The Race to Knoxville

[Coatsy]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

"Marvin/Del doesn't steal the tires off my horseless carriage before I get up there,"

Man, Del always gets a bad rap.

[NewHopeChurch]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

"Marvin/Del doesn't steal the tires off my horseless carriage before I get up there,"

Man, Del always gets a bad rap.

You didn't trek to Louisiana and back with him in the car. :tounge_sm

[Biped of Pandemonium]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

SCAR has pledged support of this effort to fill out the 2nd MI. Sounds like Sean and Greg have found a dandy reproduction fort. The video of the fort looks pretty good from what I can see.

Jim Butler

Greg, A pard of mine recomended that I post a message on here to let you know that I did not know of the event until registration was closed and I would like to go down with my mess (Furious 5) who will be in Kieves Co.

[suspenderless pard]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

One more week. :)

[Madison Barnett]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

I thought you guys might like this photo. This shows the view of the artillery pieces and looking out at the hills beyond. The view from the original fort would have been very similar, except they had cut down all of the trees!!
The phot was taken by Randy Seals last fall.

[Chad Wrinn]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

Will there be artillery pieces present at the event I sure hope that they will be?

[Madison Barnett]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

My dad says there should be at least two pieces, but I don't know.

[suspenderless pard]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

The word that I have as of now is that there will be 1 piece in the fort with the garrison troops. There may be another come, but probably just 1. With the obstacles :wink_smil that the confederates will have to negotiate, you had better keep your heads down. See you all Friday.

[Greg Barnett]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

THE DEFENSE OF KNOXVILLE.

BY ORLANDO M. POE, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U.S.A.
From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 3 pp. 731-45

"The wet, foggy, and generally disagreeable weather of the preceding days still continued, when, at about 11 o'clock on the night of the 28th, our picket lines in front of Fort Sanders were attacked with such spirit as to indicate an important movement, and after sharp skirmishing for some length of time were finally carried. This was, in fact, the prelude to an assault upon the main work, and had for its immediate effect to put us on the alert and keep us in readiness for the serious business, which we knew was close at hand.
The enemy's arrangements for the assault provided that it be made in two columns, from McLaws' division, directed against the north-west angle of Fort Sanders, the one on the left to be composed of Wofford's brigade, in column of regiments, with the 16th Georgia leading; while the other, formed in like order, was to consist of Humphreys' brigade, led by the 13th Mississippi, and closely followed by three regiments of Bryan's brigade. The attack was to be made with fixed bayonets, without cheering or firing a shot, and the men were to be urged to rush forward with a determination to succeed. The sharp shooters were to keep up a continuous fire into the embrasures of the fort and along the adjacent works, to prevent the use of artillery against the assaulting force and to disturb the fire of all arms. Anderson's brigade, following the main attack, was to carry the works about a hundred yards to the left, and, in case the assault on Fort Sanders should prove successful, was then to wheel to the left, and, followed by Benning's and Jenkins's brigades, sweep down our lines to the eastward. But if the main attack should fail, Anderson was to wheel to the right and endeavor to carry Fort Sanders from the rear. Kershaw's brigade was to advance to the assault of the works on the right of the fort as soon as it had fallen. The unassigned brigades of McLaws' and Jenkins's divisions, together with the brigades of Bushrod Johnson and Gracie, were to be held in readiness to follow up any success. Thus the plan of assault had been well studied, carefully elaborated, and clearly formulated. The preparations for resisting it were the wire entanglements already described, a slight abatis, the strong profile of Fort Sanders, and the arrangements for both a direct and a cross fire in front of the salient not only from the garrison of the fort itself, but also from the troops occupying the adjacent entrenchments.

Fort Sanders was laid out in strict accordance with the rules for constructing bastioned earth-works, but upon shorter exterior lines than were desirable. It was built upon an irregular quadrilateral of which western side was 95 yards, the northern 125 yards, the eastern 85 yards, and the southern 125 yards; the northwestern bastion being traced in the right angle between the first two sides. The western front was completed, and the two adjoining ones had been carried far enough to give us the advantage of their flanking arrangements. The eastern front had been intentionally left open. Provision had been made by pan-coupes for an artillery fire along the capitals of the two completed bastions, and a 12-pounder gun had been placed in the one attacked. The trace of the interior crest was so located on the slopes of the hill that when a parade of about forty feet in width had been formed, the undisturbed ground behind it served some of the minor purposes of a traverse. The ditch was made twelve feet wide at the bastion faces, and from six to eight feet in depth, depending upon the accidents of the ground, the average being about seven feet. The result of this location of the interior crest and depth of ditch was an unusually high relief to the work, especially at the northwestern bastion. The scarps were practically vertical, and the berme at the foot of the exterior slope was cut away. The counterscarps were continued until they intersected, and all the material between them and the curtain excavated to the general level of the bottom of the ditch, thus obviating all dead angles. A banquette was formed in the counterscarp at the north western salient, of sufficient extent for the location of about forty men, whose fire could be delivered in the direction of the capital. In addition to the ordinary flank fire, three 12-pounders were so located in notches in the immediate eastward extension of the northern front as to admit of their firing into the left flank of the assaulting column; and a fire, more or less efficient, could be delivered over the same ground from our entrenchments as far eastward as Battery Zoellner. A similar fire into their front and right flank was obtained from our lines to the southward of Fort Sanders as far as Battery Noble.

The garrison of Fort Sanders at the time of the assault, usually estimated at about 500 men, consisted of Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries and one section of Roemer's (four 20-pounder Parrotts, six 12-pounder Napoleons, and two 8-inch rifled guns), and an infantry force made up of some 120 men of the 79th New York, 75 men of the 29th Massachusetts, 60 men of the 2d Michigan, and 80 men of the 20th Michigan. About forty men of the 2d Michigan, under command of Captain Charles H. Hodskin, occupied the banquette in the counterscarp salient as long as the position was tenable, and then ran through the ditch to the southward; they entered the fort around the southeastern angle as they had been instructed to do, and took further part in the defense.

The number actually within the fort at the moment of the supreme struggle and repulse probably did not exceed 440 men. The discrepancy arises from the different ways of reckoning the limits of the fort, due to the open eastern front. The smaller estimate includes only the troops that were within the bastioned trace. Yet some very effective work was done against the assaulting column by the fire coming from the intrenchments beyond the original Fort Sanders, and it has always seemed to me only fair that troops delivering this fire should be counted in estimating the strength of the garrison, in which case the total would be increased to more than three times the number given."


Regards,

[Greg Barnett]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

The last installment:

THE DEFENSE OF KNOXVILLE.

BY ORLANDO M. POE, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U.S.A.
From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 3 pp. 731-45

About 6 a. m. on Sunday, November 29th, the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire upon Fort Sanders, to which no reply was made, because our limited supply of ammunition made it necessary to reserve it for use at a more critical moment. The fire continued for about twenty minutes and then slackened; whereupon, the columns moved to the assault, and were at once met by all the fire that could be concentrated upon them from our lines. Encountering the wire entanglements, their organization was somewhat disturbed, but the movement was not seriously checked thereby, nor did the slight abatis retard it. Although suffering from the terribly destructive fire to which they were subjected, they soon reached the outer brink of the ditch. There could be no pause at that point, and, leaping into the ditch in such numbers as nearly to fill it, they endeavored to scale the walls. Having no scaling-ladders, a portion of the men, scrambling over the shoulders of their comrades, planted the battle-flags of the 18th and 17th Mississippi and the 16th Georgia upon the parapet, but every man who rallied to them was either killed or captured, and the flags were taken.
Meanwhile those who remained in the ditch found themselves under a deadly flank fire of musketry and canister, supplemented by shells thrown as hand-grenades from inside the fort, without the slightest possibility of returning a blow. Advance and retreat were about equally difficult, and it needed but a very short exposure to convince them that if any were to leave the ditch alive it could only be by the promptest surrender. Those who were able to walk were brought through the ditch to the southeastern angle and there entered our lines as prisoners. Such of the assaulting forces as had not entered the ditch fell back, at first sullenly and slowly, but flesh and blood could not stand the storm of shot and shell that was poured upon them, and they soon broke in confused retreat.
The assault had been gallantly made, but was repulsed in little more time than is required to describe it. When the result became apparent Longstreet directed the withdrawal of the supporting brigade, but the order did not reach Anderson in time to prevent his troops from pushing on as though the assault had been successful. They swerved, however, somewhat to their left, and attacked a short distance to the eastward of the designated point, only to meet with as decided, though not so bloody, a repulse.
The assaulting columns were rallied under partial cover some five or six hundred yards from Fort Sanders and there reorganized, but no further open attempt to carry our lines was made.
Many reasons have been assigned for the failure of this assault, and there is some difference of opinion in regard to the matter. Some of those opposed to us, of unquestioned ability and fairness, have attributed it to the warning given us by taking our picket line the night before, the insufficient use of their artillery, and the improper direction taken by two of the columns, resulting in their intermingling and consequent confusion. The opinion has been confidently expressed that a subsequent assault would have been successful. All this assumes, first, that we were not already vigilant and waiting for the attack; second, that a heavy and continued artillery fire would have greatly damaged and demoralized us; third, that the confusion arising from the convergence of the advancing columns would not have occurred again; fourth, that the works were "very faulty in plan and very easy to take by a properly managed assault"; and last, but not least, that the troops of the enemy were better than ours. The first of these assumptions is erroneous; the second greatly exaggerated; the third might have been verified, but again might not; the fourth is correct only within the limits and to the extent already explained; and the last has no evidence to sustain it.


See everyone on Friday. Travel safely.

[Pvt. Middleton]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

These installments have greatly helped me understand the Union side of this Siege. I love the detail Gen. Poe puts into showing just how bloody and devestating the Assault upon Fort Sanders was to the Confederate forces there.

See everyone Friday! Be safe on your way down to Knoxville everyone.

[Jon The Beloved]

Re: The Race to Knoxville

Friends,

I am in the market for a good ground cloth - painted or oiled - one that can be justified for both my impressions: Western Fed and Western Confed (for now). I do not have one in my collection at this point. I'd love to grab one to use this weekend. SO.. If you're attending Race To Knoxville and have something to offer me, I'd be willing to pay a reasonable price for it. PM me if you can help me this weekend please.

Thanks.