in line on the clearing toward the Chickahominy, and were then ordered to the edge of the woods to support the Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, but subsequently we were ordered to the left of our line, where we were but a few moments when our center gave way and we were cut off, and made our escape only by crossing the Chickahominy, and came into Smith's division. The list of casualties will be found in the list attached.

          June 30 we were in position as given to the Second Brigade by General Meade. The Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps was to the left and slightly to the front of Randol's battery. Here we laid concealed in the grass until the enemy came within 60 feet of my regiment, when I ordered my men to rise and fire, when the enemy broke to the rear. We kept up the firing, but the enemy being re-enforced, we were obliged to retire; but shortly we faced to the front and drove them again, but being hotly pressed and losing many of my men, we were obliged to retire. A third attempt was made to rally, which was very weak, and finally my regiment broke and scattered in the woods. The next morning I collected about 200 men.

          The officers and men behaved most gallantly, and there are many instances of personal daring— many hand-to-hand conflicts. I would especially mention the names of Maj. R. H. Woolworth, Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, Acting Lieut. Col., and Capt. Thomas F. B. Tapper, Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, as deserving especial notice. I captured three secession and one Union flag from the rebels. I went into action with less than 600 rank and file, and my total loss in the two days' action was in killed, wounded, and missing 201, being more than one-third of the force engaged.

          A. L. MAGILTON, Colonel Fourth Regiment P. R. V. C., Commanding Regiment

          #164

          WHITE OAK SWAMP.

          I have the honor to report that before the attack of the enemy the ninth Regiment was posted on the edge of the wood, the line extending northeast and southwest. In an open field on an elevated ridge, and parallel to the line of my regiment, was posted Cooper's battery. After the attack, and when the battery had opened, I was ordered to advance to its support, and took my position a few yards in its rear, being covered by the ridge occupied by the battery. While in this position I was informed that the enemy was advancing on our left flank, and was directed to change front to oppose any force from that direction. Having occupied the position as directed some time and no enemy appearing, I was ordered to take my original position on the edge of the woods. While in the act of making this change Cooper's battery was captured, which fact was told me by the captain himself.

          Finding that the men deeply sympathized with the captain in his loss, I at once determined to recapture the guns. A successful charge was made. The enemy was driven from the guns diagonally to the right and into the woods. I immediately commenced reforming my regiment on the road to our right. At this time a heavy firing was opened upon us from the right. We advanced into the woods, where skirmishing commenced and continued until after dark. In this second charge I became separated from the regiment. We rallied near the hospital in rear of the battle-field. This was the most disastrous day of the three, having a number of my most efficient line officers killed or wounded. With the exception of a small percentage of skulkers, officers and men conducted themselves admirably.

          With no desire of making invidious distinctions or of giving one officer praise to the disparagement of others, when all behaved bravely, the colonel commanding cannot allow the present opportunity to pass without making special allusion to the heroic conduct of Lieut. T. Brent Swearingen, adjutant of the regiment, at the battle of Gaines' Hill, who was always to be found in the thickest of the fray, leading the men by his daring valor and cheering words on to victory, in the midst of which he was stricken down by a ball seriously, but I am happy to say not fatally, wounding him. The colonel commanding is proud to say the regiment which he had the honor to command on that eventful day captured from the enemy a stand of regimental colors, which it still has in its possession.

          C. FEGER JACKSON, Colonel Commanding ninth Regiment P.R. V. C.

          #165

          July 6, 1862.

          On Sunday at an early hour the march was continued across White Oak Swamp, with little interval for rest, till Monday at about 2 o'clock p.m. My command was then posted, by order of General McCall, in the edge of a wood, the right resting near upon the left of the ninth Regiment, and in line of battle perpendicular to that of the ninth Regiment.

          Companies B and G were thrown forward to support a battery situated immediately on our left. At about 4 o'clock p.m. the left of the regiment was exposed to a raking fire from the enemy's batteries, which opened on the batteries immediately on our left and front. I was ordered to move forward by General McCall in person, which I did, halting for several minutes behind one of our batteries. Here the horses of the batteries on our left came in wild confusion on my men. The enemy were charging boldly upon the breastworks occupied by the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, when I charged most successfully upon their flank, completely routing the enemy, killing large numbers, and capturing about 60 prisoners. The Seventeenth Virginia and Tenth Alabama Regiments were almost wholly annihilated by their extreme loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. A stand of American colors, said to be that of the Fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, was rescued and brought off by E. E. Douglass, Company I, Tenth Regiment.

          A considerable number belonging to the Tenth Regiment were at this time posted at the breastworks near the house on our line of battle, and were the last to leave this post. The enemy came up to close range without receiving our fire under protection of Union colors. Our loss in killed and wounded amounted to about 70. Several were also taken prisoners, who soon after made their escape while a panic raged among the rebels. About 300 were again rallied behind the first woods with the colors, who, with others of the reserve rallied by Major Stone and other officers, were moved up by Lieutenant-Colonel Warner in line of battle to within about 100 yards of where the right of the regiment rested when the battle began. The fire of the enemy here was very hot, but was not returned, for fear of firing upon parties of our own men.

          Darkness ended the contest. At 11 o'clock p.m. this line was ordered back to join the rest of the reserve regiments. At 2 o'clock a.m. next morning the retreat was again taken up. On Tuesday my command was not brought into action. On Wednesday, July 2, we marched to Harrison's Landing, where, after the dreadful fatigues of the battlefield, the march continued almost night and day for eight days. We rested without shelter during the storm of twenty-four hours, almost as dreadful as the storm of battle.

          JAMES T. KIRK. Colonel, Commanding Tenth Regiment P. R. V. C.

          #166

          July 5, 1862.

          I respectfully forward the following report of the operations of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps at the battle of Turkey Creek [Glendale]:
          On Monday afternoon, June 30, the regiment was formed in line of battle on the left of the Third Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, awaiting the approach of the enemy and in support of a battery on our right. By direction of Brigadier-General Seymour the position of two of the guns in the battery was changed by moving them to a hill in the rear of my regiment, and six companies (A, Captain Dannells; B, Captain Mathewson; C, Captain Gustin; F, Captain Oliver; H, Captain Bolar, and K, Captain Eyster) were detached and posted in two log huts and a breastwork of rails temporarily thrown up about 200 yards in advance to the left, commanding the approach of the enemy, while four companies (D, Captain Horn; E, Captain Schelling; G, Lieut. W. W. Arnold commanding, and I, Captain Baker) were posted in rear of the two pieces of artillery. I had just succeeded in posting the companies in the log huts and breastwork when a heavy fire was opened upon us from the enemy's artillery and his forces advanced in heavy columns from the direction of the road in front. One column of the enemy attempted to surround the men in the breastwork and log huts by advancing in the rear toward a ravine. The officers and men maintained their position and fired three volleys at the advancing foe, which failed to check his progress. Seeing that they were about to be surrounded the men retired from the log huts, but not until after losing several of their number. Captain Dannells, of Company A, was wounded in the side at this time. The position was untenable from the concentrated fire of artillery which the enemy poured upon it. As a number of men in these works have been missing since the battle there is no doubt that they were here killed, wounded, or taken prisoners.

          The enemy now advanced in force upon the two-gun battery, pouring a continuous fire of artillery and musketry upon the position, which compelled its evacuation. Here Lieut. W. W. Arnold, commanding Company G, was killed while gallantly cheering on his men. Capt. Thomas D. Horn, of Company D, was also wounded here. Captain Horn was taken to the rear, but we were unable to carry away the body of Lieutenant Arnold. A portion of the regiment was rallied after this by myself and Major Baldy, and a number of the men joined other regiments near the front and did good service while the action lasted. At midnight I marched the regiment toward Ship Point, where we halted and remained all next day, July 1. During the action that day we were kept in reserve under arms with the Third Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps.

          JOHN H. TAGGART. Colonel, Commanding Twelfth Regiment P. R. V. C.

          So much for the weekend reading assignment. :p
          [B]Charles Heath[/B]
          [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]heath9999@aol.com[/EMAIL]

          [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Spanglers_Spring_Living_History/"]12 - 14 Jun 09 Hoosiers at Gettysburg[/URL]

          [EMAIL="heath9999@aol.com"]17-19 Jul 09 Mumford/GCV Carpe Eventum [/EMAIL]

          [EMAIL="beatlefans1@verizon.net"]31 Jul - 2 Aug 09 Texans at Gettysburg [/EMAIL]

          [EMAIL="JDO@npmhu.org"] 11-13 Sep 09 Fortress Monroe [/EMAIL]

          [URL="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Elmira_Death_March/?yguid=25647636"]2-4 Oct 09 Death March XI - Corduroy[/URL]

          [EMAIL="oldsoldier51@yahoo.com"] G'burg Memorial March [/EMAIL]

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: The Federal point of view

            Attached is a letter written by a member of the 4th PRC that was printed in a local Pennsylvania newspaper. It includes a detailed casualty list for one company of the regiment. What struck me is that the majority of the wounds seem to have occured in the lower half of the body, suggesting the Rebs were aiming low.

            Eric
            Attached Files
            Eric J. Mink
            Co. A, 4th Va Inf
            Stonewall Brigade

            Help Preserve the Slaughter Pen Farm - Fredericksburg, Va.

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            • #7
              Re: The Federal point of view

              Eric:

              Considering we are probably talking .69 smooth-bores from the 47th Va perspective, it could be a couple of other things.

              Aimed at the soldiers head, the sub-sonic ball could drop significantly in a fairly short distance. Since the sights on a smooth-bore are nonexistent, there may not have been any real ability to compensate for the ballistic inadequacies.

              Another possibility would be that the 4th was at a distance, let's say 200 yards. Even if the muskets were elevated, the arc of the falling bullet may likely cause wounds in the knee to thigh area.

              Our experimentation with live-fire of smooth-bores, and some period accounts, indicate the darned things were mostly hope and prayer over 80 yards.

              We are really looking forward to seeing you guys traipsing on this turf. Beautiful stuff.
              Ley Watson
              POC'R Boys Mess of the Columbia Rifles

              [B][I]"The man who complains about the way the ball bounces is likely the one who dropped it."[/I][/B]

              [I]Coach Lou Holtz[/I]

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