Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

[Charles Heath]

Date: 10-12 October 2008
Name: Battle of Bristoe Station
Location: Bristoe Station Battlefield, Pr. William County, VA
Sponsor/Host: 1st Minnesota Vol. Inf.
Capacity: Two small battalions
POC: James Owens
Email: JDO@npmhu.org
Website: http://bristoe.1stminnd.org/
Forum: None
Listserver: None
Registration: Opens February 1, 2008.
Preservation Component: TBA
Notes: "The goal of this event is to recreate some of the sights and sounds of the October 1863 campaign in Northern Virginia, for both participants and the visiting public. This will be a campaign oriented event, with a 4-5 miles march for the opposing forces, followed by a recreation of part of the battle. Following the battle recreation, the event will focus on post battle activities that both armies engaged in by participants, using the official record and first hand accounts."

[GeraldTodd]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

website: http://bristoe.1stminnd.org

[GeraldTodd]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Registration is open and operating via snailmail and online (PayPal).

http://bristoe.1stminnd.org

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Folks,

The CS march route will parallel the same route taken by A. P. Hill's Corps on the morning of October 14, 1863 from Greenwich to what eventually would be the battlefield that afternoon at Bristoe Station. The length of the march is 8 miles and a portion will be on unpaved terrain. No hills here, just the opportunity to recreate the history of an often overlooked battle.

The CS camp for Friday night will be in the vicinity of Greenwich on a 85 acre farm with both open fields and wooded areas. All particulars are found on the website. Registration/check-in will occur at the battlefield. Directions to the Friday night camp will be provided then. Any questions, shoot!

[JStiles]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

I'm really looking forward to this event. There's going to be a march, recreation of a portion of the battle, picket scenario (both on the original ground) and living history activities. The CS side is taking shape with groups such as the North State Rifles, Liberty Rifles, Princess Anne Grays, Chesapeake Volunteer Guard and Stonewall Brigade slated to attend. Should be a great event.........Jerry Stiles

[Enfilade]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Yes! I'm glad to see this website up. If there was ever a need for high visibility to the public and preservation surrounding this original site, this is surely it. We did a LH year before last at the site. Urban sprawl has edged right up to this area and threatens it's very existence. Definitely a worthwhile place. The 27th NC was the lead company of Hill's Corps when Warren's troops raked them at the railroad tracks. Many Confederate dead buried nearby as well. Quality groups of CS and Excellent Feds. Should be a top notch event!

Mark Berrier
North State Rifles

http://www.northstaterifles.com

[DougCooper]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Registration and payment via paypal took approximately 85 seconds. Well done you guys. Been many moons since we in the 1st Minn marched down the tracks from Catlett to Bristoe in the steps of Warren's troops (we would likely get arrested today!). Back then it had changed little since the war. Not so today. Time to stand up, march and witness for this hallowed ground. Kudoes to you boys for working so hard in support of the park and CWPT to save it. A truly remarkable preservation victory with a few laps to go, so let's donate some greenbacks, shoe leather and quality campaigning.

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Hon.JAMES A.SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Near Madison Court-House, October 11,1863.

SIR: Yesterday I moved the army into this position with the hope of getting an opportunity to strike a blow at the enemy. I regretted to hear that it was announced in one of the Richmond papers of yesterday that this army was is motion and has crossed the Rapidan. All such publications are injurious to us. We have difficulties enough to overcome interposed by our enemies without having them augmented by our friends. I wish you could impress upon the editors the importance of rejecting from their papers all mention of military movements until the results has been obtained. The announcement was erroneous, but still that information received by the enemy would serve to place him upon his guard.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R.E.LEE,
General.


Hon.JAMES A.SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS, Near Warrenton Springs, October 13,1863.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that General Meade's army has been compelled to retire north of the Rappahannock by the movements of this army upon his right flank. I am still moving, with the views of throwing him farther back toward Washington. Two division have already crossed the Rappahannock at this place and the remainder are now following. The enemy were apprised of our movements and withdrew so rapidly that we have not been able to come up with his main body, that there have been a number of encounters between his cavalry and that of General Stuart, in which the latter has been uniformly successful, capturing more than 600 prisoners and inflicting serious damage upon the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R.E.LEE,
General.

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Hon.SECRETARY OF WAR,
Richmond, Va.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, October 16,1863.

SIR: The enemy has taken a position east of Bull Run, where he is reported to be intrenching. His main body is about Centreville, his depots near Fairfax Court-House. I could easily turn his position, and if he still unwilling to engage in battle, could force him to retire to the fortifications around Alexandria. I do not, however, think it advantageous to attack him in his intrenchments, nor do I see any benefit to be derived from pursuing him farther. If I advanced beyond this point I should be obliged to go to Loudoun to obtain supplies. This would carry me so far from Richmond, and the condition of the roads and stage of the streams at this season of the year are so uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous, as the army might be required in some other quarter; besides, the men are poorly provided with clothes, shoes, blankets, and overcoats, and I am unwilling to subject them to the suffering that might ensue.

The enemy in retreating from the Rappahannock completely destroyed the bridge over that river, blowing up one of the piers. It would take me a long time to rebuild it. I can therefore make no use of the railroad. I have destroyed the bridges over Cub Run this side of Manassas Junction, over Broad Run at this place, and Cedar Run south of Catlett's Station, and torn up the track between the points named, burning the ties and bending the rails. The water stations have also been destroyed, and I shall continue the destruction of the road to the Rappahannock. It may prevent the return of the enemy to that river this winter. A severe easterly storm has been raging all day. The ground is saturated with water and the streams are much swollen. Unless I see that some good will be obtained by remaining here longer, I shall return to the Rappahannock.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R.E.LEE,
General.



His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President Confederate States.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Bristoe Station, October 17,1863.

MR.PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you that, with the view of bringing on an engagement with the army of General Meade, which lay around Culpeper Court-House, extending thence to the Rapidan, this army marched on the 9th instant by way of Madison Court-House, and arrived near Culpeper on the 11th. The enemy retired toward the Rappahannock at the railroad bridge, declining battle, and removing all his stores. I determined to make another effort to reach him, and moved through Warrenton toward the railroad north of the Rappahannock. The enemy had several direct roads by which he retired, while we were compelled to march by a more circuitous route. We only succeeded in coming up with a portion of his rear guard at this place on the 14th instant, with which a severe skirmish ensued, but without any decisive or satisfactory result.

During the night of the 14th the enemy continued his retreat, and is now reported to be fortifying at Centreville. I do not deem it advisable to attack him in his intrenchments, or to force him farther back by turning his present position, as he could quickly reach the fortifications around Washington and Alexandria, which we are not prepared to invest. Should I advance farther, I should be compelled to go to Loudon for subsistence for the army, this region being entirely destitute, and the enemy having made the railroad useless to us by the complete destruction of the Rappahannock bridge. Such a movement would take us too far from other points where the army might be needed, and the want of clothing, shoes, blankets, and overcoats would entail great suffering upon our men. I can see not benefit to be derived from remaining where we are, and shall consequently return to the line of the Rappahannock.

The railroad bridges over Cub Run, Broad Run, and Cedar Run have been destroyed, and the track torn up from the first-mentioned point back toward the Rappahannock, the ties burnt, and the rails bent. The destruction will be continued as far as the river, and may prevent another advance of the enemy in this direction this season.

We have captured about 1,600 prisoners, and inflicted some additional loss upon the enemy in the various skirmishes that have occurred since the movement began. Our own loss was slight, except in the action at this place, where it was quite severe, and I regret to add that five pieces of artillery belonging to Hill's corps were captured. The particulars have not yet been officially reported to me, but shall communicated as soon as received.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R.E.LEE,
General.

[DougCooper]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Thanks Phil. This campaign has always fascinated me, as much for how history has minimized this period as well as for what happened.

This is some excellent spin from the big guy (Lee):

We only succeeded in coming up with a portion of his rear guard at this place on the 14th instant, with which a severe skirmish ensued, but without any decisive or satisfactory result.

I'll say - and it would only get worse on Nov 7.

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Doug,

Yes, Lee certainly downplayed the tragedy that struck A. P. Hill's Corps at Bristoe Station to J. Davis. Here is the official record from the impetuous A. P. Hill. Soon we'll take a look at the Federal side of things.

Colonel R.H.CHILTON,
Asst.Adjt. and Insp.General , Army of Northern Virginia.


HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, October 26,1863.


COLONEL: I have the honor to state that on the morning of the 14th instant I left my camp, 1 mile distant from Warrenton, on the Amissville turnpike, at 5 a.m., and in obedience to orders from the general commanding took the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike until reaching Broad Run Church, then took the road by Greenwich and on to Bristoe Station, the division of Major-General Anderson leading. Upon arriving at Broad Run Church, information reached me from various sources that the enemy were moving by a road leading from Greenwich to the Warrenton and Alexandria pike and coming into a mile below Buckland. The rumbling of wagons, which could be distinctly heard, led me to place reliance on these reports. General Anderson was directed to take his division down the turnpike toward Buckland, and, if possible, to strike this column at the point where it came into the pike. If nothing could be accomplished, then to turn off and rejoin me at Greenwich.

In the meantime I moved on the road to Greenwich with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, leaving one battery and Scales' brigade at Buckland to guard the train which had been directed to halt there.

General Anderson, in the execution of my orders, found the force referred to to be of cavalry, that it had already disappeared and that Major General Fitz.Lee had come up with his cavalry on my left flank. Colonel Rosser, of his advance, having skirmished with the enemy and driven them back, rejoined me at Greenwich, following Heth's division. From this point to Bristoe we followed close upon the rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march toward Manassas. I determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division, forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and parallel to Broad Run. Pouague's battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken completely by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until reaching the run, and then to move by the flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly
obeyed when I perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division.Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of Heth's division, to look out for his right flank, and he very promptly changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back.

In the meantime I sent back to General Anderson to send McIntosh's battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened and protect the right flank of Heth. The head of Anderson's column appearing, Heth was now ordered to advance again and carry out the original order. Davis' brigade, of Heth's division, had been detached as a support to Poague's battalion. The three brigades (Cooke's, Kirkland's, and Walker's) advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily. Cooke's brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware.

The position was, an exceedingly strong one, and covered by the direct and enfilading fire of batteries on the rising ground in rear. A portion of Cooke's brigade became hotly engaged, and of course it became impossible to execute his original order to move by the left flank. Kirkland, finding Cooke engaged, also swung around his left and gallantly charged to Cooke's assistance. McIntosh's battalion had before this been ordered by me to take a position overlooking the railroad and station, and in rear of Cooke's left. Poague's battalion was ordered to take another position and open fire on the battery which was enfilading Kirkland's line. This was not done as quickly as I expected, and Kirkland's line was exposed to a very deliberate and destructive fire; nevertheless, it continued to advance, and gained the railroad, clearing it for a time of the enemy. About this time Generals Cooke and Kirkland were both wounded, and their fall at this critical moment had a serious influence upon the fortunes of the combat. Their men were unable to stand the heavy fire which was poured them and commenced falling back (the tree right regiments of Cooke's brigade) in good order.

Walker had crossed Broad Run in pursuance of the original order. Anderson had been sent to the right to look out for the threatened right flank, and no support was immediately available, Wilcox's division not having yet come up. The infantry falling back, the left of Cooke's brigade passed through McIntosh's guns, and the enemy pressing on the guns, five in number were immediately seized, and run down the hill under protection of the enemy's artillery and line of battle. General Walker, upon being informed of the perilous condition of the guns, immediately sent forward a regiment and drove off the enemy, but the guns had disappeared. Dark came upon us before new dispositions could be made to attack, and during the night the enemy retreated.

Brigadier-General Posey was seriously wounded by a shell in the early part of the action.

In conclusion, I am convinced that I made the attack too hastily, and at the same time that a delay of half an hour, and there would have been no enemy to attack. In that event I believe I should equally have blamed myself for not attacking at once.

I inclose my official report of killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A.P.HILL,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding Third Corps.

[JStiles]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Hey Phil,
Any mention on the Federal side of the effect of their first volley on the Confederates? I'm wondering if there's any mention of an audible moan going up from the CS ranks. I've read of this happening several times during the war when troops were completely surprised and decimated by the first volley of the enemy. I believe I remember reading this happened at Gettysburg during Iverson's blind assualt...Looking forward to this event....Jerry Stiles

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Jer - Nothing I have found mentioned it. A. P. Hill, Cooke, and Kirkland had observed the Federal skirmishers on the CS side of the railroad track as both brigades were moving towards the ford over Broad Run (1/2 mile north of Bristoe Station). The right most regiment of Cooke's Brigade was sent out as skirmishers to quell this threat. A. P. Hill also called up two brigades of Anderson's Division and ordered them to advance upon Cooke's right. Before they could get into position, both Cooke and Kirkland realized that they would be struck on their flank by the II Corps that was concealed behind the railroad. They changed direction to meet this threat. The result was a devastating loss to both brigades, not to mention a hard blow to the psyche of one A. P. Hill.

[Cornfed]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

Report of Major General Henry Heth, C.S.Army, commanding division.

Captain W.N.STARKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS HETH'S DIVISION, October 24,1863.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the 14th instant:

The division moved from camp near Warrenton at 5.30 a.m. on the 14th instant, following General Anderson's division. When within a mile of New Baltimore, orders were received to pass General Anderson's artillery by keeping to the right, as it was designed that my division should follow a different road. After passing through New Baltimore, and about a mile and a half or less from the village, I was, directed to take a right-hand road, which proved to be a cross-road leading to Bristoe Station, via Greenwich. Just before reaching Greenwich some 200 stragglers of the Third Corps, Federal Army, were captured. A desultory fire of artillery was heard from just after daybreak, apparently on our right, and continued during the entire day.

It was ascertained at Greenwich that a corps of the enemy had encamped there the night previous, the last of this corps leaving about 8 a.m. on the 14th. From Greenwich we pressed on by the most direct road to Bristoe Station, picking up a number of stragglers on the road. When within a mile and a half of Bristoe Station I was directed by General A.P.Hill to form three brigades of my division in line of battle perpendicular to the road on which we were advancing, holding the Fourth Brigade as a reserve, which was to continue its march by the flank. Cooke's brigade (leading) was formed on the right of the road, its left resting on the road. Kirkland was put in position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road and forming a continuous line with Cooke. Walker was directed to form on Kirkland's left. Davis' brigade was held in reserve in the road.

Kirkland had not quite completed the formation of his line, when orders were received from General Hill to push on with the two brigades then in line (Cooke's and Kirkland's), informing me at the same time that the enemy were retreating rapidly and that expedition was necessary. Walker's brigade was at this time in rear of Kirkland, his right resting in rear of Kirkland's right. General Walker was informed of the change and directed to form on Kirkland's left, if possible, as Kirkland moved forward.

The order was now given to advance. On reaching a cleared space some 200 or 300 yards in our front the enemy was discovered about three-quarters of a mile in front of Kirkland's left. A few shots from one of Poague's batteries threw them into much confusion, and all that were in sight retreated in disorder across Broad Run. On seeing this General Hill directed me to move by the left flank, cross Broad Run, and attack the fugitives. This order was given and my line halted for the left to commence the flank movement. Before this movement was commenced information was received that a heavy column of the enemy had appeared on our right. I asked General Hill whether the flank movement should continue. He directed that it should be deferred for the present. Some ten minutes afterward I received orders to move forward.

About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward. This was reported to General Hill, who informed me that General Anderson's division had been, or would be, ordered to the right. General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced. Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left. The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style. The skirmishers soon became engaged. The enemy's strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, Engineer Corps. As subsequently shown, it proved to be Warren's, Second Army Corps.

Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods. On seeing our advance the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad Run and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some 30 or 40 feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery. The railroad cut and embankment at the foot of the hill gave him perfect protection for his infantry.

In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad Run. These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.

As Kirkland moved forward his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut near Broad Run. He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits, &c.,) that were in his front. When in the railroad cut his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut and were captured.

General Cooke was wounded early in the action. When within some 500 yards of the railroad, his brigade halted and commenced firing. It subsequently charged up to within 40 yards of the railroad embankment, but was driven back, being exposed not only to a heavy fire from the enemy behind the railroad embankment, but also to a fire on its right flank. The enemy's batteries, during the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, completely swept the field over which the advance was made. As soon as Cooke's brigade gave way, I ordered General Davis to form his brigade on Cooke's right, thus protecting Cooke from a flank movement.

During the advance of Cooke and Kirkland a battery belonging to McIntosh's battalion, Anderson's division, was ordered to take position on a hill about 500 or 600 yard from the railroad, and about opposite Kirkland's right flank and Cooke's left. This battery was captured by the enemy. I was ignorant of the fact that a battery had been ordered to occupy this position until it had been taken. A knowledge of its position on my part, however, would not have saved it, as it would not have been deemed necessary to have furnished a special support for it, so long as the two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) were in its front. On receiving information that the enemy's skirmishers were approaching the battery, and that it was in danger, a regiment was ordered to its support, but arrived on the ground after give guns had been taken off.

During the advance of Kirkland, Walker gained ground to the left, crossing Broad Run. Finding that Kirkland's left was gaining ground to the right, General Walker recrossed the run. Before he could form on Kirkland's left, Kirkland had been driven back. General Walker during the rest of the engagement supported a battery from Poague's battalion, placed on a hill about 700 or 800 yards from the railroad. The engagement was over before either Walker or Davis could be brought into action.

After the repulse of Cooke and Kirkland, I reformed my line and advanced again to within about 500 yards of the railroad, where I remained during the night. No second attack was ordered, as I was convinced that the position of the enemy was too strong to be attacked in front. The position now occupied enabled me to avail myself of an opportunity to resume the attack, in the event of an attack being made on the enemy's left flank by General Ewell's troops or others.

I deem it but just to the troops commanded by Generals Cooke and Kirkland to say that with the exception of one regiment, all behaved well under the circumstances. It must be born in mind that when the attack was made by Cooke and Kirkland, the enemy's force in front was unknown. It turned out that a much larger force was in our front than was supposed - one, if not the greater portion of two entire corps. The position accidentally occupied by the enemy was as strong, or stronger, naturally and artificially, than military art could have made it by many hours' work. The enemy's left flank extended probably a mile or three-quarters to my right. He was not compelled to maneuver to get into position. Marching by the flank he was already in line of battle, protected by a railroad embankment at a convenient height to shelter his men, with hills in his rear admirably adapted to render effective his numerous batteries.

No military man who has examined the ground, or who understands the position and the disproportionate number of the contending forces, would attach blame to these two brigades for meeting with a repulse. My confidence in these troops in not shaken by the result, and I feel satisfied on fields to come they will vindicate the high reputation they have gained on many a hard-fought battle-field. Had they succeeded in driving the enemy in their front before them, and carried the hills beyond the railroad, it is probable the two brigades would have been captured by the enemy unengaged on their right.

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the lieutenant-general commanding the gallantry displayed by Generals Cooke and Kirkland, both of whom were severely wounded. I regret that in the absence of the reports of brigade and regimental commanders I am unable to name of the officers who deserve special mention for good conduct.

A report of the casualties is inclosed. My thanks are due to my personal staff.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H.HETH,
Major-General.

[Mississippian]

Re: Bristoe Station 10-12 October 08

I wish I could make this event. My GGG-Grandfather, Pvt. William H. McDonald of Co. H, 26th North Carolina was wounded at Bristoe Station and spent a month in the hospital afterwards. Too bad Mississippi is so far away and gas is so high.....

Will MacDonald