Firing on the move: Infantry in line

[RJSamp]

Many accounts of the ACW speak of veteran regiments firing whilst on the move. Monocacy Junction and Fort Stephens (the one where Old Abe almost got hisself shot) both featured this awe inspiring tactical manuever....and am sure a few dozen other battles featured it. (My Monocacy battle book is at home, I can get the citation later).

Am visualizing a slightly slower pace.....loaded weapon soldiers moving to the front.....firing...and then being overtaken by rear rankSS....loading at the trail whilst moving....moving to the front again...repeat.

Is there any safe way to reenact this? Have any of you drilled/experimented with it? Would be interested in any foibles overcome.

[Robert A Mosher]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

Rj -

I can only assume you mean they would actually stop when they pulled the trigger - but otherwise, it seems to me that you are describing the skirmisher drill. My unit has practiced these movements, including loading while on the march, and has used them both in tacticals and in reenactments.

Robert A. Mosher

[stx]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

I think this tactic was made popular when fighting Indians. We did the extensivly on both advancing and retreating at one event and it was always called Indian tactics. Maybe it was the indians that did it, I'm not sure.

[markj]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

R. J. --

Maybe you've already read this?

http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABK4014-0029-77

Yours truly, &c.,

Mark Jaeger

[Rob]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

This is described under "Instructions for Skirmishers" (Article III, Section 2, para. 111, "To Fire Marching"). Casey's Infantry Tactics, 1862.

[erik]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

Firing on the Move;
I am a great fan of this particular tactic/event. I describe it as an event, since I believe it was in fact a spontaneous reaction to the frustration of being fired at with no command intervention. Once a unit became involved in a fire fight the overwhelming desire must have been to get in there and finish it because the way home was through the ranks opposing you.
In the Bloody Crucible of Courage, by Brent Noseworthy, an engagment at Labiedeville LA involving a Conn. Unit devolved into a spontaneous example of the tactic you raise, pp 8 - 12.
The tactic worked, acheiving moral ascendancy though inflicting few casualties.
I have been fascinated by this action as I appreciate the developing reaction to fire by the Federal soldier; get down , loosen your files and independent fire once engaged.
I have been schooled in the Rifle Regiment tactics of the British and Canadian Rifles units and this sits well with me. The trust in the individual to understand the mission and employ his fire effectivley is at the root of the tradition.
Union and Confedrate soldiers learned early on that the path to survival lay in dispersion and rapid fire.
Dispersion opens the files. Rapid fire, independent is best, gives moral ascendancy.
I am presently in the midst of a discussion about this on the CGAR website, which appears to be a long drawn out affair as my primary protaganist is a fan of the first empire tactics of column against line. To that I must say, Waterloo.
I am sure that there are no manuals that dictate these movements or firing modes though they did happen early on in the war.
The throwing of massed columns at an objective, as at Fredricksburg, or later by the Heavy Artillery Units after the Wilderness, were only tragic failures by poor appreciations or bloody mindedness.
The employment of file fire soon eclipsed by independent fire is a tactic used in the war. Set piece attacks were delivered by a volley and a charge were common. Often times the soldiers were ordered to advance with unloaded rifles. Nice idea if you did not have put your body on the line. A loose fire and continuous advance became the norm in many engagements.
To put it simply, if someone shoots at me I will seek cover, if required to advance I will take care to cover myself and return fire as rapidly as I can.
What a novel idea that harks back to the creation of the Royal American Regiment and Rogers Rangers.
American soldiers soon learned that the French tactics suited to the plains of Europe and North Africa did not work in Virginia.
The tactic is a battle winner. It has nothing to do with skirmishing, which is a totally different art form. I must admit this is the other side of my coin.
Last year at Milton Ontario, one of the largest reenactments in Canada,(Yes we actually do this up here.) I skirmished with my company for 40 minutes on the defence and took Johhny out in 20 minutes in the assault by using continuous fire by file and aggressive skirmishing.
A spectator emailled me that he had never seen anything so violent.
More numbers more violence.
The tactic to appear spontanious requires great control and discipline and must be very carefully practised.
It is an instance that was a fact of life which must be controlled for safety and presentation.
Once learned it is easy.
I shall not disclose the essentials as those Rebs might be listening.

Erik Simundson, Captain
Co. C 4th Michigan Volunteer Infantry

[Jimmayo]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

If I am not mistaken the firing on the move at Ft. Stevens and Monocacy was done by CS Sharpshooters. The fighting at those locations is described in "Shock Troops of the Confederacy" by Fred Ray.

See the thread below.

http://www.authentic-campaigner.com/forum/showthread.php?t=10753&highlight=sharpshooters

[john duffer]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

"Is there any safe way to reenact this? Have any of you drilled/experimented with it? Would be interested in any foibles overcome."

RJ

While not exactly what you are describing (and an answer better suited for the Sinks than Authenticity Discussion no doubt), I've halted briefly and fired one rank, advanced far enough for that rank to reload on the move, halted and fired the other rank, repeat as needed. I don't have any historical justification for it but it seems to be very effictive in the world of imaginary bullets.

[erik]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

My method,
I have tried this tactic with the full understanding of its actual spontaneous origin. It is not found in any drill book US or foreign. it is perhaps the Civil War equivilent of the Mad Minute.
Given the frustration of receiving fire with out the order to reply and the very early learned response to open files and take cover it is understandable that such fire and movement would occur.
The Highland Brigade at the Battle of the Alma, during the Crimean War, advanced steadily fire continously and drove many times their numbers out of the redoubts opposing them.
The lessons of superior fire production and slight dispersion were not lost on the Federal soldier nor on his Confederate opponent.
It became common practice to open files and fire as rapidly as possible.
The reference I have mentioned is an example of what could be acheived.
How can we do it?
With very careful training. What was spotaneous becomes carefull controlled drill.
This can arise by determining the objective; a company/battalion advancing and independently firing its way onto the objective under total control of the commander.
The means, Training.
First, each member must be accomplished in the shcool of the soldier and company.
Second, each file closer must be alert and well drilled to watch the activities to his front.
Third, dry training and lots of it.
Fourth, wet training and lots of it.
Fifth, each member must clearly understand his role and the overall roll of the company/ battalion.
Sixth, the companies must be tauight to open files to at least a one pace interval, something that the originals did automatically on coming under fire. This will vary as at the company level they should open from the center, the ight file goingleft and the left files to the left. Rear files should then uncover to their right and lock up toight to their front rank files.
A file fire from the right should then be ordered. When the fire has degenerated to an an independent fire, an oder to advance in common time shoulod be given.
The whole then advance firing alternatley by rank and keeping up a continuous fire dismaying the enemy.
Each soldier, while reloading, should place the musket under his left elbow close to his side with the muzzle elevated and under control. While capping the muzzle is well to the front and clear of his front rank. The barrel can become quite hot during this rapid fire and the solution is to grasp the sling and lock the left elbow tighter. Each rank will know when the other is capping and while advancing awaiting their turn to fire will keep their dressing.
This takes training and great supervision on the part of the file closers.
These are comments based upon my experience and must be practiced with care and the full understanding of the dangers involved.
I niether promote nor recommend this practice to others unless they are completely confident in the musketry skills of their members.
If employed with care and caution this can demonstrate a real aspect of tactics in the War.
Authentic? Yes as practised in the field and spontanious.
My method? No. Buit a means of demonstrating the method with safety and control.

Erik Simundson
4th Michigan, Co. C

[Rob Weaver]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

In my younger days in California, we used fire by file a lot. I realize that it's not what you're talking about, but it was surprising the great volume of firepower a company of men firing by file can produce. The violence mentioned in the above post reminded me of that. IIRC, didn't Hood's Texans win the battle of Gaine's Mill by the ability to fire and load on the move, which meant that they crossed the creekbed quickly and under the cover of their own fire?

[jacobite8749]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

Scott's, Hardee's, Casey's are all examples of French manuals being translated. France had gone on to experiment with more and more light infantry tactics, (up from Hardee's) and had developed Chassuer style skirmishing, which included fire and move. I had always given to understood, that both sides developed what they termed "an Indian Rush". Itself a variation of light French tactics.

[paulcalloway]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

Don Heitman claims to have a historical source for a firing tactic similar to this. Understand, while Don is a wonderful human being, he's not generally the guy I go to with authenticity questions.

Regardless, his tactic is basically done in the column formation - the men "front" while staying in their fours. The first man fires and moves to the back of the file, the other three men move up. The man who has just fired reloads while the second man fires. Second man moves to the rear, third man moves up... and so on.

It's probably been 6-7 years since I fell in with his outfit and participated in this drill. I've always meant to track him down and get the source. He absolutely insisted he had historical evidence to support this particular formation and method.

I wouldn't touch this without getting that source though.

[john duffer]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

I'm afraid I didn't express myself very clearly in my earlier post. I'm not talking about a skirmish or light infantry formation but a simple advance in two ranks in close order that is firing by rank as it moves forward. A simple halt - fire by rank - rear rank ready aim fire reload - forward march - halt - fire by rank - front rank ready aim fire - etc, etc. You advance steadily on the enemy while firing volleys at frequent intervals.

[markj]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

Don Heitman claims to have a historical source for a firing tactic similar to this. Understand, while Don is a wonderful human being, he's not generally the guy I go to with authenticity questions.

Regardless, his tactic is basically done in the column formation - the men "front" while staying in their fours. The first man fires and moves to the back of the file, the other three men move up. The man who has just fired reloads while the second man fires. Second man moves to the rear, third man moves up... and so on.

It's probably been 6-7 years since I fell in with his outfit and participated in this drill. I've always meant to track him down and get the source. He absolutely insisted he had historical evidence to support this particular formation and method.

I wouldn't touch this without getting that source though.

Greetings Paulus Pontifex Maximus,

You're referring to the concept of "Advance Firing," which was developed by BG August Willich for his brigade. Willich reportedly devised this "new and peculiar drill" when he was a "guest" of the Confederate government at Libby Prison during the spring of 1863. "Advance Firing" was indeed used at Liberty Gap TN and Chickamauga GA (June and September 1863, respectively) by (at least) the 49th Ohio and the 89th Illinois. What may be overlooked is that this maneuver was apparently so devastating that, in the case of the Liberty Gap engagement, only three ranks fired before the opposing Confederates broke and fled.

The problem is that, to my knowledge, no precise written description of "Advance Firing" has survived. Willich died in 1878, before he could write his memoirs, and to my knowledge, none of his subordinate commanders (e.g., Col. Frank Erdelmeyer, 32nd IVI) went into any detail about the maneuver either.

However, the method offered up by the modern 49th Ohio is probably as close to what was actually done as we'll ever get:

http://www.geocities.com/jeremiah49th/page17.html

In the meantime, here is something else for whatever it's worth:

Report of Col. Hiram Berdan,
First U.S. Sharpshooters, commanding Third Brigade, on the
Battle of Chancellorsville

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863.


Capt. HENRY R. DALTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAPTAIN.: I have the honor to report that my command was not engaged with the enemy during the recent movement until Saturday, May 2.
On Friday evening, May 1, my brigade was formed in two lines in front of the division, on the right of the brick house used by General Hooker as his headquarters. We remained there until about midnight, when we returned to our previous place of halting, on the road to the United States Ford, and bivouacked for the night.
At an early hour on Saturday morning, we were formed in two lines, with regimental front on the left of the road, in the woods, at the rear of the opening behind the brick house before mentioned. At about noon, I received orders to report with my command to General Birney for a reconnaissance. I received general instructions from General Birney, which were to skirmish through the woods, keeping in the direction of a smoke which was rising from the woods on the southeast of our position. I deployed my First Regiment in the woods, using the Second Regiment as a reserve, and ordered them to advance and drive the rebels from the woods. My skirmishers soon engaged the enemy's skirmishers, consisting of a portion of the Twenty-third Georgia, and drove them steadily from the woods, where they rallied at a large building, apparently used as a foundry. I then advanced my right and left, with flankers from the Second Regiment, and kept up so accurate and rapid a fire that the enemy dared not leave the cover of the building. I then ordered my men to cease firing, and called upon the rebels to surrender, upon which they came in, after throwing down their arms and showing a white rag. The support of their skirmishers, with those who were able to escape, fell back along the road and rallied in a lane, covering in their retreat a wagon train, which was visible moving down the read. After sending the prisoners to the rear, I caused my left to gradually advance, keeping the attention of the enemy by desultory firing while I rapidly pushed forward my right in the woods until I had outflanked them and opened fire. They then attempted to come out of the railroad cut, in which they had taken shelter, and to retreat to the rear, but on meeting our fire they returned again to their cover, and very soon threw down their arms and surrendered. The whole number of prisoners taken was 365, including 19 officers, among whom was the major of the regiment. Our loss was trifling. Four regiments of infantry were brought up to our support, and I established a line of pickets along the road as far as I thought it safe to do so. About sunset we were ordered to withdraw, which we did, bringing all of our men who had not been killed. The guns, which were Springfield muskets, we were compelled to destroy. The whole affair was very successful, and had we been promptly supported, I am confident we could have taken the battery and a portion of the enemy's train.
At night we bivouacked with our division, and on Sunday morning I was relieved from duty with General Birney, and reported to General Whipple. I posted my First Regiment in the woods on the right of the Plank road, deploying two divisions as skirmishers, and ordering them to advance, firing. They drove back a heavy line of the enemy's skirmishers with a rapid fire from their breech-loading rifles, and took of those who passed by them, behind trees, and of the portion of the enemy's line which extended farther to the right than my line, as nearly as I can judge from the reports of my officers, from 318 to 325 prisoners, besides killing a great many of the enemy. They advanced until they met the double lines of the enemy; when they retired, firing, to their supports. I held my Second Regiment as reserve, and afterward posted it farther to the right. Our loss here was considerable.
On Sunday afternoon, a detachment of about 120 men was posted near the building occupied as a hospital, under the command of Captain Wilson, and at the request of General Barnes, of the First Division, Fifth Corps, it drove the enemy from the woods and established a picket line for a portion of the Fifth Corps. He was afterward ordered by General Sickles to move to the left and establish the line in front of the Third Corps. which was done. He was relieved on Monday morning by my Second Regiment, and the remainder of my command was stationed behind slight works, thrown up by themselves, like the rest of the forces in the vicinity, one regiment relieving the other on picket, on which they lost several men, and were continually engaged in a scattering fire, and occasionally taking a prisoner.
On Monday morning, a detail was called for to go out and endeavor to silence the rebel sharpshooters, who had occasioned considerable loss in our lines by shooting over into them. I called for 10 volunteers, and went with them to the line of skirmishers, which I ordered to advance, firing, and we drove the advanced skirmishers to their rifle-pits, and held the ground gained, so that no more casualties occurred from the enemy's fire.
On Monday evening, the Eleventh New Jersey, which was acting as our support, was alarmed by firing on our right, and it opened fire upon my Second Regiment, which was deployed in its front, wounding 5 of my men. My regiment maintained its ground until the Eleventh New Jersey had retreated under fire of the rebel battery to its rifle-pits, and then retired in good order. After the firing had ceased, it returned and established its original line. At the request of General Sickles, we retired across the river with the remainder of the corps, and arrived in camp about 5 p.m.
I cannot close my report without mentioning that my command, with a few exceptions, both officers and men, behaved splendidly. The results achieved by it are sufficient evidence that it was not, remiss. 1 would make special mention of Major Stoughton, commanding my Second Regiment; Captains Nash, Baker, Wilson, and Marble, and Lieutenant Brewer, of my First Regiment. They all rendered valuable service, not only in encouraging the men to do their duty, but exhibited excellent judgment and great coolness and daring in handling their men.
Lieutenant Brewer, who has twice before been wounded, received his fatal shot, and was the only officer in my command who was killed. Captains Rowell and Chase, of the Second Regiment, as well as Lieutenant Norton, the adjutant of the regiment, also deserve great praise. Chaplain [Lorenzo] Barber, of the Second Regiment, took a rifle, and went in with the skirmishers with his usual bravery. My first surgeons, Drs. [George M.] Brennan and [A. C.] Williams, deserve special credit for the coolness displayed in going wherever the discharge of their duties, which often called them to the extreme front, demanded their presence. Dr. Williams, surgeon of my Second Regiment, was wounded by a ball passing through his arm, bet he did not leave his duties for a moment. I extremely regret the temporary loss of the services of Lieutenant [William H.] Horton, one of my aides, who was wounded on Monday morning.
I herewith inclose a detailed report of the killed, wounded, and missing, which, considering the circumstances, is comparatively small. The command, though somewhat fatigued, is in excellent condition and ready for service. The following is a recapitulation of the result of our action: The number of prisoners taken by the command, 683. The number of rounds of ammunition fired was at least 60 per man. We lost--killed, 11; wounded, 61; missing, 12.

I have the honor, captain, to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. BERDAN,
Colonel (U. S. Sharpshooters), Comdg. Third Brigade.

****************

Regards,

Mark Jaeger

[Greg Renault]

Re: Firing on the move: Infantry in line

The maneuver that Erik describes seems to be that of a typical two-rank line (albeit in a somewhat looser order), simultaneously advancing while engaging in independent fire. I imagine it would look and function like a skirmish line in relatively close order.

The Harper's article that Mark J. refers to ("First Time Under Fire"--the 12th CT at Lafourche, LA on October 27, 1862) describes a green regiment that fires by volley when ordered to fire by file, and which then spontaneously engages in independent fire while advancing.

The Advance Fire maneuver, however, is clearly an adaptation of close-order volley fire, done in four ranks, with each rank advancing before firing:

"The regiment formed in four ranks. The first rank delivered their fire, the fourth, third, and second in secesson took the front and delivered their fire...."

And, "...our fire, which was delivered with a regularity and rapidity that no veteran could withstand." further suggests volley fire.

Mark J notes: The problem is that, to my knowledge, no precise written description of "Advance Firing" has survived. Willich died in 1878, before he could write his memoirs, and to my knowledge, none of his subordinate commanders (e.g., Col. Frank Erdelmeyer, 32nd IVI) went into any detail about the maneuver either.

However, the method offered up by the modern 49th Ohio is probably as close to what was actually done as we'll ever get:

Here's my guess:

--The regiment was formed in four ranks using the existing command from Casey, probably something like "Regiment; in four ranks form companies".

--However, if alternate files do not move left (likely the even files), when the odd files oblique behind the man to their left, the regiment will be formed in four ranks, with a one-file space between each of the files. Frontage would not change from that of the two-rank line formation. The men of the rearmost rank would use this space to pass to the front of the formation for the next volley.

Because only one-fourth of each company is firing during each volley, the effect is similar to having the companies fire "by rank, by platoon", which more simply combines already-existing firing modes. The latter, however is a stationary mode of fire, while the Advance Fire combines the rolling volleys with a very slow advance (one rank's advance for each volley fired). As such, it strikes me as a cousin to the Street Firing maneuver we discussed earlier this year.